MCCASKEY v. SIMMONS (2026)

Andrenica McCaskey—individually and as the mother of her minor daughter, A. M.—sued Doctors Lorenza Simmons, Alan Neuman, Janet Davis, and their respective medical practices.¹ In doing so, McCaskey alleged that the Defendants breached the standard of medical care in managing her high-risk pregnancy and caused her daughter to suffer a significant injury at birth. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. McCaskey now appeals the verdict and the denial of her motion for new trial, arguing the trial court erred by (1) failing to adequately instruct the jury on a physician's duty of care; (2) failing to instruct the jury on the definition of fault as it relates to apportionment; (3) improperly instructing the jury that it was prohibited from finding liability based solely on hindsight; and (4) ruling the verdict—which included a handwritten note from the jury on the verdict form—was not inconsistent and void as a matter of law. For the following reasons, we affirm.²

Construed in favor of the jury's verdict,³ the record shows that in October 2014, McCaskey became pregnant with her fourth child. Before her pregnancy, McCaskey suffered from asthma, took medication to treat diabetes and chronic hypertension, and had a pre-term delivery in a previous pregnancy. But after confirming McCaskey's pregnancy, her primary-care physician took her off the diabetes and hypertension medication (as they were potentially harmful to the baby) and referred her to an obstetrician/gynecologist (“OB/GYN”) for care. So, on November 19, 2014, McCaskey saw Dr. Simmons, an OB/GYN at Prestige Healthcare.

Based on McCaskey's medical history, Dr. Simmons recognized that she was a potential high-risk-pregnancy patient. As a result, Simmons referred McCaskey to Atlanta Perinatal Associates (“APA”), where she was supervised by maternal-fetal-medicine specialists Drs. Neuman and Davis, who consulted on management of her diabetes and blood pressure. But the appointments at APA were conducted by nurses and staff, and neither Neuman nor Davis ever examined or met with McCaskey in person. Even so, the three physicians shared information about McCaskey's status through faxes and notations in electronic medical records.

Over the next several months, McCaskey's pregnancy was, by and large, uneventful, with regular ultrasounds showing that her developing baby was normal. Additionally, testing related to McCaskey's placenta showed normal development, with no indications of preeclampsia (a complication related to high blood pressure during pregnancy)—which McCaskey developed in a previous pregnancy. Later, McCaskey underwent regular biophysical profile tests, which consistently showed that her pregnancy was progressing well and her developing baby was receiving sufficient blood and oxygen in the womb.

Still, during many of her appointments, McCaskey presented with elevated blood pressure consistent with her preexisting, chronic mild hypertension. Even so, none of McCaskey's three physicians believed her hypertension warranted additional treatment, especially given the danger hypertension medications can pose to unborn babies. That said, because hypertension during pregnancy can be a precursor to preeclampsia, the doctors counseled McCaskey to watch for other signs of that condition. And while under the care of Drs. Simmons, Neuman, and Davis, McCaskey never reported any of these additional symptoms.

On May 26, 2015, around 37 weeks into her pregnancy, McCaskey went to an appointment at APA, and her ultrasound and biophysical profile showed nothing abnormal. She did initially present with extremely high blood pressure during that appointment, but a second test and reading a short time later showed that her blood pressure had returned to normal. As a result, the nurse caring for McCaskey believed there was no reason to call Dr. Davis or send her to the hospital. The next day, at an appointment with Dr. Simmons, McCaskey's blood pressure was normal and Simmons noted no abnormalities. In light of these circumstances, Drs. Simmons, Neuman, and Davis did not believe that McCaskey needed to deliver her baby early, rather than allow for another week or so of continued fetal development.

But on May 30, 2015, McCaskey's water spontaneously broke, and she was taken by ambulance to Emory Hospital–Midtown. And by the time she arrived, neither McCaskey nor her baby were exhibiting signs of distress such as preeclampsia or lack of oxygen; but her blood pressure was significantly elevated. Notably, additional laboratory testing also did not indicate preeclampsia. As a result, McCaskey was placed on a list to have a cesarean section (“C-section”), but because there was a back up for such procedures that day, she did not undergo the operation until several hours later.

Tragically, following the C-section, McCaskey's baby—who she named A. M.—had a critically low heart rate, which soon became undetectable. Hospital staff in the delivery room started chest compressions, intubated her, and placed her on a ventilator after transferring her to the neonatal intensive care unit (“NICU”). One of the NICU physicians performed a neurological examination on A. M., the results of which were abnormal. More precisely, the physician found signs consistent with hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (“HIE”)—a permanent brain injury caused by lack of oxygen. McCaskey was discharged after a few days, but A. M. remained in the Emory NICU until June 24; and although she survived, A.M. suffered a serious brain injury resulting in developmental delays.

In May 2017, McCaskey—individually and as the mother of her minor daughter, A. M.—sued Dr. Simmons, his practice, Prestige Healthcare OBGYN, LLC; Drs. Neuman and Davis and their medical practice, APA; as well as an Emory physician and several Emory-related entities. Specifically, McCaskey's complaint alleged that the Defendants breached the standard of medical care in managing her high-risk pregnancy and failing to diagnose her with preeclampsia. She also alleged that the Emory defendants breached the standard of care by failing to recognize that her condition required an immediate C-section, all of which resulted in her daughter suffering a significant brain injury at birth. All of the various defendants filed answers, and a lengthy discovery period ensued. Later, at the parties’ request, the trial court granted a continuance but set trial for January 2024.

After two days of jury selection, during which the Emory physician and Emory-related entities reached settlement agreements with McCaskey, the trial began on January 31, 2024, against Drs. Simmons, Neuman, Davis, and their medical practices. As noted above, McCaskey's theory of the case was that the Defendants did not adequately communicate with each other about her care, resulting in a failure to diagnose her with preeclampsia and their subsequent failure to expedite her delivery following the May 26 and 27, 2015 appointments. These failures, according to McCaskey, resulted in A. M.’s tragic injury.

At trial, the parties presented the above evidence, as well as expert testimony. One of McCaskey's experts testified that A. M.’s HIE was caused by an acute event occurring close to the time of her birth. And another one of McCaskey's experts explained that A. M.’s brain injury resulted from the failure to properly treat her at the hospital, testifying that the C-section to deliver A. M. should have been performed as soon as McCaskey arrived. In turn, the Defendants presented evidence that—although McCaskey often presented with elevated blood pressure at her prenatal appointments—it did not warrant early delivery. Rather, in the Defendants’ view, it was the delay in performing the C-section that caused A. M.’s injury.

After both parties rested, the Defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. McCaskey also moved for directed verdict solely to preclude her contributory negligence from being an option on the verdict form, arguing that no evidence had been presented in that regard. The trial court agreed and granted her motion. Following a charge conference, during which the form of the verdict was also discussed, the parties made their closing arguments; and the trial court then instructed the jury on the applicable law. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Defendants, which the trial court affirmed in its final judgment.

McCaskey filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to provide certain jury instructions, providing erroneous instructions, and ruling that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent. The Defendants then filed responses, and the court held a hearing on the motion before denying it. This appeal follows.

1. McCaskey first contends the trial court erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury on a physician's duty of care when it refused to provide two of her requested charges. We disagree.

As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, a trial court has “a duty to charge the jury on the law applicable to issues which are supported by the evidence.”⁴ So, if there is even “slight evidence on a specific issue, it is not error for the court to charge the jury on the law related to that issue.”⁵ That said, it is a fundamental rule in Georgia that “jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charges contained error.”⁶ And if the charge as a whole “substantially covered the issues to be decided by the jury, we will not disturb a verdict supported by the evidence simply because the charge could have been clearer or more precise.”⁷ Indeed, for a refusal to charge to be error, the request “must be entirely correct and accurate; adjusted to the pleadings, law, and evidence; and not otherwise covered in the general charge.”⁸ And importantly, because the review of allegedly erroneous jury instructions is a legal question, we “owe no deference to the trial court's ruling and apply the ‘plain legal error’ standard of review.”⁹

Here, in McCaskey's requests to charge, she sought to have the trial court instruct the jury on two charges expounding on a physician's duty of care to her patients. More precisely, request number 27, titled “Diagnosis and Treatment - Duty of Physician,” provided:

The law imposes upon a physician the same degree of care in making a diagnosis of a patient's condition as in prescribing or administering treatment to a patient. In informing himself/herself of the patient's condition, a physician is required to use the same degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by physicians generally under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances as the case on trial.

A physician must inform himself/herself of his/her patient's condition by proper communications with other physicians and providers, and by proper tests, examinations, and consultations ordinarily used by physicians generally under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances as the case on trial.

If a physician fails to exercise this degree of skill or care in diagnosing and/or treating his patient's condition, an error in judgment will not relieve him/her of liability.

And request number 28, titled “Notice or Knowledge - Duty of Inquiry,” provided:

The means of knowledge are ordinarily the equivalent in law to knowledge. If it appears from the evidence in the case that a person had information that would lead a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry through which that person would surely learn the facts, then this person may be found to have had actual knowledge of those facts, the same as if that person had made such inquiry and had actually learned such facts.

The law charges a person with notice and knowledge of whatever that person would have learned, on making such inquiry as it would have been reasonable to expect the person to make under the circumstances.

Knowledge or notice may also be established by circumstantial evidence. If it appears that a certain condition has existed for a substantial period of time, and that the person had regular opportunities to observe the condition, then you may draw the inference that the person had knowledge of the condition.

Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found that such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact due to negligence shall be equivalent to knowledge in fixing the rights of parties.

But during the charge conference, the trial court informed McCaskey that it would not instruct the jury on these two charges. Instead, echoing the pattern charge on the standard of care,¹⁰ the court instructed the jury as follows:

You may have heard testimony regarding the standard of care as it applies to medical professionals.

A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of the profession a reasonable degree of care and skill.

Any injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be an act for which a recovery may be had.

This standard, when applied to the facts and circumstances of any particular case, must be of such degree of care and skill as, under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances, is ordinarily employed by the medical profession generally.

A medical professional in the treatment and care of a patient should use that degree of care and skill ordinarily employed by the profession under similar conditions and like surrounding circumstances. ․ If the medical professional does so, then the medical professional would not be negligent. Therefore, there could be no finding of malpractice.

If, on the other hand, the medical professional should fail to use such degree of care or skill, they would be negligent and if the injury resulted because of such failure, the doctor or other medical professional would be liable for such injury as a result of malpractice.

The presumption in this case or in all of these types of cases is that the services were performed in an ordinarily skillful manner. The person claiming an injury may overcome this legal presumption by introducing evidence that the medical professional did not treat the patient in an ordinarily skillful manner.

On appeal, McCaskey claims the trial court erred in refusing to provide her requested charges, arguing that they would have clarified for the jury that the Defendants’ duty was broader than “treatment and care” and included a duty to properly diagnosis and make inquiries into her condition. But McCaskey's claim begs the question—presuming that diagnosis and a duty of inquiry are somehow divorced from the concepts of treatment and care discussed in the pattern charge. And here, the primary focus during trial was whether the Defendants violated the standard of care by failing to diagnose McCaskey with preeclampsia and order an early delivery. So, we do not agree with the implication that a jury of ordinary intelligence would not have understood that the alleged failure to diagnose was included within the “treatment and care” referenced in the court's thorough instruction on the standard of care. The court did not err, then, in declining to give McCaskey's requested charges.¹¹

2. McCaskey similarly contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of fault when it provided the instruction on apportionment. Again, we disagree.

McCaskey's requested jury instruction number 40, titled “Apportionment of Damages - Defined - Elements - Burden of Proof,” in part, provided as follows:

By asserting the defense of apportionment, the Defendants allege that some negligence on the part of the other Defendants also contributed as one of the proximate causes of the injuries and damages [McCaskey and her daughter] may have suffered. Defendants further allege that any damages the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover should be apportioned between the Defendants according to the percentages of fault of each of them that proximately caused or contributed to [McCaskey and her daughter's] injuries and damages.

After explaining that any defendant asserting apportionment had the burden of proving all the elements of malpractice as to the other defendants, the requested charge also provided:

If you believe that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover and further find that the damages sustained by the Plaintiffs were caused by more than one Defendant, after you determine the total amount of damages to be awarded for Plaintiffs’ injuries, you are authorized to determine whether the fault of those Defendants you find were negligent and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries is divisible.

Then, during the charge conference, McCaskey's counsel asked the trial court if it was going to define “fault” within the context of the apportionment charge. Initially confused as to whether counsel was referring to the verdict form or the jury charges, the court stated it had already explained how it would charge apportionment and that the verdict form had the term “fault” on it.

Later, in charging the jury on apportionment, the trial court stated as follows:

One of the other questions that you are going to be asked to decide in this case is a question that has to do with whether or not damages, should you find them to be appropriate in this case, as to different defendants or multiple defendants and/or nonparties, should be apportioned amongst them.

So if you believe that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and you further find that the damages sustained by the plaintiff were caused by more than one defendant, in determining the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, then you should apportion your award of damages among the parties who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each defendant that you find to be liable in this case.

The Court will take into account in entering a final judgment after your verdict the percentage of that defendant's negligence that you determine compared to the total negligence of the parties in this action.

After the trial court concluded the jury charge, McCaskey objected to its failure to define fault along with the apportionment instruction; and now on appeal, she maintains the court's failure in this regard amounts to reversible error. This contention lacks merit.

First, the text of McCaskey's request did not include a definition of fault. Rather, in a lengthy footnote to the requested charge, McCaskey cited Zaldivar v. Prickett,¹² and its language explaining that “fault” in the apportionment statute—OCGA § 51-12-33(b)—“refers to a breach of a legal duty that a defendant owes with respect to a plaintiff that is a proximate cause of the injury for which the plaintiff now seeks to recover damages.”¹³ But setting that aside, the trial court's instructions as a whole thoroughly explained the legal requirements for determining fault as defined in Zaldivar. Indeed, the court instructed the jury on the standard of medical care, that a breach of this standard constitutes negligence, and that recovery of damages requires the plaintiff to show such negligence proximately caused the injury. Then, in its instruction on apportionment, the court explained that apportionment applies only if the plaintiff was “entitled to recover” and damages “were caused by more than one defendant[.]” The verdict form also reiterated the court's instructions on apportionment, noting: “If you found ․ that any named Defendant or named non-party was negligent, and that such negligence was the cause of injury to Plaintiff and/or her minor child, you should assign a percentage of fault, as you find it to be, for any such person below.” Given the verdict form—which is treated as part of the jury instructions ¹⁴ —and the jury instructions as a whole, McCaskey has not shown that the trial court erred in refusing to give a separate definition of “fault” with its instruction on apportionment of damages.¹⁵

Moreover, even if we agreed that the trial court erred by failing to define “fault” within the context of its apportionment charge, such an error would not warrant a new trial. And generally, when the error in the giving or not giving of jury instructions “relates only to the issue of damages, and the jury finds that the defendant is not liable, the error is harmless because it does not affect the verdict.”¹⁶ Here, the question of apportionment to which McCaskey's requested charge pertains was not reached because the jury found for the Defendants on the issue of liability. As a result, McCaskey cannot show the trial court's refusal caused harm.¹⁷

3. McCaskey also contends the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury that it was prohibited from finding liability based solely on hindsight. Once again, we disagree.

Similar to our review of a trial court's refusal to provide a requested instruction, we also “review de novo an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, which is a legal question.”¹⁸ Again, in assessing the assertion of an erroneous jury instruction, the instruction “must be evaluated in the context of the trial court's jury instructions as a whole.”¹⁹ And significantly, the only requirement regarding jury charges is that “they were, as given, correct statements of the law and, as a whole, would not mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence.”²⁰ Indeed, an erroneous charge does not warrant a reversal “unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered.”²¹ That said, we have held that “erroneous charges are presumed to be prejudicial and harmful, but this is not conclusive because the presumption of harm which arises from a charging error may be overcome by a review of the record as a whole.”²²

Here, the Defendants requested a charge on hindsight, and McCaskey objected during the charge conference, arguing that a hindsight charge was not applicable and that her charge requests (numbers 27 and 28) were more appropriate. But the trial court agreed with the Defendants to provide the pattern charge on hindsight,²³ and instructed the jury as follows:

In a medical malpractice action, a party cannot be found negligent or a defendant cannot be found negligent on the basis of an assessment of a patient's condition that only later, in hindsight, proves to be incorrect as long as the initial assessment was made in accordance with the applicable standard of care—medical care.

McCaskey reiterated her objection after the trial court's jury charge, and on appeal argues the hindsight instruction was not warranted by the evidence. But we are not persuaded the trial court erred.

In Smith v. Finch,²⁴ the Supreme Court of Georgia disapproved of a former version of the pattern charge on hindsight, which read as follows:

In a medical malpractice action, a defendant cannot be found negligent on the basis of an assessment of a patient's condition that only later, in hindsight, proves to be incorrect as long as the initial assessment was made in accordance with reasonable standards of medical care. In other words, the concept of negligence does not include hindsight. Negligence consists of not foreseeing and guarding against that which is probable and likely to happen, not against that which is only remotely and slightly possible.25

More precisely, the Smith Court found that “the final sentence of the instruction is plainly inconsistent with the medical decision-making process, which often requires the consideration of unlikely but serious consequences in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, and is generally inconsistent with the standard for foreseeability in our negligence law.”²⁶ But critically, our Supreme Court also explained immediately after that

it is well recognized that an after-the-fact assessment of facts or evidence cannot be the basis of a negligence claim so long as the initial assessment was made in accordance with the reasonable standards of medical care. The first sentence of the hindsight charge presents this concept in a straightforward manner, and we have no quarrel with it.”27

The Smith Court then added “this portion of the instruction is appropriate in any medical-malpractice case in which the facts warrant it, i.e., where the negligence claim is based in whole or in part on the assertion that the physician made an incorrect assessment of a patient's condition.”²⁸

In this case, the trial court provided the current pattern charge on hindsight, rather than the earlier version disapproved by Smith. Even so, McCaskey argues that the instruction was improper, asserting that if the Defendants had properly communicated with each other about her condition, they would have learned everything they needed to diagnose her with preeclampsia and send her to the hospital for an early delivery. But crucially, jury charges are not limited to “a plaintiff's characterization of the lawsuit.”²⁹ Rather, a trial court has a duty to charge the jury on “the law applicable to issues which are supported by the evidence.”³⁰ And if there is even slight evidence on a specific issue, it is “not error for the court to charge the jury on the law related to that issue.”³¹ Here, the main contested issue was whether the Defendants incorrectly assessed McCaskey's condition and allowed her pregnancy to proceed. But there was evidence that—even with McCaskey's risk factors—the examinations of her and her unborn baby during the final appointments did not indicate that the delivery needed to be expedited. As a result, more than slight evidence was presented raising an issue of whether McCaskey's medical-malpractice claim was based on later-acquired knowledge, and the hindsight charge was warranted.³² The trial court did not err, then, in providing that charge.

4. Finally, McCaskey maintains the trial court erred in ruling that the verdict—which included a handwritten note from the jury on the verdict form—was not inconsistent and void as a matter of law. Yet again, we disagree.

During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court: “If we add additional context to the verdict form, will it be shared with both parties?” The court shared the note with the parties, and while all involved agreed that the answer to the question was obviously “yes,” the court stated it was inclined to simply respond by writing “yes” on the note, without requiring the jury to return to the courtroom. At that point, counsel for one of the Defendants engaged in the following colloquy with the court:

Defense counsel: They're asking if they can amend the verdict form? They're asking to write something on the form.

The Court: It sounds like they are wanting to explain what they've done on the verdict form is the way I would interpret it. I don't know what it means, but that's what I think that's what that means.

None of the parties objected—at which point, the trial court wrote “yes” on the note and directed the deputy to return it to the jury.

The jury then returned with a verdict. And after the verdict form was handed to the trial court and read, the court stated: “All right. Ladies and gentlemen, the jury has returned a verdict, and I'm going to share it with you now. They also did attach, I guess, or sent to you-all a note about some of the reasoning behind their verdict. I'm not going to read that to you, but you will have a copy of it.” The court then read the verdict, which in summary provided that none of the three Defendants “deviated from the applicable standard of care treating the plaintiff.” The remainder of the form regarding proximate cause, damages, and apportionment—all of which turned on a finding that the Defendants deviated from the standard of care—was left blank.

But on a separate blank page attached to the verdict form, the jury added a handwritten note, which read:

While we found no legal violation of the standard of care, we believe there is a lot of room for improvement: communication, documentation and record-keeping; timely review of records, particularly through end of pregnancy.

In general, we found less fault with Simmons’ care.

We also found Davis to be the only doctor that showed compassion in her care and paid attention through trial.

Dr. Page [not a party], APA, was inconsiderate, unprofessional, and disrespectful in front of an injured mother.

There was a lack of evidence around the events at Emory—we would not have been able to make a responsible decision.

The trial court then asked if any of the parties wished to examine the verdict form, and all declined.

McCaskey now argues that the jury's handwritten note—stating there was “room for improvement” and that it found “less fault” with Dr. Simmons—resulted in an inconsistent verdict and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial on this ground. But again, we do not find this argument persuasive.

Under Georgia law, in a civil case, a verdict that is “contradictory and repugnant is void, and no valid judgment can be entered thereon.”³³ So, a judgment entered on such a verdict “will be set aside.”³⁴ But not merely any irregularity will “render a verdict void.”³⁵ Indeed, OCGA § 9-12-4 provides that “[v]erdicts shall have a reasonable intendment and shall receive a reasonable construction. They shall not be avoided unless from necessity.”As a result, the presumptions are in favor of “the validity of verdicts, and if possible, a construction will be given which will uphold them.”³⁶ So, even if a verdict is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, “one of which would uphold it and one of which would defeat it, that which would uphold it is to be applied.”³⁷ All that is essential to a valid verdict, then, is “substantial certainty to a common and reasonable intent.”³⁸ The burden is on the party attacking a verdict, then, to show its invalidity.³⁹

Here, the first part of the verdict form read: “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [Dr. Simmons] deviated from the applicable standard of care in treating Plaintiff?” The jury checked the line next to “No.” This same question was repeated for Drs. Neuman and Davis, separately; and each time, the jury responded “No.” The remainder of the questions on the verdict form required no answer unless the jury found that the Defendants had deviated from the standard of care, and those questions were left blank—including those asking the jury to apportion fault. Thus, nothing in the printed verdict form could possibly be construed as anything other than an unequivocal verdict in favor of the Defendants.

As for the jury's handwritten note, regardless of whether it is considered part of the verdict form, it did not render the verdict inconsistent. Indeed, in the first part of the note's first sentence, the jury expressly reiterated that it “found no legal violation of the standard of care[.]” In light of this opening caveat, construing the second part of the sentence stating there was “room for a lot of improvement” as a volte-face assigning legal liability strains credulity. Similarly, the jury's statement that it found “less fault” with Dr. Simmons can be reconciled as opining that he had less need for improvement than the other two defendants, who nonetheless had also not deviated from the standard of care. And given the presumption in favor of validity of verdicts and that the jury's verdict here is susceptible of a construction that resolves any ambiguities, the trial court did not err in concluding that the jury's verdict is not inconsistent.⁴⁰

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment and its denial of McCaskey's motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to Simmons, Neuman, Davis, and their respective medical practices collectively as “Defendants” throughout this opinion.

2.   Oral argument was held on December 4, 2025, and is archived on the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia's website. See Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, Oral Argument, Case No. A26A0004 (Dec. 4, 2025), available at https://vimeo.com/1144961509

3.   See Am. Infoage, LLC v. Only Sol. Software, LLC, 362 Ga. App. 706, 707, 870 S.E.2d 47 (2022) (“Following a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” (quotation marks omitted)).

4.   Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213, 214(2), 563 S.E.2d 863 (2002) (punctuation omitted). Accord McCommons v. White, 371 Ga. App. 93, 102(2), 899 S.E.2d 731 (2024). See Sw. Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Quinney, 347 Ga. App. 410, 419–20(3), 819 S.E.2d 696 (2018) (noting that a jury charge “must be adjusted to the evidence, apt, and a correct statement of the applicable law” (punctuation omitted)).

5.   Jones, 275 Ga. at 214(2), 563 S.E.2d 863 (punctuation omitted). Accord McCommons, 371 Ga. App. at 102(2), 899 S.E.2d 731.

6.   Lee v. Swain, 291 Ga. 799, 800(2)(a), 733 S.E.2d 726 (2012) (punctuation omitted). Accord McCommons, 371 Ga. App. at 102(2), 899 S.E.2d 731.

7.   Lee, 291 Ga. at 800(2)(a), 733 S.E.2d 726 (punctuation omitted). Accord McCommons, 371 Ga. App. at 102(2), 899 S.E.2d 731.

8.   Lee, 291 Ga. at 800(2)(a), 733 S.E.2d 726 (punctuation omitted). Accord McCommons, 371 Ga. App. at 102(2), 899 S.E.2d 731.

9.   Sw. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 347 Ga. App. at 420(3), 819 S.E.2d 696 (quotation marks omitted).

10.   See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 62.305 (5th ed. 2025).

11.   See Geary v. Est. of Tapley, 373 Ga. App. 561, 563–64(2)(a)(i), 908 S.E.2d 324 (2024) (holding that because jury instruction on pain and suffering damages tracked pattern instruction, was legally correct, and covered principles at issue in medical malpractice, the trial court did not err in failing to give surgeon's requested charge that there needed to be some evidence the deceased was conscious of his imminent death); Thomas v. Alligood, 358 Ga. App. 703, 706–07(1)(b), 856 S.E.2d 80 (2021) (concluding that the trial court adequately instructed jury, in a medical-malpractice case arising from delay in locating a glidescope, that the hospital was required to use ordinary care in making equipment available for use in emergencies, even though the court omitted some of plaintiff's requested language, given that the court also instructed the jury on ordinary negligence and the plaintiff's burden of proof). Cf. Game Truck Ga., LLC v. Quezada, 360 Ga. App. 519, 522(1), 859 S.E.2d 125 (2021) (finding that the trial court's failure to give a charge on assumption of risk was harmful because although the pattern charge on duty to use ordinary care for one's safety was correct, it omitted knowledge and voluntary exposure elements highlighted in the pattern charge on assumption of the risk, and there was some evidence the plaintiff engaged in conduct that he knew was dangerous).

12.   297 Ga. 589, 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015).

13.   Id. at 595(1), 774 S.E.2d 688.

14.   See Fassnacht v. Moler, 358 Ga. App. 463, 473(1)(a), 855 S.E.2d 692 (2021) (noting that “a preprinted verdict form is treated as part of the jury instructions which are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is error” (punctuation omitted)).

15.   See supra note 9 & accompanying text.

16.   Endsley v. Geotechnical & Env't Consultants, Inc., 339 Ga. App. 663, 676(2), 794 S.E.2d 174 (2016).

17.   See Black v. Johnson, 233 Ga. 533, 534(6), 212 S.E.2d 368 (1975) (explaining that appellant's claim the trial court erred in failing to charge on punitive damages lacked merit given the jury's verdict in favor of the appellee); Asbury v. Ga. World Congress Ctr., 212 Ga. App. 628, 632(4), 442 S.E.2d 822 (1994) (holding that because the jury found for the appellee on the issue of liability, the question of damages to which the requested charge pertained need not be reached and the appellants showed no harm by the refusal to give the requested charge).

18.   Smith v. Gadegbeku, 377 Ga. App. 39, 46(2), 921 S.E.2d 524 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). See Walker v. State, 311 Ga. 719, 722(2), 859 S.E.2d 25 (2021) (“Whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the requested instruction is a legal question, which we review de novo.” (punctuation omitted)).

19.   Smith, 377 Ga. App. at 46(2), 921 S.E.2d 524 (quotation marks omitted). Accord White v. Stanley, 369 Ga. App. 330, 331–32, 893 S.E.2d 466 (2023). See Walker, 311 Ga. at 724(3), 859 S.E.2d 25 (“When we are presented with a claim that a particular instruction is misleading, we do not evaluate jury charges in isolation, but rather consider them as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction.” (punctuation omitted)); Fassnacht, 358 Ga. App. at 475(1)(b), 855 S.E.2d 692 (explaining that jury charges and recharges must be read as a whole).

20.   Smith, 377 Ga. App. at 46(2), 921 S.E.2d 524 (quotation marks omitted).

21.   Id. (quotation marks omitted).

22.   Payne v. Thompson, 234 Ga. App. 533, 533, 507 S.E.2d 257 (1998) (punctuation omitted). See Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737(2), 363 S.E.2d 547 (1988) (“When an error in the charge of the court is shown to exist, it is presumed to be prejudicial and harmful, and this [C]ourt will so hold unless it appears from the entire record that the error is harmless.” (punctuation omitted)); Thomas v. Emory Clinic, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 457, 461(1)(d), 739 S.E.2d 138 (2013) (“[E]rror is presumed hurtful unless it appears to have had no effect upon the result of the trial.” (punctuation omitted)).

23.   See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 62.311 (5th ed. 2025).

24.   285 Ga. 709, 681 S.E.2d 147 (2009).

25.   See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 62.311 (4th ed. 2009). See Smith, 285 Ga. at 710(1), 681 S.E.2d 147.

26.   Smith, 285 Ga. at 710(1), 681 S.E.2d 147. Accord Gilley v. Hudson, 299 Ga. App. 306, 308(1), 682 S.E.2d 627 (2009).

27.   Smith, 285 Ga. at 711(1), 681 S.E.2d 147 (citation and punctuation omitted).

28.   Id. at 711(1) n.3, 681 S.E.2d 147. Accord Armstrong v. Gynecology & Obstetrics of DeKalb, P.C., 327 Ga. App. 737, 741(2), 761 S.E.2d 133 (2014).

29.   Armstrong, 327 Ga. App. at 741(2), 761 S.E.2d 133 (quotation marks omitted). Accord Mercker v. Abend, 260 Ga. App. 836, 839(1), 581 S.E.2d 351 (2003).

30.   Armstrong, 327 Ga. App. at 741(2), 761 S.E.2d 133 (quotation marks omitted).

31.   Jones, 275 Ga. at 214(2), 563 S.E.2d 863 (punctuation omitted). Accord Armstrong, 327 Ga. App. at 741(2), 761 S.E.2d 133.

32.   See Armstrong, 327 Ga. App. at 741–72(2), 761 S.E.2d 133 (holding that hindsight charge was authorized in medical-malpractice case where the “key and hotly disputed issue in the trial was whether the physicians were correct in their assessment of the length of time this high-risk pregnancy could be allowed to proceed before performing a caesarean section”).

33.   Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr. Co., 288 Ga. 79, 79, 702 S.E.2d 139 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Cruz v. Patel, 367 Ga. App. 431, 432, 886 S.E.2d 386 (2023).

34.   Anthony, 288 Ga. at 79, 702 S.E.2d 139 (quotation marks omitted). Accord Cruz, 367 Ga. App. at 432, 886 S.E.2d 386.

35.   Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80, 702 S.E.2d 139 (quotation marks omitted). Accord Cruz, 367 Ga. App. at 432, 886 S.E.2d 386.

36.   Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80, 702 S.E.2d 139 (quotation marks omitted). Accord Lucas v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 354 Ga. App. 522, 524(2), 841 S.E.2d 150 (2020).

37.   Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80–81, 702 S.E.2d 139 (quotation marks omitted). Accord Lucas, 354 Ga. App. at 524(2), 841 S.E.2d 150.

38.   Cruz, 367 Ga. App. at 433, 886 S.E.2d 386 (quotation marks omitted).

39.   See id.

40.   See Preferred Women's Healthcare LLC v. Sain, 367 Ga. App. 821, 830–31(2), 888 S.E.2d 599 (2023) (holding that even if the verdict form were arguably ambiguous, the jury could have found in favor of husband of decedent on wrongful-death claim, but also found that husband did not meet his burden of establishing a reasonable, meaningful amount of damages on that claim, and therefore, the verdict was not inconsistent); Cruz, 367 Ga. App. at 433–34, 886 S.E.2d 386 (explaining that the verdict finding that defendant was negligent, the plaintiff was entitled to damages, the plaintiff was 65 percent at fault, and the defendant was 35 percent at fault was not void as inconsistent because the jury understood the trial court's statement that the plaintiff would not be entitled to damages if the jury found his negligence was at least equal to the defendant's negligence, to mean that the trial court would be responsible for any reduction in damages based on the plaintiff's fault); Lucas, 354 Ga. App. at 524–25(2), 841 S.E.2d 150 (determining the jury's verdict finding the decedent did not authorize agent to name beneficiary of estate but awarding beneficiary proceeds was not void as it could be construed that the decedent ratified agent's actions); Hewitt Assocs. v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 848, 853–54(5), 708 S.E.2d 697 (2011) (holding that jury verdict in employer's breach-of-contract action against retirement plan administrator, stating that, as to administrator's counterclaim for quantum meruit, that jury found for the defendant on counterclaim and awarded zero dollars in damages and attorney fees, was not inconsistent, since evidence supported a finding that although the administrator performed work for employer, the work was of no value).

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur.