MOHAMMED v. ALI (2026)

The father appeals from the circuit court's final judgment modifying the parties’ parenting plan and timesharing schedule. The father raises several arguments, only one of which requires reversal, as discussed below. We affirm the father's remaining arguments without discussion.

The father argues the circuit court erred by including, in the modified parenting plan, the following clause regarding any future medical treatment for the child:

In the event that the parties disagree upon the proper course of treatment, they shall obtain a second opinion and that second opinion shall be binding upon the parties.

(emphases added). According to the father, the “binding second opinion” clause unlawfully delegates the circuit court's decision-making authority to a third party.

The mother responds the “binding second opinion” clause does not unlawfully delegate the circuit court's decision-making authority to a third party, but instead “merely set[s] up a mechanism whereby the parties could resolve differences over medical issues within the framework of shared parental responsibility” and “prevents repeated post-judgment resort to judicial intervention whenever the parties disagree.” The mother additionally argues: “[T]he binding second opinion clause in the final judgment does not restrict either party's access to the Court. Nothing in that clause prevents a party from seeking temporary modification or emergency intervention in the event a party believes the second opinion is contrary to the best interests of the child.”

We agree with the father that the “binding second opinion” clause unlawfully delegates the circuit court's decision-making authority to a third party. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“The court shall determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act[.]”) (emphases added); Angeli v. Kluka, 190 So. 3d 700, 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“Florida law does not require health care providers to assume the burden of refereeing or going to court to resolve disputes between parents[.]”).

Our enforcement of section 61.13(2)(c) here is consistent with our prior enforcement of section 61.13(2)(c) in other contexts. See, e.g., Malley v. Malley, 388 So. 3d 38, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“When making these determinations [under section 61.13(2)(c)], a trial court may ‘condition increased timesharing on the successful completion of parenting courses and therapy[.]’ However, the trial court is to be the sole decider of whether a parent has sufficiently complied with court-ordered conditions to be eligible for an increase in timesharing and may not delegate this authority to anyone, including a court-appointed doctor.”) (emphases added; internal citation omitted; second alteration in original); Subramanian v. Subramanian, 239 So. 3d 719, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“[T]he trial court properly set forth the specific steps the former husband must take to reestablish timesharing, and was within its discretion to condition increased timesharing on the successful completion of parenting courses and therapy. However, the trial court erred insofar as the order delegates authority to determine visitation to therapists and the guardian ad litem.”) (emphases added; internal citations omitted).

The mother's primary response—that the “binding second opinion” clause “prevents repeated post-judgment resort to judicial intervention”—demonstrates the clause's illegality. The clause prevents the circuit court from exercising its sole authority to “determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act[.]” § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphases added).

The mother's additional response—that the “binding second opinion” clause does not “prevent[ ] a party from seeking temporary modification or emergency intervention in the event a party believes the second opinion is contrary to the best interests of the child”—lacks merit. See Binding, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “binding” as “having legal force to impose an obligation” and “requiring obedience”).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the final judgment's “second binding opinion” clause unlawfully delegates the circuit court's decision-making authority to a third party. We reverse only that portion of the final judgment, and remand for the circuit court to enter an amended final judgment removing that clause.

As stated above, on all other arguments which the father has raised in this appeal, we affirm without further discussion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Gerber, C.J.

Shaw and Lott, JJ., concur.