FINNEY v. STATE (2018)

We have for review Charles William Finney's appeal of the postconviction court's order denying Finney's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Finney's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Finney responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Finney v. State, 235 So.3d 279 (Fla.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 197, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2018), should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Finney's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that our prior denial of Finney's postconviction appeal raising similar claims is a procedural bar to the claim at issue in this appeal, which in any event, does not entitle him to Hurst relief. See Finney, 235 So.3d at 279-80; Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217; see also Foster v. State, No. SC18-860, 258 So.3d 1248, 1251–52, 2018 WL 6379348, at *2-4 (Fla. Dec. 6, 2018) (explaining why the “elements of ‘capital first-degree murder’ ” argument derived from Hurst and the legislation implementing Hurst “has no merit”). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Finney's motion.

It is so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, J., concur in result. QUINCE, J., recused.