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Justin Derlic McGee, Appellant, v. Yolanda Joyce McGee, Appellee.
Justin D. McGee (“Former Husband”), who is proceeding pro se in this appeal, challenges various rulings made by the trial court in his dissolution of marriage litigation with Yolanda McGee (“Former Wife”). More specifically, and according to his amended notice of appeal, Former Husband is appealing the: (1) final judgment of dissolution of marriage; (2) amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage after rehearing; (3) post-judgment order denying Former Husband's emergency motion for temporary custody of the parties’ minor child; and (4) order denying his Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motions to vacate the final judgment, as amended. For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss Former Husband's appeal of the final judgment, amended final judgment, and the order denying his motion for emergency temporary custody because Former Husband did not timely invoke our jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's order denying Former Husband's motion to vacate the final judgment.
JURISDICTION
We begin our analysis by acknowledging that neither party has raised the question of our jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.1 Nevertheless, as an appellate court, we are required to address jurisdiction, even when not raised by the parties. Bialostozky v. GAHC3 Mount Dora FL MOB II, LLC, 397 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citing Nacius v. One W. Bank, FSB, 211 So. 3d 152, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). Stated slightly differently, an appellate court has the independent duty to determine if it has jurisdiction over an appeal. Shassian v. Riverwalk Park, LLC, 365 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing Medeiros v. Firth, 200 So. 3d 121, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)).
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), the jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal to review final orders or final judgments of the lower tribunal is invoked by the filing of a notice with the clerk of the lower court within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. The chronology of events described below shows that we lack jurisdiction to review all but the order denying Former Husband's post-judgment motions to vacate the amended final judgment.
a. The final judgment of dissolution and amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage after rehearing
The trial court, pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490, referred this case to be heard by a general magistrate. Following a contested hearing on issues of alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and costs,2 the magistrate, consistent with Rule 12.490(e)(1), submitted her report to the trial court recommending entry of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage prepared by her that included findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On December 2, 2024, the trial court rendered its final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage in which the court approved, ratified, and confirmed the report of the general magistrate. The final judgment also adopted and incorporated the parties’ mediated settlement agreement and their parenting plan. Among other things, Former Husband was ordered to pay Former Wife durational alimony for seven years in the amount of $1,801 per month.
Citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530,3 Former Husband timely moved for a rehearing of this final judgment. Pertinent to our jurisdictional analysis, this motion tolled the rendition of the December 2, 2024 final judgment until Former Husband either withdrew his motion by written notice or the motion was resolved by rendition of an order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)–(2).
The trial court held a hearing on Former Husband's motion, after which, on March 18, 2025, it rendered an “amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage after rehearing.” This amended final judgment, which Former Husband is presently appealing, made various material changes to the original final judgment, including a reduction in Former Husband's monthly durational alimony payments to Former Wife from $1,801 to $900.
“[I]n cases where a trial court makes a material amendment to the final judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal runs from the date of the amendment, rather than the date of the original final judgment.” Giroux v. Giroux, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D2088, D2091 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 7, 2026) (emphasis removed) (citing DeGale v. Krongold, Bass & Todd, 773 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). To be more precise, Former Husband had until April 17, 2025, to timely file his notice of appeal.
Former Husband did not meet this deadline. Instead, he waited until December 9, 2025, to file his notice of appeal. In fact, Former Husband filed two notices of appeal that day. Former Husband's first notice appealed only a December 8, 2025 order of the trial court that had denied his later Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions to vacate the final judgment. Former Husband's second notice indicated that he was also appealing the amended final judgment dissolving his marriage. Nine days later, on December 18, 2025, Former Husband filed an amended notice of appeal that showed that he was also appealing the original final judgment from December 2024, as well as an order of the trial court that had denied his post-judgment emergency motion for temporary custody of the parties’ minor child.
Former Husband's notice of appeal as to the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage, filed months after the thirty-day deadline under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), is plainly untimely, resulting in what has been referred to as “an irremediable jurisdictional defect.” Tedder v. Est. of Tedder, 200 So. 3d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting Bak v. Bak, 110 So. 3d 523, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
Accordingly, because Former Husband did not timely invoke the jurisdiction of this court to challenge either the amended final judgment dissolving his marriage or the original final judgment, we dismiss this aspect of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Hawks v. Walker, 409 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because “[a] timely notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days in order for this court to have jurisdiction; late filing is a defect no one can correct, not even the court” (citations omitted)).
b. The order denying Former Husband's emergency motion for temporary custody of the parties’ minor children
Five months after the rendition of the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage, Former Husband filed an “emergency motion for temporary custody (ex parte)” in which he requested, among other things, that the trial court “immediately award [him] temporary custody of the [parties’] minor child.” The trial court concluded that no emergency existed and, on August 20, 2025, rendered an order denying the motion. Former Husband did not appeal this order until his December 18, 2025 amended notice of appeal.
To the extent that the order denying Former Husband's emergency motion for temporary custody was an appealable nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)b., Former Husband's notice of appeal of this order had to have been filed within thirty days of its rendition. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b). Former Husband failed to do so. Alternatively, if the trial court's August 20, 2025 order denying Former Husband's motion for emergency temporary custody can be construed as a final appealable order, his appeal was untimely under Rule 9.110(b) because it was not filed within thirty days of its rendition.
Accordingly, because Former Husband did not timely invoke our jurisdiction, we dismiss his appeal of the August 20, 2025 order denying his emergency motion for temporary custody.
THE DECEMBER 8, 2025 ORDER
On December 8, 2025, the trial court rendered an order denying Former Husband's separate and several Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motions to vacate the final judgment of dissolution of marriage.4 This order is separately appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5); and, unlike Former Husband's appeal of the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the order denying his emergency motion for temporary custody, he did timely invoke our jurisdiction to consider this December 8, 2025 order.
Former Husband argued in his various post-judgment Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions that the final judgment dissolving his marriage was void. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) (stating that the trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment that is void). The trial court's denial order now on appeal provided that Former Husband's motions were denied “as previously described in paragraph 8 of the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage after rehearing.”
ANALYSIS
In appellate proceedings, the decision of the trial court is presumed correct, see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979), and Former Husband, as the appellant, has the burden here to show how the trial court reversibly erred. See Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citation omitted). To do so, Former Husband, though not an attorney, must nevertheless adequately present his arguments on appeal. Walker v. Est. of Yee, 376 So. 3d 758, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“In Florida, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules that apply to counsel.” (quoting Stueber v. Gallagher, 812 So. 2d 454, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002))).
Former Husband's initial brief raises a number of arguments directed towards either the final judgment or amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage, or the order that denied his emergency motion for temporary custody. For the reasons previously explained, we are unable to consider the merits of any of these arguments because Former Husband did not timely invoke our jurisdiction to allow us to do so.
However, as to Former Husband's appeal of the denial order of his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions for which this court does have jurisdiction, the burden is on him, as the appellant, to submit an initial brief that, in addition to acquainting this court with the material facts of the case, sufficiently sets forth the points of law involved and the legal arguments supporting his position. See Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (citations omitted). And, “[w]hen points, positions, facts and supporting authorities are omitted from the brief, a court is entitled to believe that such are waived, abandoned, or deemed by counsel to be unworthy.” Id.; see also Figueroa, 336 So. 3d at 1264 (applying the Polyglycoat principles to a pro se litigant's brief). Former Husband's initial brief is infirm in this regard as he provides little, if any, analysis as to how or why the order itself denying his Rule 1.540(b) motions was erroneous. See Lynn v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“[T]he duty rests upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.” (citation omitted)).
The trial court's order denying Former Husband's Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions to vacate the amended final judgment is affirmed.
Appeal Dismissed as to Amended Final Judgment and Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage and Order Denying Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody. Affirmed as to the order denying Former Husband's Rule 1.540(b) motions to vacate.
I fully concur in the majority opinion but write separately to expand upon the reasons Former Husband was unsuccessful in this appeal.
It is not fully apparent from the record or from his initial brief why Former Husband chose to wait until December 9, 2025, to appeal the amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Perhaps Former Husband concluded that he needed to wait until after the trial court addressed his then-pending Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions to vacate the final judgment, which the court did with its December 8, 2025 denial order. Former Husband's delay, however, was fatal to his appeal of the amended judgment dissolving his marriage because the trial court's resolution of these motions did not toll or stop the time for Former Husband to appeal the amended final judgment. To the point, Rule 1.540(b) specifically states that “[a] motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment, decree, or order or suspend its operation.” See also Stubbs v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 250 So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (recognizing that a Rule 1.540 motion does not toll the time under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h)(1) for taking an appeal from a final judgment because it does not affect the finality of the judgment).
Applying these principles, Former Husband's first of his five Rule 1.540(b) motions was filed after the rendition of the December 2, 2024 final judgment but prior to the trial court entering its amended final judgment. Former Husband essentially alleged in this motion that his ex-wife had entered into a supportive relationship with another man; therefore, his monthly durational alimony obligation to her should be reduced or terminated. This motion which, as an aside, differed from Former Husband's four subsequent post-amended final judgment Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions claiming the judgment was void, had no effect on the finality of the final judgment. This motion did not toll the thirty days Former Husband had to timely appeal from the amended final judgment. Former Husband's delay in appealing unfortunately (for him) caused our court not to have jurisdiction to consider this aspect of the appeal.
Former Husband's next four Rule 1.540 motions, brought under subsection (b)(4) of this rule, were filed several months after the rendition of the March 18, 2025 amended final judgment. The trial court entered one order denying Former Husband's motions. These motions did not alter, nor chronologically could they have, the thirty-day time period for Former Husband to have appealed from the March 18, 2025 amended final judgment.
Turning to the trial court's August 20, 2025 order denying Former Husband's emergency motion for temporary custody, if this order is construed to be a final, appealable order then, for the reasons just discussed, Former Husband's Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions that were actually filed within thirty days of this denial order did not toll the time for Former Husband to appeal this order. Resultingly, Former Husband's December 18, 2025 amended notice of appeal of this order was untimely; and, as the majority rightly holds, we lack jurisdiction to consider this aspect of the appeal. And to the extent that the August 20, 2025 order was an appealable nonfinal order, his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions were not authorized, see Lawrence v. Marina Tower of Turnberry Isle Condo. Ass'n, 323 So. 3d 271, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), and thus did not alter the time in which to appeal.
Lastly, I agree with the majority opinion that Former Husband did not sufficiently brief his claim that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions. However, assuming that Former Husband's brief was sufficient, the trial court's ruling was correct; and affirmance is the proper disposition. Former Husband's dominant theme in his numerous post-judgment Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions was that the final judgment was void because he never received a copy of the general magistrate's report and recommended final judgment prior to the trial court rendering the final judgment approving, ratifying, and confirming the magistrate's report. Former Husband contended that this failure constituted a “structural” defect and thus per se reversible error. Former Husband essentially argued throughout these motions that his right to due process was violated.
Former Husband's argument lacks merit because it is based upon an earlier version of Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490. Effective April 1, 2022, the Florida Supreme Court amended Rule 12.490(e) and deleted the former subparagraph (f) of the rule that required a general magistrate to serve copies of his or her report and recommendation on all parties and provide the parties with ten days in which to file exceptions to the report. See In re: Amends. to Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490 & 12.491, & Forms 12.920(a)–(c), 346 So. 3d 1053, 1054–55 (Fla. 2022).
The version of Rule 12.490(e) applicable in this case required the general magistrate to submit a recommended order directly to the court, which the court must review and promptly enter unless it finds the recommended order to be facially or legally deficient. Id. The magistrate was not required to first send copies of her report to the parties. As recently explained by our court, “as amended, the rule replaced the [previous requirement of the] parties’ filing of exceptions before the magistrate's recommendations were adopted by the court with a motion to vacate filed after the court enters the magistrate's order as its own.” Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 434 So. 3d 120, 123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2026) (citing Wells v. Wells, 392 So. 3d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)).
Here, the general magistrate complied with Rule 12.490(e). The magistrate submitted her report recommending entry of final judgment directly to the trial court. Contrary to Former Husband's argument, this was not a denial of due process. The trial court thereafter promptly approved, ratified, and rendered the final judgment, copies of which were provided to each party. Under Rule 12.490(e)(3), Former Husband then had fifteen days to file a motion to vacate the final judgment, which he did not timely do. Nevertheless, as discussed in the majority opinion, Former Husband, citing to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, did move for rehearing of the final judgment; and he was, in fact, partially successful as the trial court amended the final judgment which granted Former Husband some financial relief.
Because the amended final judgment was not void, the trial court reached the right result in denying Former Husband's Rule 1.540(b)(4) motions, albeit its reasoning was erroneous. Nevertheless, affirmance is appropriate under the tipsy coachman doctrine, which “allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ so long as ‘there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.’ ” Garcon v. W. Palm Beach Police Dep't, 112 So. 3d 768, 770 & n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002)).
Lastly, Former Husband's initial brief raises arguments about the trial court failing to rule on his motions for contempt, not terminating his alimony based on Former Wife being in a supportive relationship, and allegedly improperly applying the res judicata doctrine during a later hearing on Former Husband's request for temporary custody of the parties’ minor child. Contrary to Former Husband's apparent position, these matters are not before us in this specific appeal. Our record shows that at the time Former Husband filed his notices of appeal, his separate supplemental petition for modification of alimony based upon his ex-wife allegedly being in a supportive relationship was pending, as was his substantive post-judgment claim for temporary custody. Also, there is no clear record indication that Former Husband had brought his motions of contempt for hearing. Because judicial labor appeared to be required below on these matters, we lack the present jurisdiction to consider them. See generally S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).
FOOTNOTES
1. Former Wife has not filed a brief, nor has she otherwise appeared in this appeal.
2. The parties had separately entered into a mediated settlement agreement concerning their vehicles, personal property, and health insurance, together with a parenting plan involving their various parental responsibilities and timesharing of their minor child.
3. Because this was a family law case, the proper reference for the rehearing motion would have been to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530. However, for our purposes, there is no substantive difference between the two rules.
4. Because this matter involved family law litigation, Former Husband should have filed his motions to vacate under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b). This, however, is not dispositive as our court has recognized that “Rule 12.540(b) is ‘substantively identical’ to rule 1.540.” Martin v. Sater, 427 So. 3d 76, 80 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (citing Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 709 n.4 (Fla. 2001)).
Per Curiam.
Makar and Kilbane, JJ., concur. Lambert, J., specially concurs, with opinion.
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Docket No: Case No. 5D2025-3728
Decided: November 17, 2026
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
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