WRIGHT v. STATE (2021)

Joel Dale Wright appeals an order of the circuit court denying his successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

In 1983, Wright was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, burglary of a dwelling, and second-degree grand theft. He was sentenced to death. Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1985). His death sentence became final when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on January 21, 1986. Wright v. Florida, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 870, 88 L.Ed.2d 909 (1986). This Court subsequently affirmed the denial of Wright's first three postconviction motions. Wright v. State, 581 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1991); Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2003); Wright v. State, 995 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2008).

In 2017, Wright filed a third successive postconviction motion raising claims based on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), and chapter 2017-1, Laws of Fla.¹ He now appeals the denial of his most recent postconviction claims.

ANALYSIS

The crux of Wright's argument on appeal is that this Court's decision in Hurst v. State established a new offense—capital first-degree murder—and that the jury sentencing determinations described in Hurst are “elements” of that new offense. From that assertion, Wright insists that Hurst created a substantive rule of law that dates back to Florida's original capital sentencing statute, thereby requiring Wright's death sentence to be vacated on the ground that certain elements of his crime were never found by a jury.

We rejected a similar argument in Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1251 (Fla. 2018). As we explained in Foster, there is no independent crime of “capital first-degree murder”; the crime of first-degree murder is, by definition, a capital crime, and Hurst v. State did not change the elements of that crime. Id. at 1251-52 (holding that when a jury makes Hurst determinations, “it only does so after a jury has unanimously convicted the defendant of the capital crime of first-degree murder”).

Moreover, “[w]e have consistently applied our decision in Asay [v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016)], denying the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State to defendants whose death sentences were final when the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).” Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla. 2017). Wright echoes other pre-Ring defendants who have advanced myriad legal theories that, in the end, turn on pleas for a retroactive application of Hurst. But this Court has rejected such arguments, however styled. See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla. 2017) (rejecting arguments based on “the Eighth Amendment,” “denial of due process and equal protection,” and “a substantive right based on the legislative passage of chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida”).

Finally, Wright offers an extensive critique of this Court's decision in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), where we partially receded from Hurst. We need not address Poole here, however, because Wright's claims fail even under our pre-Poole jurisprudence on Hurst and retroactivity.

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida was a legislative enactment by which Florida's capital sentencing statute was amended to require jury sentencing determinations of the kind described in Hurst v. State.

PER CURIAM.

POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., concurs in result.