MANSFIELD v. STATE (2018)

We have for review Scott Mansfield's appeal of the circuit court's order denying Mansfield's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Mansfield's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). This Court stayed Mansfield's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). After this Court decided Hitchcock, Mansfield responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

Because Mansfield's response to the order to show cause appeared to raise issues independent of Hurst, we issued an order directing briefing on the “non-Hurst related issues.” Having reviewed Mansfield's initial brief, the State's answer brief, and Mansfield's reply brief, we conclude that Mansfield has not raised any issue that does not depend on the retroactive application of Hurst and that Mansfield is not entitled to relief.¹ Mansfield was sentenced to death following a jury's unanimous recommendation for death. Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 642 (Fla. 2000). Mansfield's sentence of death became final in 2001. Mansfield v. Florida, 532 U.S. 998, 121 S.Ct. 1663, 149 L.Ed.2d 644 (2001). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Mansfield's sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Mansfield's motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Mansfield, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.

It is so ordered.

Because Mansfield's jury's recommendation for death was unanimous, he would not be entitled to Hurst ² relief if Hurst applied retroactively to his case. Therefore, I agree that he is not entitled to relief. As to retroactivity, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Mansfield has argued claims related to the State's presentation of alternate theories of murder that would otherwise appear facially to be independent of Hurst and yet untimely, he argues that they are timely because they were filed within one year of the issuance of Hurst v. Florida. Because Hurst v. Florida, as interpreted by this Court in Hurst, does not apply retroactively to Mansfield's case, it does not open the door to otherwise untimely claims under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2)(B).

2.   Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

3.   Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216, 220–23 (Fla.) (Pariente, J., dissenting), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017); see Asay v. State (Asay V ), 210 So. 3d 1, 32–37 (Fla. 2016) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 41, 198 L.Ed.2d 769 (2017).

PER CURIAM.

LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.