VALENTINE v. STATE (2020)

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.¹ We affirm the denial of relief.

First, Valentine's claim relating to the legal name of one of his victims, to whom he had been married, is untimely and procedurally barred. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.”); Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being litigated in a successive motion.”). This information was known to Valentine and raised during his initial postconviction proceedings. See Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 50 n.8, 51 (Fla. 2012).

Second, the trial court properly denied Valentine Hurst ² relief because he waived his right to a penalty phase jury. See Twilegar v. State, 228 So. 3d 550, 551 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he Hurst decisions do not apply to defendants like Twilegar who waived a penalty phase jury.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Valentine's successive motion for postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

2.   Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016); Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).

PER CURIAM.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. COURIEL, J., did not participate.