HASLEM v. STATE (2026)

On appeal from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery and child molestation, Daron Haslem argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a recidivist because his prior conviction was handed down by a military court, which did not categorize his crime as one against a child. We find no error and affirm.

As the parties agree, “a sentencing court has jurisdiction to vacate a void sentence at any time.” von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 571 (2), 748 S.E.2d 446 (2013) (emphasis omitted).

A trial court has no jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the term of court ends or 60 days pass. Where a sentence is void, however, the court may resentence the defendant at any time. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow․ A direct appeal lies from the denial of a petition attacking a sentence based upon the contention that it is void.

Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 232 (1), 807 S.E.2d 10 (2017) (citation modified).

As relevant to the single issue on appeal, the record shows that Haslem was arrested in 2022 on charges that he sexually assaulted and molested his stepdaughter. The State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of other transactions under OCGA §§ 24-4-413 and 24-4-414 and also indicated that it would seek recidivist punishment under OCGA §§ 16-6-4 (b) and 17-10-7.

At trial, the State presented evidence from Haslem's 2004 court martial for molesting an older stepdaughter in 2001-2002 as well as other incidents from 2018 and 2021. After Haslem was found guilty on one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of child molestation, the State presented the trial court with the previously admitted 2004 court martial judgment pursuant to a guilty plea as well as his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in 2019. The trial court then sentenced Haslem as a recidivist to consecutive life sentences and later denied his motion for new trial. This appeal followed.

Haslem's sole argument on appeal is that his sentence is void because the 2004 court martial judgment against him did not amount to a first conviction for child molestation for purposes of OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1), which provides that after a first such conviction, a recidivist defendant “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years nor more than 30 years or by imprisonment for life.” Specifically, Haslem asserts that the elements of the crime of child molestation are not “identical” to those constituting the crime of “indecent acts” on the earlier victim of which he was found guilty.

As this Court has held, the child molestation statute “requires enhanced punishment for an individual who has been convicted of out-of-state offenses that would be the equivalent of child molestation in the State of Georgia[.]” Moffitt v. State, 359 Ga. App. 261, 264, 857 S.E.2d 264 (2021) (emphasis supplied). The question, then, is whether the 2004 court martial conviction was the “equivalent” of a Georgia child molestation conviction for sentencing purposes.

The version of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) applicable at the time of the 2004 court martial, to which Haslem pled guilty, provided as follows:

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice and good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.

10 U. S. C. § 934 (emphasis supplied). As Haslem concedes, Article 134 “incorporates common law crimes,” defined as “crimes and offenses not capital.” Id. The 2004 court-martial charge sheet at issue here, which Haslem concedes is the “legal equivalent” of an indictment, charged him with touching “a female under 16 years of age, not [his] wife, by rubbing her vagina and breasts, and making her touch his penis, with intent to gratify [his] sexual desires[.]” (Emphasis added.) By contrast, the portion of the record cited by Haslem contains merely a summary or “gist” of this same charge as “indecent acts,” but also indicates that he pled guilty to the specific charge fully quoted above and that the court martial accepted that plea.

Although the State suggests that the UCMJ did not criminalize the sexual abuse of children until 2011, the Manual for Courts Martial has long defined “[i]ndecent acts with a child under the age of 16 years” as “taking any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with, or the commission of any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body of, any child of either sex under the age of 16 years with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires, either of the person committing the act, or of the child, or of both.” Former para. 213d (3), quoted in United States v. Brown, 13 C. M. R. 10, 11-12 (C. M. A. 1953) (citing the 1951 Manual).¹ In 1969 and 1984, the Manual was updated, but both of these versions continued to criminalize “indecent acts or liberties with a child,” with the changes concerning the two scenarios of “physical contact” and “no contact.” See United States v. Tabor, 82 M. J. 637, 646 (II) (2) (b), (c) (Marine Corps Ct. Crim. App., 2022). The current Appendix to the Manual identifies the elements of “indecent acts or liberties with a child” as consisting of that “the accused committed a certain act upon or with the body of a certain person;” “the person was under 16 years of age and not the spouse of the accused;” “the act of the accused was indecent;” and “the accused committed the act with intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust ․ or sexual desires of the accused, the victim, or both[.]”² (Emphasis supplied.)

The 2004 court martial accusation thus laid out a charge that would amount to child molestation under Georgia law, which encompasses acts both on the body of a child (as here) and in the presence of that child. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (defining child molestation as the commission of “an immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person”). Haslem pled guilty to this specific charge, the court martial accepted his plea, and the trial court had previously admitted the record of that plea. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that this 2004 judgment should result in a mandatory life sentence in the case-in-chief, and the trial court imposed this sentence.

Construed in favor of the trial court's judgment, the record and military law outlined above authorized the conclusion that Haslem was previously found guilty of the “equivalent” of child molestation under Georgia law. The trial court did not err when it used that judgment as a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing in the case-in-chief. See Moffitt, 359 Ga. App. at 264, 857 S.E.2d 264.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See also United States v. Knowles, 35 C. M. R. 376, 377 (1) (C.M.A., 1965); United States v. Neblock, 40 M. J. 747, 749 (II) (A. F. C. M. R., 1994) (“Manuals for courts-martial ․ have recognized ‘indecent acts with a child under the age of 16 years’ as an offense for more than 40 years”), reversed on other grounds, 45 M. J. 191 (U. S. C. A. A. F., 1996).

2.   Manual of Courts Martial United States, Appendices, Appendix 20, Punitive Articles Applicable to Sexual Offenses Committed Prior to 1 October 2007.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

Markle and Hodges, JJ., concur.