AMAYA BONILLA v. STATE (2026)

In 2025, a jury found Santos Edgardo Amaya-Bonilla guilty of three counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sodomy, and two counts of aggravated assault involving his girlfriend, M. R.¹ Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Amaya-Bonilla appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence that M. R. used a false name when she applied for a job. Amaya-Bonilla contends that the evidence against him was not overwhelming, in part because of M. R.’s inconsistent recounting of the crimes and in part because of a lack of physical and DNA evidence. As a result, he contends, the erroneously excluded false-name evidence was highly relevant and affected the verdict because, if admitted, it would have cast doubt on the credibility of M. R.’s testimony. He further contends that the false-name evidence would have helped support his theory of the case, which is that M. R., who is from El Salvador, made up the crimes in order to strengthen her pending application for a visa. In particular, Amaya-Bonilla points out that he was first tried for the crimes against M. R. in 2023, when the false-name evidence at issue here was admitted through M. R.’s testimony—and that the jury was unable to reach a verdict, resulting in a mistrial. We reverse.

“On appeal, we review the trial court's grant of a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 302 Ga. 837, 838, 809 S.E.2d 720 (2018). In the context of a motion in limine, “this Court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment[.] ․ The trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” Weintraub v. State, 352 Ga. App. 880, 836 S.E.2d 162 (2019). “[E]ven where an abuse of discretion is shown, there are no grounds for reversal if the error did not affect a substantial right, and thus harm, the defendant.” Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 393(2), 830 S.E.2d 110 (2019). See OCGA § 24-1-103(a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). “A nonconstitutional error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Betterson v. State, 362 Ga. App. 257, 258(1), 867 S.E.2d 863 (2022).

The relevant facts show that Amaya-Bonilla and M. R. moved into a house together in February of 2020, then soon after, on March 15, 2020, moved to a two-bedroom apartment with two roommates. M. R. had recently lost her job, and Amaya-Bonilla helped her get a new job at a grocery store-taqueria where she worked in the kitchen. Pertinent to Amaya-Bonilla's contention of error, the excluded evidence would have shown that she did not work under her own name; rather, she worked under the name of Amaya-Bonilla's daughter.

Although Amaya-Bonilla treated M. R. well at first, she testified that after they moved in together, he began mistreating her. In March 2020, Amaya-Bonilla saw her talking with a male co-worker at the taqueria while making coffee. He told her, “You'll pay later.” When Amaya-Bonilla picked her up from work that night, he produced a handgun, threatened her in the car, saying he would kill her, and, after they got back to their apartment, forced her to engage in oral sex at gunpoint and accused her of “selling” herself to his friends. That day, and over the next several days, he hit her, put a gun to her head, and threatened to kill her. He forced her, multiple times, to engage in oral sex against her will at gunpoint, and raped her anally and vaginally multiple times. He also hit her in the head with a gun when they were in his car. M. R. did not call the police, however, because she was scared. In addition to being frightened by the violence, M. R. testified, she was also frightened because Amaya-Bonilla had told her he was one of the founders of a Salvadoran gang, and that if she told police, he would have the gang kill her family in El Salvador.

After raping her a final time, on March 29, Amaya-Bonilla took M. R. to work, where a co-worker noticed that M. R. looked frightened and unstable. M. R. told the co-worker that Amaya-Bonilla had raped her and had a gun. The store manager called the police, who interviewed her on site. During the interview, she told police that Amaya-Bonilla had verbally and physically abused her, and raped and sexually assaulted her. The officer reported that M. R. had no markings or bruises, and referred the matter to the Special Victims Unit (“SVU”).

During the SVU interview, M. R. described several occasions when Amaya-Bonilla had held a gun to her head and slapped her during intercourse and threatened to kill her if she left him. M. R. also said that he had forced her to have oral sex. and anal sex until she bled.

M. R. did not go to the hospital until March 31, 2020, two days after the final sexual assault. M. R. told hospital personnel about the physical and sexual assaults: that Amaya-Bonilla had hit her in the head, mouth, chest, and left side; that he punched her; and that he vaginally and orally sexually assaulted her on March 28, 2020. She also reported that he sexually assaulted her vaginally and orally on March 24. The medical records do not reflect that she reported to hospital workers about the rape that she testified had occurred on March 29. The hospital did not attempt to collect DNA evidence.

In mid-May 2020, approximately six weeks after the sexual and physical assaults, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”) examined M. R., but did not collect DNA evidence and observed no visible, physical trauma.

Further, although this Court does not judge the credibility of witnesses,² as Amaya-Bonilla points out, there were inconsistencies and gaps in M. R.’s recounting of the crimes, which are relevant to an assessment of whether the evidence against him was overwhelming. For example, he argues that although M. R. testified at trial that Amaya-Bonilla first raped her in February 2020, she did not report this incident to police or to the SANE. Rather, she told police that the first time Amaya-Bonilla abused her was in mid-March, but she reported only the late-March sexual assaults to the SANE. At trial, Amaya-Bonilla presented evidence that although M. R. was treated for a urinary tract infection and painful intercourse at a medical facility in mid-March, she did not complain of physical or sexual abuse, and the examination report makes no mention of bruises, cuts, or scratches. He also presented evidence that although M. R. testified at trial that Amaya-Bonilla struck her with a gun, she did not mention this when she was examined at the hospital, and did not mention this in her interview with the SANE. He additionally cites to evidence that M. R. did not report bleeding when she was examined at the hospital two days after the final assault, but, some six weeks later, reported to the SANE that she experienced bleeding that lasted for a week after the final assault.

Amaya-Bonilla contends that this evidence against him was not overwhelming because there was no physical or DNA evidence, and the only evidence came from M. R. or law enforcement and medical professionals to whom she had spoken. As a result, he argues, M. R.’s credibility was crucial. The false-name evidence, he asserts, would have cast doubt on her credibility, making it highly probable that its exclusion contributed to the verdict against him, particularly in light of the mistrial from his previous trial, where the false-name evidence was admitted. We agree.

Amaya-Bonilla cites OCGA §§ 24-4-401 and 24-6-620 to argue that M. R.’s use of a false name “for a benefit related to immigration status” is a fact of consequence in the determination of the case. As he points out, witness credibility, which is determined by the trier of fact, OCGA § 24-6-620, was at issue in his case, and relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. See generally Lewis v. State, 323 Ga. 339, 343(2) n. 9, 924 S.E.2d 295 (2025) (recognizing the admissibility of credibility evidence that makes facts of consequence more or less probable). Accord Parker v. Warden, 546 Fed.Appx. 859, 862 (11th Cir. 2013).³ Pertinently, as OCGA § 24-4-402 provides, “[a]ll relevant evidence shall be admissible, except as ․ otherwise provided by law[.]”

Amaya-Bonilla argues that M. R.’s using a false name for employment was admissible under OCGA § 24-6-608,⁴ which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, subject to the following limitations:

(1) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and

(2) Evidence of truthful character shall be admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's character for truthfulness, other than a conviction of a crime as provided in Code Section 24-6-609, or conduct indicative of the witness's bias toward a party may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Such instances may however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness:

(1) Concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.]

Amaya-Bonilla specifically argues that the false-name evidence is admissible under OCGA § 24-6-608(b), citing Lewis, 323 Ga. at 339, 924 S.E.2d 295. In Lewis, in which defendant Georgia Michael Lewis was charged with malice murder and other crimes, id., Lewis argued that the admission of his underlying conduct related to a discharged, unrelated First Offender plea to employment insurance fraud was error. Id. at 342(2), 924 S.E.2d 295. On cross examination, Lewis was asked whether he had “made false representations to the Department of Labor” in this context, and he responded that he had. Id. at 342-43(2), 924 S.E.2d 295. Our Supreme Court determined that this was admissible evidence under OCGA § 24-6-608(b) because “false representations to the Department of Labor in order to receive more unemployment insurance money than what he was entitled to ․ is the type of fraudulent conduct that pertains to his character for untruthfulness.” Id. at 343(2), 924 S.E.2d 295. See id. at 340, 344(2), 924 S.E.2d 295 (noting that Lewis’ character for truthfulness was at issue because of conflicting eyewitness testimony, the credibility of which he had challenged). In support of its determination, the Lewis Court cited to Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1464 (IV)(B) (11th Cir. 1994), which recognizes the admissibility of evidence of “[a]cts probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b)[, which] include such acts as forgery, perjury, and fraud.” (emphasis added).

Amaya-Bonilla argues that M. R.’s willingness to engage in false-name fraud to benefit her immigration status in order to secure employment using the name of a person who was legally authorized to work in the United States is relevant to his defense. His defense is that she was willing to lie about the sexual and physical assaults to benefit her application for a U visa. An immigration attorney and law professor, who was qualified as an expert witness without objection at trial, testified, that a U visa is offered to applicants who, among other things, show they have been victims of a qualifying crime, suffered physical or emotional harm from the crime, and were helpful to law enforcement in investigating or prosecuting certain crimes. The expert testified that rape, domestic violence, and felonious assault are among the qualifying crimes for a U visa; other related crimes may also qualify. We find that the evidence was relevant in this context because, given the lack of any other witnesses,⁵ the lack of physical evidence of harm, and the lack of DNA evidence, M. R.’s “credibility was a significant issue at trial[.]” Lewis, 323 Ga. at 344(2), 924 S.E.2d 295.

The State asserts that this evidence should not have been admitted because it was prejudicial. See OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). In the trial court, the State argued the false-name evidence was not relevant because it had nothing to do with the charges, and because it was a way of “backdooring” the fact that M. R. was “undocumented.” At trial however, M. R. testified that she entered the United States in 2019 without documents, but that immigration nonetheless allowed her in; that she was supposed to stay in touch with immigration and did so; that she had been working with an attorney to obtain a U visa; and that she presently had a work permit. The State makes no further argument whatsoever on appeal that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or waste of time. See generally Muniz v. State, 375 Ga. App. 140, 141–42(1)(b), 914 S.E.2d 358 (2025) (finding that appellate courts will “not speculate or make arguments on [a litigant's] behalf; to do so would improperly change this Court's role from disinterested decision-maker to appellate advocate.”) (punctuation omitted). Given the unobjected-to testimony regarding M. R.’s immigration status elicited at trial, we do not find the evidence that she used a false name to gain employment was so prejudicial as to outweigh its probative value. See OCGA § 24-4-403.

Further, given that Amaya-Bonilla's prior trial ended in a mistrial when this evidence was admitted, and that the evidence against Amaya-Bonilla was not overwhelming, as outlined above, it is highly probable that the error contributed to the verdict; as a result, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, and its error was not harmless. See Betterson, 362 Ga. App. at. 258-59(1), 867 S.E.2d 863. See generally Hilliard v. State, 226 Ga. App. 478, 482(1), 487 S.E.2d 81 (1997) (finding, where evidence of defendant's guilt was not overwhelming and depended heavily on the credibility of witnesses, and where no other testimony was presented regarding the victim's credibility, that admission of witness testimony that victim had been molested was “not superfluous[,]” making it highly probable that this witness testimony contributed to the verdict). For the foregoing reasons, we find that Amaya-Bonilla is entitled to a new trial.

Judgment reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court granted directed verdicts of acquittal on counts of terroristic threats and aggravated assault.

2.   See McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 425(1), 768 S.E.2d 751 (2015) (finding that, to the extent that there was inconsistent testimony at trial, “[r]esolving evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies and assessing witness credibility are the province of the fact finder, not the appellate court”).

3.   State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 555-56(2), 820 S.E.2d 1 (2018) (noting that, when interpreting Georgia's new Evidence Code, which became effective in 2013, courts may consider the decisions of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals).

4.   “Because [OCGA § 24-6-608] is materially similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 608, we look to federal case law in applying Rule 608.” Lewis v. State, 323 Ga. 339, 343(2) n. 9, 924 S.E.2d 295 (2025), citing Almanza, 304 Ga. at 556(2), 820 S.E.2d 1.

5.   M. R. testified that her roommates were at home when the assaults took place, but were in their room. The roommates were not interviewed by police and did not testify at trial.

Hodges, Judge.

Barnes, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.