Desmond Hallman, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. (2026)

We affirm on at least two independent bases. First, a claim of denial of counsel's presence at sentencing is not a sentencing error and therefore not cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 574 (Fla. 2008). Second, Hallman has raised this issue multiple times, and this court has been clear that “[b]ecause this correction [and resentencing] is a ministerial act, the defendant shall be represented by counsel but need not be personally present.” Hallman v. State, 41 So. 3d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); see also Hallman v. State, 357 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (affirming per curiam the identical issue regarding entitlement to resentencing because he was not present at 2011 resentencing).

Because this issue has been raised and addressed by this court multiple times, we caution Mr. Hallman that any additional frivolous pro se pleadings related to Lower Tribunal No. F03-5785B may result in the imposition of sanctions, including prohibition of the filing of pleadings in this court absent the signature of a member in good standing of the Florida Bar and the forfeiture of gain time. See O'Haver v. State, 944 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM.