MOREY WRIGHT JR v. MIKE GELIN CITY OF TAMARAC FLORIDA JOE SCOTT BROWARD COUNTY SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS (2026)

Morey Wright, Jr., appeals from an October 14, 2026 final judgment disqualifying him as an incumbent candidate for City of Tamarac Commissioner, District 2. We affirm because the trial court correctly determined that Wright failed to comply with basic qualification requirements.

Background

Wright sought candidacy for City of Tamarac Commissioner, District 2. On October 2, 2025, Wright filed Department of State, Division of Elections Form DS-DE 9 to designate his campaign treasurer and a depository with the City Clerk (the “2025 Form”). Wright listed Wells Fargo bank in item 19 and filled out the bank's address in items 20 to 24. He did not, however, complete item 18, which required him to specify whether he was designating the bank as a primary or secondary depository.

On June 12, 2026, the last day of the qualifying period, Wright filed another Form DS-DE 9, and personally signed a check paying the qualifying fee from a Wells Fargo account named: “Morey Wright Campaign.” Wright's 2026 form did not complete item 1, which required him to indicate whether this was an initial filing of the form or a refiling to change a prior designation. Item 10, which required Wright to specify whether he was appointing a campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer, was likewise incomplete. Additionally, items 18 through 24 were left entirely blank. These items required Wright to designate a bank as a primary or secondary depository and to provide the name and address of the bank. Wright signed the form in item 27, which required him to print the name of the person accepting the appointment. He checked the box within this item accepting appointment as “deputy treasurer.” But he did not sign in item 29, which required the signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer accepting the appointment. Instead, item 29 was left blank.

The City Clerk accepted Wright's qualifying papers and payment and deemed him qualified as a candidate for the District 2 commissioner seat.

On September 9, 2026, Wright's only opponent, appellee Mike Gelin, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Gelin alleged that Wright had failed to comply with statutory qualification requirements. Gelin requested the court disqualify Wright as a candidate. Wright filed a response.

After an October 9, 2026, non-jury trial, at which the trial court heard testimony and reviewed documentary evidence, the trial court rendered the final judgment at issue. The trial court found that Wright had failed to comply with basic statutory election qualification requirements, and disqualified Wright from appearing on the ballot.

Wright appeals, arguing that he had substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and the trial court erred in concluding that he had not properly designated himself as deputy treasurer before signing the check paying the fee from his campaign account.

Discussion

We review the trial court's purely legal determination and interpretation of the statute de novo. Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765, 770 (Fla. 2016).

Section 99.061(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2026), provides, in relevant part:

In order for a candidate to be qualified, the following items must be received by the filing officer by the end of the qualifying period:

1. A properly executed check drawn upon the candidate's campaign account payable to the person or entity as prescribed by the filing officer in an amount not less than the fee required by s. 99.092, unless the candidate obtained the required number of signatures on petitions pursuant to s. 99.095. The filing fee for a special district candidate is not required to be drawn upon the candidate's campaign account. If a candidate's check is returned by the bank for any reason, the filing officer shall immediately notify the candidate and the candidate shall have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier's check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate.

2. The candidate's oath required by s. 99.021, which must contain the name of the candidate as it is to appear on the ballot; the office sought, including the district or group number if applicable; and the signature of the candidate, which must be verified under oath or affirmation pursuant to s. 92.525(1)(a).

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5. The completed form for the appointment of campaign treasurer and designation of campaign depository, as required by s. 106.021.

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7. An oath or affirmation in writing that states whether the candidate is a citizen of another country in addition to being a citizen of the United States and, if so, discloses any other country of which the candidate is also a citizen.

§ 99.061(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2026).

Payment of the fee with “[a] properly executed check drawn upon the candidate's campaign account,” as section 99.061(7)(a)1. requires, is a basic qualification requirement and must be strictly followed. Wright, 200 So. 3d at 772. Section 99.061(7)(a)1. creates a “true bright line” rule. Id.¹ Courts must strictly enforce this statute, which plainly states that “[f]ailure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate.” § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2026); see, e.g., Spiritis v. Botel, 384 So. 3d 260, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (applying Wright and concluding that payment by cashier's check was not sufficient); Boatman v. Hardee, 254 So. 3d 604, 609–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (same); Thompson v. N. Bay Vill., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1727 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 21, 2026) (same).

The Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Amador v. Secretary, Florida Department of State, No. SC2026-1039, 2026 WL 2323248 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2026), is instructive. There, the Department of State had deemed a candidate's submission for election “incomplete,” on the ground that the check used to pay the candidate's qualifying fee had not been drawn upon the candidate's “campaign account,” as section 99.061(7)(a)1. requires. Instead, the candidate's qualifying fee had been paid from a bank that was named as a “secondary depository.” 2026 WL 2323248 at 1-2. The Supreme Court denied the candidate's mandamus petition, clarifying that the “candidate's campaign account,” as referenced in section 99.061(7)(a)1., means the “primary campaign depository” which the candidate must designate under section 106.021(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Id.

Here, the trial court similarly and properly concluded that Wright had failed to meet section 106.021’s requirement to designate a primary campaign depository. Wright's October 2025 form designated a treasurer (Michelle Webb) and named Wells Fargo bank. But, item 18 of the form was incomplete and did not designate the bank as either a primary or a secondary depository. The form which Wright later filed on the qualifying period's last day in September 2026 also was incomplete and did not name any bank at all, let alone designate one as a primary or secondary depository.

Wright's 2026 form also failed to designate him as treasurer or deputy treasurer. Importantly, Wright did not complete item 10 of the form, which required him to specify whether he was appointing a treasurer or deputy treasurer. Additionally, he did not sign in item 29 as required. He only signed within item 27, where the appointee's name must be printed. He checked the box within this item, however, indicating he was accepting appointment as “deputy treasurer.”

Because Wright had never designated a primary campaign depository, and because he did not properly appoint himself as deputy treasurer, the fee was not paid by a check properly drawn on the primary campaign account. Section 106.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2026), provides that expenditures from the primary campaign depository may be made “only by means of a bank check drawn upon the campaign account,” and section 106.11(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2026), requires that the check contain “[t]he signature of the campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer.” Wright's check was not signed by either.

Wright argues that he “substantially complied” with section 99.061(7)(a)1.’s technical requirements, as State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1972), permitted. But the “substantial compliance” doctrine does not apply to basic qualification requirements, like proper payment of the fee. Id. at 347 n.3 (recognizing that substantial compliance does not apply to basic requirements, “i.e., paying a proper fee, the filing of necessary qualifying papers and registering to vote”); Wright, 200 So. 3d 765, 772 n.3 (“We also note that our precedent concerning the doctrine known as substantial compliance has no place in our analysis because the statute at issue is not ambiguous and directly addresses the facts presented.”).

In Pedraza v. City of Miramar, 401 So. 3d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), we extended the basic-requirement principle beyond payment of the fee “to substantive statements in election qualifying papers.” Id. at 1199. There, the candidate had mistakenly checked boxes on two different forms, opting to run as a write-in candidate. Id. at 1196. We rejected the argument that substantial compliance cured the candidate's own errors on the forms. Id. at 1199 (holding that a trial court may not “re-write a candidate's substantive statements and selections on the qualifying forms”).

Likewise, a “completed” form appointing a campaign treasurer and designating a campaign depository is a mandatory basic qualification requirement. § 99.061(7)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (2026). Section 99.061(7)(a)5. is unambiguous and must be enforced as written. Siegendorf itself recognizes that “the filing of necessary qualifying papers” is a basic requirement that must be strictly followed. 266 So. 2d at 347, n.3.

To the extent Wright argues that the Clerk's acceptance of his documents excuses his incomplete filing, or converts the filing into a compliant qualification, we are not persuaded. In Pedraza, we explained:

Section 99.061(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2024), unambiguously states:

The filing officer performs a ministerial function in reviewing qualifying papers. In determining whether a candidate is qualified, the filing officer shall review the qualifying papers to determine whether all items required by paragraph (a) have been properly filed and whether each item is complete on its face, including whether items that must be verified have been properly verified pursuant to s. 92.525(1)(a). The filing officer may not determine whether the contents of the qualifying papers are accurate.

401 So. 3d at 1199–200 (emphasis in original).

Furthermore, the Legislature imposed a duty on the filing officer receiving qualifying papers to “make a reasonable effort to notify the candidate of the missing or incomplete items” only if the filing officer receives those qualifying papers “prior to the last day of qualifying.” § 99.061(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2026) (emphasis added). Here, Wright's 2026 form was filed on the last day of qualifying. The City Clerk accepted the Form DS-DE 9 which Wright had provided, but this does not excuse Wright's failure to properly complete the form. The filing officer did not have to make a reasonable effort to notify the candidate regarding any missing or incomplete items, nor did the filing officer have a duty to ensure whether each item contained in the form was correctly completed.

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Wright failed to satisfy the mandatory qualification requirements of sections 99.061(7)(a)1. and 99.061(7)(a)5.²

The above cases, including the Supreme Court's recent decision in Amador, support the trial court's conclusion that compliance with these basic requirements is required. Wright's completion of some sections of his Form DS-DE 9 did not suffice to meet the qualification requirements. Disqualification may be a harsh result, but we must enforce the law as written. See Spiritis, 384 So. 3d at 264 (“[S]ection 99.061(7) is clear, and it is not for us to rewrite a statute to save a party in such a situation. We must enforce the law as written.”).

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Supreme Court in Wright recognized a constitutional exception, because the candidate's fee was rejected by bank error outside the candidate's control. 200 So. 3d at 774-78. No such error or exception applies here.

2.   Having found Wright failed to comply with these two subsections and thus did not lawfully qualify as a candidate, we decline to address whether Wright complied with section 99.061(7)(a)7.

Per Curiam.

May, Shepherd and Shaw, JJ., concur.