John Gregorian, Appellant, v. New Century Alhambra Automobiles, Inc., Appellee. (2026)

ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING

Upon consideration of Appellant's motion for rehearing, we grant rehearing, withdraw our decision dated July 29, 2026, and issue the following opinion in its place.

Appellant, John Gregorian, challenges a final order dismissing his statement of claim against appellee, New Century Alhambra Automobiles, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, Gregorian contends that the trial court reversibly erred in failing to first consider his outstanding jurisdictional discovery before dismissing his claim. Consistent with the holding in Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos, 602 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1992), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

Gregorian filed suit alleging that New Century surreptitiously embedded trackers known as “spy pixels” into marketing emails and then shared consumer information with third parties, in violation of section 934.27, Florida Statutes (2025). The amount in controversy placed the dispute within the Florida Small Claims Rules. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.010(b). The unverified statement of claim alleged personal jurisdiction based on tortious acts committed in the State of Florida, along with substantial and not isolated activity within the state, including selling goods and services, direct advertising, and maintaining a dedicated Florida website. See § 48.193(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2025) (providing acts subjecting a person “to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state”). New Century filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, supported by the affidavit of its corporate representative, Daniel Linn. Linn attested that New Century had no physical presence in the state and lacked continuous and systematic general business contacts with Florida.

A few weeks later, Gregorian propounded jurisdictional discovery. New Century answered the request for admissions but objected to the remaining discovery. Gregorian moved to compel and filed the affidavit of his attorney, detailing outstanding discovery and unsuccessful attempts to coordinate depositions with opposing counsel.

The trial court convened a hearing on the competing motions. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to compel discovery as moot. The court reasoned that under Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla.1989), Gregorian's failure to traverse Linn's jurisdictional affidavit was dispositive and therefore discovery was unwarranted. This appeal ensued.

II

A

Gregorian contends the trial court applied the incorrect legal framework. He asserts that the trial court put the proverbial “cart before the horse” by finding that his failure to contravene Linn's affidavit was fatal to his motion to compel without first affording him limited jurisdictional discovery.

In the bedrock case of Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos, 602 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction to resolve a conflict as to “whether discovery is appropriate on jurisdictional issues while the jurisdictional question is still pending before the trial court.” Id. at 1282. Noting that “[f]ederal courts permit discovery for the purpose of determining issues such as whether jurisdiction exists,” the Gleneagle court reasoned that “limited discovery in such instances will provide the trial court with additional information on which to base its decision regarding jurisdiction.” Id. at 1284 (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978)). The court therefore adopted the federal courts’ policy. Id.

In so doing, the court explained that allowing jurisdictional discovery does not conflict with the procedures set forth in Venetian Salami. Under Venetian Salami, “a defendant wishing to contest the allegations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file affidavits in support of his position.” 554 So. 2d at 502. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff “to prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained.” Id. If the affidavits are capable of harmonization, “the court will be in a position to make a decision based upon facts which are essentially undisputed.” Id. at 502–03. But if not, an evidentiary hearing is required. Id.

The court further recognized “that averments made in good faith may not always rise to assertions which could be made under oath.” Gleneagle, 602 So. 2d at 1284. Consistent with this observation, “a plaintiff should be able to conduct limited discovery on the jurisdictional question in order to gather facts and file an opposing affidavit.” Id. Once discovery on the jurisdictional issue is conducted, “the procedure outlined in Venetian Salami should be followed by the trial court.” Id.

Gleneagle does not, however, create a bright-line rule. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) (Gleneagle recognizes a “qualified right to conduct jurisdictional discovery”). Instead, the trial court retains the discretion to control the availability and scope of discovery. Jurisdictional discovery “is appropriate where the existing record is ‘inadequate’ to support personal jurisdiction and ‘a party demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery.’ ” Trintec Indus., Inc. v Pedre Promotional Prod., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting GTE New Media Svcs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). But as the gatekeeper, the trial court is charged with guarding against “broad, onerous or expansive” discovery and that which is designed to “address the merits of the case.” Gleneagle, 602 So. 2d at 1284.

In this vein, courts have distinguished between timely discovery requests and the failure to seek disclosures until the so-called “eleventh hour.” See Estes v. Rodin, 259 So. 3d 183, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Bosdorf v. Beach, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“[P]recedent from the Eleventh Circuit and Florida courts support a qualified right to conduct jurisdictional discovery” where “plaintiffs actually served interrogatories or production requests before the motion to dismiss was ruled on.” (citing Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 729–31 (11th Cir. 1982) and Gleneagle, 602 So. 2d at 1284)); Bosdorf, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (“Plaintiffs’ failure to obtain jurisdictional discovery in the state case resulted more from Plaintiffs own inaction than it did the trial court's denial of their ‘right’ to seek discovery. Plaintiffs did not serve or propound any discovery requests,” and therefore “[t]he state court ․ did not so much deny discovery as it dismissed the case before discovery was taken.”). Courts similarly take a dim view of vague allusions to the necessity of acquiring jurisdictional facts. See Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 n.7 (distinguishing Gleneagle and denying request for jurisdictional discovery where “no discovery efforts were made in the eight months between the time Plaintiffs filed the complaint and the time it was dismissed” and the “only allusion to jurisdictional discovery was on the first page of their memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss filed seven and one-half months after the complaint and more than five months after the filing of the motion to dismiss”). And absent a “colorable basis” that jurisdiction exists, a denial of discovery may be proper. Lang v. Morris, 823 F. Supp. 2d 966, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citation omitted).

B

Against these principles, we examine the case at hand. As the trial court astutely observed, small claims cases in Florida are to be resolved expeditiously and efficiently. But where both parties are represented by counsel, discovery, including jurisdictional discovery, is governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.020(b) (“Any party represented by an attorney is subject to discovery pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280-1.380 directed at said party, without order of court.”).

Though unverified, the statement of claim contained a colorable basis for jurisdiction. Under Gleneagle and its progeny, the fact that Gregorian failed to file a contravening affidavit did not bar him from seeking information to corroborate his own jurisdictional allegations and testing the accuracy of Linn's affidavit.

Given that there was no evidence Gregorian engaged in dilatory tactics, we conclude that the trial court should have first considered the merits of the motion to compel. We therefore reverse and remand for renewed consideration. See Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones, 227 So. 3d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (reversing an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanding “for the trial court to consider in the first instance [plaintiff's] motion to compel to the extent that the motion sought discovery relevant to personal jurisdiction”).

Reversed and remanded.

MILLER, J.