WARREN v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA (2026)

This appeal stems from the tragic death of three-year-old B. W. (the “Child”), who died while in the care of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia's (the “BOR”) medical personnel at the Augusta University Medical Center (the “AUMC”). The Child's parents, Bryce Warren (the “Father”) and April Bradshaw (the “Mother”) sued the BOR for wrongful death and emotional distress in their capacities as the surviving parents and legal guardians of the Child, and the Mother sued in her capacity as the administratrix of the Child's estate. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the parents, awarding a total of $37 million in damages. Post-trial, the trial court entered an order and judgment: (1) reducing the jury's damages award to a total of $2 million under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”); (2) granting the BOR's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) on the parents’ emotional distress claims; (3) finding that the parents were not entitled to fees and expenses under Georgia's offer of settlement statute, OCGA § 9-11-68; and (4) declining to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc to the date of the jury's verdict. The parents now appeal from these rulings.¹ We affirm the trial court's rulings granting the BOR's motion for JNOV and declining to enter its judgment nunc pro tunc to the date of the jury's verdict. However, we reverse the portion of the trial court's order reducing the damages award to $2 million and vacate the denial of the parents’ motion for fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a total judgment of $3 million in damages on the wrongful death and estate claims, and to reconsider the parents’ motion for OCGA § 9-11-68 fees.

The evidence shows that in May or June 2016, the Father felt a “mass or a ball” in the Child's stomach and took him to several physicians in their hometown of Moultrie. Thinking that the Child had some sort of “blockage,” the Child's parents took him to the AUMC on June 23, 2016, to “get it pumped out.”

To their shock, the Child's parents were told by BOR physicians that the Child had cancer — stage four Burkitt's lymphoma — and that he needed surgery to insert a port to receive chemotherapy. The operating surgeon assured the parents that the Child's cancer was “99 percent curable.” Post-surgery, the Child was moved to the pediatric intensive care unit.² Initially, the Child responded somewhat well to chemotherapy; in the first week after surgery, his tumor decreased 40 percent in size.

On July 4, 2016, without the parents’ knowledge, the Child's doctors started him on allopurinol, a medication that reduces uric acid levels, to manage his tumor lysis syndrome (a condition where the breakdown of a tumor can cause the accumulation of toxic byproducts in the body, that, in turn, can lead to inflammation and damage the kidneys). The day after the first dose, on July 5, the Child began exhibiting “skin sloughing,” meaning that the skin is peeling off. That same day, a wound nurse recommended a dermatology consult to address this issue. However, BOR physicians did not call for a dermatology consult until July 12 — one week later. In the meantime, the Child received seven additional doses of allopurinol, even though “the package insert for allopurinol recommends strongly that allopurinol be discontinued at the first sign of any abnormal skin findings.”

On July 12, a dermatologist diagnosed the Child with Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (“SJS”) and Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (“TEN”), a severe inflammatory condition that is typically caused by exposure to medication or an infection and results in irritation of the mucous membranes and sloughing of the skin, and discontinued the allopurinol. Later that day, the Child could not maintain an open airway, and his oxygen levels dropped. A medical resident intubated him, but then an “accidental extubation” occurred. A second accidental extubation occurred several hours later. The next morning, the Child lost his pulse, coded multiple times, and died.

An autopsy showed that the Child had bleeding in his lungs, abnormally sized liver and kidneys, a candida infection, and that 25 percent of his skin showed evidence of SJS/TEN. The death certificate listed Burkitt's lymphoma, hyperkalemia (high potassium), and sepsis as the causes of death, but did not include SJS/TEN.

The parents sued the BOR, among other parties, for the Child's wrongful death and their emotional distress. Specifically, the Father and Mother asserted a wrongful death claim in their capacities as the Child's surviving parents, the Mother asserted an estate claim in her capacity as the administratrix of the Child's estate, and the parents asserted emotional distress claims in their individual capacities for their emotional damages.

Prior to trial, the parents filed a brief claiming that under OCGA § 50-21-29(b)(1) of the GTCA, “the aggregate limitation of liability applicable to the BOR in this matter is $3,000,000.00.” They argued that, as defined in the GTCA, the estate was one “person” entitled to $1 million, the Father was one “person” entitled to $1 million, and the Mother was one “person” entitled to $1 million. In response, the BOR maintained that the GTCA was to be read in conjunction with Georgia's Wrongful Death Act, OCGA § 51-4-1 et seq., and when so construed, the damages on the parents’ claims was capped at $2 million (i.e., $1 million for the estate claim, and $1 million for the wrongful death claim, which, it contended, the Father and Mother held jointly). The trial court agreed with the BOR's reasoning, finding that the limit of liability was capped at $2 million.

By the time of trial in April 2024, the BOR was the only remaining defendant. Following an eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict on May 1 in favor of the parents, awarding a total of $37 million in damages: $10 million for the Child's pain and suffering, $22 million for the Child's wrongful death, and $5 million for the parents’ emotional distress. Post-trial, the BOR filed, in part, a motion to reduce the verdict to the GTCA caps, and moved for a JNOV on the parents’ emotional distress claims.

The parents opposed the BOR's motion to reduce the verdict and moved for an entry of judgment for the full $37 million verdict. To justify this figure, the parents argued that under the GTCA, fourteen “occurrences” caused the Child's wrongful death, such that they could receive $14 million (i.e., $1 million for each of the fourteen occurrences) per person.³ Additionally, they argued that the trial court should enter the judgment nunc pro tunc to the date of the verdict. The parents also moved to recover their fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68 based on the BOR's rejection of an offer of settlement for $1,750,000.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the BOR's motion to reduce the verdict, capping the judgment at $2 million ($1 million for the estate claim and $1 million for the wrongful death claim). In doing so, the court adhered to its earlier pre-trial ruling, finding that the Father and Mother jointly shared the right of recovery for the wrongful death claim. The trial court also rejected the parents’ “hindsight” argument that fourteen distinct “occurrences” supported separate recoveries under the GTCA. The trial court granted the BOR's motion for JNOV on the emotional distress claims, determining that “[t]he conduct giving rise to the claim[s] ․ sounds, at most, in negligence.” Because the trial court entered judgment for $2 million, it denied the parents’ motion for fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68, finding that they needed to obtain a judgment of at least $2,187,500 to trigger recovery under the statute. Lastly, the trial court declined to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc to the May 1, 2024 verdict date because “the claims in this case were not fully decided [at that time].” This appeal followed.

1. Georgia Tort Claims Act. The parents argue that the trial court erred in reducing the jury's verdict to $2 million pursuant to the GTCA's cap on damages. More specifically, they contend that the trial court erred: (1) in ruling that the Father and Mother are one combined person for purposes of recovery for the Child's wrongful death; and (2) in finding that the BOR's negligence constituted a single occurrence that caused the Child's wrongful death.

The Georgia Constitution provides:

The General Assembly may waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act, in which the General Assembly may provide by law for procedures for the making, handling, and disposition of actions or claims against the state and its departments, agencies, officers, and employees, upon such terms and subject to such conditions and limitations as the General Assembly may provide.

․

Except as specifically provided in this Paragraph, sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. 2, Par. IX (a), (e).

The General Assembly, in adopting the GTCA, recognized the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the General Assembly recognize[d] that, while private entrepreneurs voluntarily choose the ambit of their activity and can thereby exert some control over their exposure to liability, state government does not have the same flexibility. In acting for the public good and in responding to public need, state government must provide a broad range of services and perform a broad range of functions throughout the entire state, regardless of how much exposure to liability may be involved. The exposure of the state treasury to tort liability must therefore be limited. State government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done. Consequently, it [was] declared to be the public policy of this state that the state shall only be liable in tort actions within the limitations of [the GTCA] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established in [the GTCA].

OCGA § 50-21-21(a). One of these “limitations” is a cap on the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover. To that end, OCGA § 50-21-29(b)(1) provides that “in any action or claim for damages brought under the provisions of this article, no person shall recover a sum exceeding $1 million because of loss arising from a single occurrence, ․ and the state's aggregate liability per occurrence shall not exceed $3 million.” This appeal concerns the parameters of “person” and “occurrence” as provided for by the GTCA, which we address in turn.

(a) “Person.” The GTCA defines a “person” as a “natural person, corporation, firm, partnership, association, or other such entity.” OCGA § 50-21-22(4). The parties reiterate their arguments below, with the parents claiming that the trial court erred in construing them as one combined “person” as it relates to the recovery of damages on the wrongful death claim, and the BOR contending that, under the Wrongful Death Act, the parents stand “in the same shoes” as the Child, and thus they can only recover those damages that the Child himself could have recovered had he been able to assert the claim himself.4

The resolution of this issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. When parsing statutory language, we

presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. And toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, consider the text contextually, read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would, and seek to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. A statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes in pari materia, are construed together, and harmonized whenever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.

Vaughn v. Windfield Homeowners Ass'n, 375 Ga. App. 18, 20–21, 913 S.E.2d 74 (2025) (citation modified).

The Wrongful Death Act generally allows a parent to recover for the death of a child. See OCGA § 51-4-4 (providing that the right to recover for the homicide of a child shall be as provided, in relevant part, in OCGA § 19-7-1). OCGA § 19-7-1, in turn, provides that “[i]f the deceased child does not leave a spouse or child, the right of recovery shall be in the parent or parents, ․ [i]f the parents are living together and not divorced, the right shall be in the parents jointly.” OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(A).

We considered OCGA § 19-7-1 in Roberts v. Aderhold, 273 Ga. App. 642, 615 S.E.2d 761 (2005). There, a mother and father brought a wrongful death action against a physician, based on alleged negligence that resulted in the birth of a stillborn child. Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the parents but awarded them no damages due to the mother's contributory negligence. Id. at 643, 615 S.E.2d 761. The trial court granted the father's motion for new trial on the issue of damages only, and we affirmed. Id. at 646–47, 615 S.E.2d 761(1), (2). In so holding, we noted that “[u]nder Georgia law, the cause of action for the death of a child belongs to both parents jointly,” and thus that the mother's contributory negligence did not defeat the father's right of recovery. Id. at 644–45, 615 S.E.2d 761(1). It stands to reason, then, that for the purposes of a wrongful death recovery, a child's parents are not considered as one combined person. If that were the case, then the mother's contributory negligence in Roberts would have barred the father's right of recovery. Under OCGA § 19-7-1(c)(2)(A), it is the right of recovery that is jointly vested in the parents, it is not that the parents are conjoined. See Roberts, 375 Ga. App. 18, 20–21, 913 S.E.2d 74 (2025) (explaining that the father in the case may sue the doctor “for one-half the full value of his deceased child's life”).

Returning to the GTCA, OCGA § 50-21-29(b)(1) provides by its plain language that a “person” may recover a maximum of $1 million in damages because of loss arising from a single occurrence, and thus, we conclude that if more than one person has the right to recover, then each person may recover up to $1 million under the statute, subject to the limitation that the state's aggregate liability per occurrence shall not exceed $3 million. See Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 320(1), 486 S.E.2d 851 (1997) (holding that “two distinct legal ‘persons’ ” could recover damages under GTCA in wrongful death action). Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in treating the Father and Mother as one joint “person” under the GTCA and limiting their recovery for the Child's wrongful death to $1 million. As a result, we reverse the trial court's $1 million judgment on the parents’ wrongful death claim and instruct the trial court to enter judgment awarding the Father and Mother $1 million each in damages per the GTCA's limit of liability. Because the BOR does not dispute the $1 million damages award to the Child's estate, we instruct the trial court to enter a total judgment of $3 million in damages against the BOR.

(b) “Occurrence.” Under the GTCA, “occurrence” means “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” OCGA § 50-21-22(3.1). In a theory of recovery raised after the jury's verdict, the parents argued below, and now on appeal, that fourteen occurrences caused the Child's pain and suffering and eventual death,5 and thus, that the Father, Mother, and the Child's estate could each recover $1 million for each occurrence — $14 million to the Father and $14 million to the Mother for the Child's wrongful death, and $14 million to the estate for the Child's pain and suffering. The BOR contends that the parents’ multiple occurrence theory was untimely raised and that there was only a single occurrence that resulted in the Child's death. We agree with the BOR that the parents’ multiple occurrence theory was not timely raised, and consequently that the total amount of damages that could be assessed is confined to the terms of the pre-trial order.

As referenced above, in a pre-trial brief regarding the BOR's limit of liability, the parents argued that the BOR's “aggregate” limitation of liability under OCGA § 50-21-29 was $3 million. Notably, the parents emphasized the definition of both “person” and “loss” under the GTCA in their brief, but not of “occurrence.” Later, in the “amended consolidated pre-trial order,” the parents agreed that the “BOR is required to compensate [p]laintiffs up to $3 million pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-29.”

Our Supreme Court's decision in Phillips, supra, guides our ruling on this point. In that case, the plaintiff sued a state entity for the wrongful death of her family member in her capacity as the family member's personal representative and in her capacity as the estate administratrix. Phillips, 268 Ga. at 317, 486 S.E.2d 851. In the pre-trial order, the plaintiff agreed that “under the [GTCA], OCGA § 50-21-29, the maximum amount of damages is $1,000,000.00[.]” Id. at 317, 486 S.E.2d 851(1). The jury returned a total verdict of $3.5 million, and the plaintiff asked the trial court nine days after the jury's verdict to enter judgment in that amount instead. Id. at 318–19, 486 S.E.2d 851(1). The trial court awarded the full $3.5 million, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the total maximum amount of damages that could be assessed against the state agency was limited by the pretrial order. Id. at 320, 486 S.E.2d 851(1). In reaching its holding, the Court explained that “[t]he pretrial order has been likened to ‘a rudder to the ship of litigation,’ ” and accordingly, “it generally is recognized that, unless the pretrial order is modified at or before trial, a party may not advance theories or offer evidence that violate the terms of the pretrial order.” Id. at 318, 486 S.E.2d 851(1). See also Long v. Marion, 257 Ga. 431, 433(2), 360 S.E.2d 255 (1987) (“If a claim or issue is omitted from the order, it is waived.” (punctuation omitted)).

Here, the parents’ pre-trial brief and the pre-trial order both contain similar limiting language concerning the BOR's liability as found in Phillips. The parents asserted in their pre-trial brief that the BOR's “aggregate” limitation of liability under OCGA § 50-21-29 was $3 million and subsequently stipulated in the pre-trial order that the “BOR is required to compensate [p]laintiffs up to $3 million pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-29.” (emphasis added). Compare with Phillips, 268 Ga. at 317, 486 S.E.2d 851(1) n.3 (noting that pre-trial order provided that “under the [GTCA], OCGA § 50-21-29, the maximum amount of damages is $1,000,000.00,” and that plaintiff's trial memorandum stated that the GTCA's damages cap applied to plaintiff's claim, “consistent with the statement in the pretrial order”). Moreover, the parents’ post-trial motions for entry of judgment on the jury's $37 million verdict and on the applicability of their fourteen “occurrences” theory were filed on December 30, 2024 — almost eight months after the jury rendered its verdict on May 1, 2024. Given these circumstances, we decline to permit the parents to modify their theory of recovery to obtain a damages award not contemplated by the pre-trial order.⁶ See Phillips, 268 Ga. at 319–20, 486 S.E.2d 851(1) (reversing portion of judgment awarding damages in excess of the amount specified in the pre-trial order).

2. Emotional Distress Claims. The parents claim that the trial court erred in granting the BOR's motion for JNOV on their intentional infliction of emotional distress claims (“IIED”).⁷ Specifically, they contend that the BOR's refusal to provide them information about why the Child died and its “false[ ] [omission of] SJS/TEN as the cause of death” amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to sustain a finding of IIED. The BOR argues that sovereign immunity barred the emotional distress claims because the parents did not give a sufficient ante litem notice of those claims, and that the evidence at trial failed to support the claims.

Although the trial court did not rule on the BOR's insufficient ante litem notice argument, we address it first given that “[t]he applicability of sovereign immunity to claims brought against the State is a jurisdictional issue.” McConnell v. Dep't of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18–19, 805 S.E.2d 79 (2017) (holding that appellate courts cannot decide merits of certain claims without first considering whether sovereign immunity doctrine barred the claims (footnote omitted)).

The [GTCA] provides a limited waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, and that waiver is effective only if all of the requirements in the [GTCA] are met. Under the [GTCA], a tort claimant who plans to file a lawsuit against the State must provide an ante litem notice within a certain time frame, in a certain manner, and including certain information. If the required notice of a claim is not given, the courts do not have jurisdiction over the claim. The ante litem requirements ensure that the State receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit, and a claimant must strictly comply with the notice requirements. Strict compliance is exactly what it sounds like: strict. Thus, if the ante-litem notice requirements are not met, then the State does not waive sovereign immunity, and the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.

Mazza v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 380 Ga. App. 344, 345, 932 S.E.2d 705 (2026) (citation modified). In this case, we are concerned with the notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(5), which provides in part that “[a] notice of claim under this Code section shall state, to the extent of the claimant's knowledge and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances, ․ (D) [t]he nature of the loss suffered[.]”

Under the GTCA, “loss” is defined as personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence.

OCGA § 50-21-22(3). Here, the parents identified their losses in their ante litem notice as follows: “As the parents (next of kin) of [the Child], a minor, and as the anticipated administrators of the Estate of [the Child], [the Father and Mother] are entitled to all wrongful death damages and survival damages, including the full value of [the Child's] life (economic and intangible), medical expenses, funeral expenses, and pre-death pain and suffering.” Notably, our Supreme Court has held that the GTCA's ante litem notice provision requires a claimant to list only the type of loss sustained, and not a detailed description of his or her injuries. See Roberts v. Unison Behavioral Health, 312 Ga. 438, 445(2)(c), 451(4), 863 S.E.2d 99 (2021). However, the parents’ ante litem notice, which excludes any mention of the parents’ “mental anguish,” see OCGA § 50-21-22(3), or of their emotional distress, does not meet the Roberts sufficiency standard as it concerns their IIED claims.

The parents maintain in their reply brief that mention in their ante litem notice of their “concerns” and their “extremely difficult” experience provided sufficient notice for the BOR to know that the type of loss they suffered included emotional distress. We disagree. At most, these are “general phrase[s]” which “could ostensibly apply to any of the losses listed in OCGA § 50-21-22(3).” Bush v. Eichholz, 352 Ga. App. 465, 470(1)(a), 833 S.E.2d 280 (2019). See also Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Myers, 295 Ga. 843, 845– 46, 764 S.E.2d 543 (2014) (explaining that while strict compliance with ante litem notice provisions does not require a “hyper-technical construction,” strict compliance is nevertheless “necessary, and substantial compliance is insufficient” (punctuation omitted)). Thus, we conclude that the parents’ ante litem notice did not sufficiently state the nature of loss they allegedly suffered as it concerned their emotional distress.⁸ See Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Baldwin, 292 Ga. App. 816, 824–25(9), 665 S.E.2d 898 (2008) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful death claim for the loss of his unborn child where ante litem notice did not mention that type of loss). Given our holding, we do not reach the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to support an award of damages on the parents’ emotional distress claims.

3. Offer of Settlement Statute. The parents contend that if we reverse on any of their GTCA damages cap or emotional distress claims of error, then they would be entitled to fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68, commonly called the “offer of settlement” statute. Ga. Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 470(1)(b) (759 S.E.2d 804) (2014).

The purpose of OCGA § 9-11-68 is to encourage tort litigants “to make and accept good faith settlement proposals to avoid unnecessary litigation and advance the state's strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements.” Kane Clinic v. Keitt, 374 Ga. App. 230, 233, 912 S.E.2d 97 (2025) (punctuation omitted). The statute states in part:

If a plaintiff makes an offer of settlement which is rejected by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such offer of settlement, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff's behalf from the date of the rejection of the offer of settlement through the entry of judgment.

OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(2). Here, the parents sent the BOR a pre-trial offer of settlement under OCGA § 9-11-68 for $1,750,000. Thus, in order to trigger the recovery of fees and expenses under the statute, the parents would have to obtain a final judgment of more than $2,187,500 (equaling 125 percent of the parents’ $1,750,000 offer of settlement).

Post-trial, the parents moved for fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-11-68, but the trial court found that the statute was inapplicable given its conclusion that the parents could not recover a judgment in excess of $2 million. But in light of our holding in Division 1(a) finding that the parents are entitled to a total judgment of $3 million under the GTCA damages cap, we vacate the denial of the parents’ motion for fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68 and remand the case for reconsideration of that motion. See Kane Clinic, 374 Ga. App. at 233, 912 S.E.2d 97 (noting that “[o]nce a prevailing party establishes that OCGA § 9-11-68 applies, the trial court shall order the payment of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,” but since the statute “is in derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed against the award of attorney fees and costs and not extended beyond its plain and explicit terms” (citation modified)).

4. Nunc Pro Tunc. Lastly, the parents contend that the trial court erred by not entering judgment on the jury's verdict nunc pro tunc to the date the verdict was rendered. The parents maintain that by doing so, the trial court deprived them of 11 months of post-judgment interest.⁹ We discern no error.

A trial court is authorized to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to the date that a jury verdict is rendered. See Taylor v. Devereux Found., Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 95(IX), 885 S.E.2d 671 (2023) (“A trial court may enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to perfect the record and properly reflect when an order or judgment should have been entered.” (punctuation omitted)). See also OCGA § 15-1-3(6) (providing that every court has the power to “amend and control its processes and orders, so as to make them conformable to law and justice”).

OCGA § 7-4-12(c) provides that “[t]he postjudgment interest provided for in this Code section shall apply automatically to all judgments in this state and the interest shall be collectable as a part of each judgment whether or not the judgment specifically reflects the entitlement to postjudgment interest.” As our Supreme Court has explained, OCGA § 7-4-12 “presupposes the rendition of a judgment for a sum certain, or for an amount mathematically determinable without reliance upon additional evidence.” Taylor, 316 Ga. at 96, 885 S.E.2d 671 (IX) (punctuation omitted).

Here, given that the trial court needed to resolve post-trial, at minimum, the amount of damages that the BOR would be liable to pay the parents under the GTCA damages cap, the judgment was hardly for “a sum certain.” Taylor, 316 Ga. at 96, 885 S.E.2d 671 (IX). Accordingly, “[w]e cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exercise its nunc pro tunc authority in this case.” McGovern v. Rowland, ––– Ga. App. ––––(2) n.6 (932 S.E.2d 762, 766) (2026) (holding that trial court was not required to enter judgment on jury's verdict for plaintiff nunc pro tunc to verdict date, disapproving City of Milton v. Chang, 373 Ga. App. 667, 906 S.E.2d 784 (2024)).

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and case remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Oral argument was held on April 28, 2026, and is archived on the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia's website. See Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, Oral Argument, Case No. A26A0885 (Apr. 28, 2026), available at https://vimeo.com/1188466743?fl=tl&fe=ec.

2.   In addition to Burkitt's lymphoma, the Child had or developed other significant health issues including tumor lysis syndrome, a urine infection, sepsis (blood infection), skin lesions, leaky blood vessels in the abdomen, and pleural effusions (collection of fluid around the lungs that keep the lungs from fully inflating).

3.   The parents also argued that five “occurrences” caused each of them to suffer emotional distress and thus that they were each entitled to $5 million in damages for these claims.

4.   The BOR does not dispute the $1 million damages award to the Child's estate.

5.   According to the parents, these “occurrences” consist of the two “botched” intubations (two occurrences), each decision by the BOR's attending physicians during the Child's hospital stay not to obtain a dermatology consult (four occurrences), each decision not to discontinue allopurinol (seven occurrences), and the failure to train and supervise a resident doctor (one occurrence).

6.   Alternatively, given that the parents participated in the preparation of the pre-trial order and consented to its entry, we find that the parents have waived the applicability of their fourteen occurrences theory for the purposes of this appeal. See Phillips, 302 Ga. 18, 18–19, 805 S.E.2d 79 (2017). Accordingly, while the parents urge us to “look to insurance law” in support of their multiple occurrence theory given the purported similarities between the definition of “occurrence” in the GTCA and “many motor-vehicle insurance policies,” we decline to reach that argument today. See id. (in light of the plaintiff's concessions in the pre-trial order, Court would not address the issue plaintiff raised on appeal).

7.   While the trial court's order states that the parents pursued claims for IIED, and both parties briefed this issue, we note that the parents’ claims for emotional distress were styled “negligent” infliction of emotional distress in their complaint.

8.   In light of our ruling, we do not reach the BOR's argument that the parents’ ante litem notice also failed to sufficiently identify “[t]he acts or omissions which caused the loss” as required by OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(5)(F).

9.   As discussed in Division 1(b), supra, the jury's verdict was rendered on May 1, 2024, and the trial court's judgment on the verdict was entered on April 2, 2025.

Padgett, Judge.

McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.