OVADIAH v. LOBO (2026)

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Appellant Shlomo I. Ovadiah appeals a November 4, 2025 default final judgment (the “Order”) entered in favor of Rafael Lobo, plaintiff below, and against two defendants below, Wadiah Capital, Inc. and Banfield & Temperley, Inc. Because the instant appeal of the Order is not brought by either Wadiah Capital, Inc. or Banfield & Temperley, Inc., on July 29, 2026, this Court ordered Ovadiah to show cause as to why this appeal should not be dismissed for Ovadiah's lack of standing.

Ovadiah first argues that he was a named party below and that the Order dismissed him as a party. That is not true.¹ In fact, the record reflects that on October 24, 2025, over a week before the Order was entered, Lobo filed a Notice of Dropping Party. See Two Islands Dev. Corp. v. Clarke, 239 So. 3d 115, 124-25 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“As a general rule, the effect of a plaintiff's announcement of a voluntary dismissal is ‘immediate, final, and irreversible,’ terminating the trial court's authority to enter further orders as to that defendant who has been dropped from the action.” (quoting Kelly v. Colston, 977 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))). Then, on January 20, 2026, approximately two months after the Order was entered and after Ovadiah's November 12, 2025 notice of appeal was filed, Ovadiah filed, in the lower court, a motion to intervene, claiming he had a right of purchase in the real property at issue. Our limited record does not reflect the motion to intervene has ever been ruled upon.

In his Response to this Court's show cause order, Ovadiah concedes that: (1) “[t]he Judicial Default was entered only against [Wadiah Capital, Inc. and Banfield & Temperley, Inc.]”; (2) “the [Order] imposed no personal monetary liability upon him”; and (3) Banfield & Temperley, Inc. is the “legal titleholder” of the property. However, Ovadiah argues that the Order affected his right of purchase in the property, which he first raised below in his motion to intervene. Again, the limited record does not reflect that Ovadiah's motion to intervene has ever been ruled upon, and, in any event, it was filed long after Ovadiah's notice of appeal. While we express no opinion on any potential merits of Ovadiah's intervention motion or whether it is cognizable, we dismiss his appeal because Ovadiah lacks standing to appeal the Order. See King v. Brown, 55 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1951) (“It is the rule that before a person may bring an appeal he must be a party or privy to the record and must show that he is, or will be, injuriously affected by the order sought to be reviewed.” (emphasis added)); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. All Ins. Restoration Servs., Inc., 365 So. 3d 434, 435-36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[O]nly a party aggrieved by a judgment may ordinarily maintain an appeal.”).

Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Order does not explicitly mention Ovadiah, nor does it dismiss any party. To the extent that Ovadiah relies on the language in the SRS stamp which follows the judge's signature on the Order, this Court has held that affixing such an SRS stamp to an order does not operate to dismiss the other parties from the action. See Kwartin v. Miami Beach Townhomes, 434 So. 3d 118, 120 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026); see also Colby III, Inc. v. Centennial Westland Mall Partners, LLC, 386 So. 3d 1003, 1005-1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[A]ffixing the SRS stamp to an order is a purely ministerial function.”).

PER CURIAM.