THOMPSON v. STATE (2019)

We have for review William Lee Thompson's appeal of the postconviction court's order denying Thompson's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Thompson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Thompson responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Thompson's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that Thompson is not entitled to relief. Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following a jury's recommendation for death by a vote of seven to five. Thompson v. State, 619 So.2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1993). Thompson's sentence of death became final in 1993. Thompson v. Florida, 510 U.S. 966, 114 S.Ct. 445, 126 L.Ed.2d 378 (1993). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Thompson's sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217; see also Foster v. State, No. SC18-860, 258 So.3d 1248, 1250–53, 2018 WL 6379348, at *2-4 (Fla. Dec. 6, 2018) (explaining why the “elements of ‘capital first-degree murder’ ” argument derived from Hurst and the legislation implementing Hurst “has no merit”). Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's order denying relief.

It is so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result.