FORREST v. STATE (2025)

After entering an Alford ¹ plea to first degree arson,² Sterling Forrest was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with two years to serve and the balance of one year probated, and credit for time served. On appeal, Forrest argues that the Superior Court of Fulton County erred in excluding the time Forrest served in DeKalb County as required by the applicable version of OCGA § 17-10-11. We agree and therefore vacate this portion of the sentence and remand the case with direction.

According to the factual basis presented by the State at the April 26, 2024 plea hearing, Forrest intentionally set fires throughout a vacant house in Fulton County on August 1, 2022. The record reflects that, after Forrest's arrest on the Fulton charge and prior to the plea hearing, Forrest spent time in the DeKalb County jail on a different charge.

After accepting the Alford plea, the Fulton court sentenced Forrest to three years, to serve two in custody. Apparently applying the pre-amendment version of OCGA § 17-10-11,³ the court rejected the position that Forrest should get credit for the entire time of incarceration since the arrest. The court stated that it was “only interested ․ in the time [Forrest] served in Fulton County.” In the final disposition order, the court directed that Forrest “shall receive credit for time served in custody from 8/[1]/2022[⁴ ] — 9/18/2023, 1/26/2024 — 2/2/2024 and 4/19/2024 — present.” This appeal followed.

Forrest argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in excluding credit for the days Forrest was incarcerated in DeKalb County between the time of arrest on the Fulton charge and sentencing. We agree.

The amount of credit for time served is to be computed by the sentence custodian, not the trial court, and a defendant aggrieved by such calculations generally must seek relief against the Department of Corrections. However, to the extent the trial court oversteps its authority and misdirects the correctional custodian as to the amount of credit for time served, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case to remove the offending time computation language from the order.5

“[A]s in all appeals involving the construction of statutes, our review is conducted under a de novo standard.”⁶

As amended in 2020,⁷ OCGA § 17-10-11 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that “upon conviction for an offense, a person shall be given full credit for each day spent in confinement in any penal institution or facility[,] including [p]retrial confinement, for any reason, since the date of arrest for the offense which is the subject of the sentence[.]”⁸ Prior to this amendment, individuals were only entitled to credit for time served “in connection with and resulting from a court order entered in the criminal proceedings for which sentence was imposed.”⁹

Thus, under the plain language of the current version of OCGA § 17-10-11, Forrest was entitled to full credit for each day spent in confinement since the date of arrest, including any time served in DeKalb County, for the Fulton arson charge. Because “the trial court in its written sentencing order [gave] gratuitous misdirection to the correctional custodians[,]”¹⁰ we vacate the portion of the judgment regarding credit for time served and remand the case for the trial court to strike that portion of the order.¹¹ The Department of Corrections can then properly calculate the amount of credit Forrest is to receive.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

2.   See OCGA § 16-7-60 (a).

3.   See Wilson v. State, 273 Ga. 97, 538 S.E.2d 429 (2000) (holding that, under the prior version of OCGA § 17-10-11, the defendant was not entitled to credit for time served on unrelated charges).

4.   The State agrees with Forrest's contention that the written sentence contains a scrivener's error in that it lists August 22, 2022, rather than August 1, 2022, as the starting date for Forrest's custody in Fulton County. As discussed below, the trial court is directed to strike that portion of the order in its entirety.

5.   (Citations omitted.) Kellum v. State, 367 Ga. App. 742, 744-745 (2), 888 S.E.2d 315 (2023).

6.   (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. State, 360 Ga. App. 211, 213 (1), 860 S.E.2d 868 (2021).

7.   See Ga. L. 2020, p. 361, § 3 (HB 984) (effective January 1, 2021).

8.   (Emphasis supplied.)

9.   OCGA § 17-10-11 (2010); see Scott v. State, 315 Ga. App. 786, 787 (2), 727 S.E.2d 518 (2012).

10.   (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cochran v. State, 315 Ga. App. 488, 490, 727 S.E.2d 125 (2012).

11.   Compare Kellum, 367 Ga. App. at 745, 888 S.E.2d 315, with Cutter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 888, 890-891 (2), 622 S.E.2d 96 (2005).

Watkins, Judge.

Doyle, P. J., and Hodges, J., concur.