SHALTOUKI v. MA VENTURES LLC (2026)

Petitioner Shahrokh Shaltouki filed his petition requesting we issue a writ of prohibition to preclude the Seminole County Court from exercising jurisdiction over Respondent MA Ventures, LLC's amended complaint filed after final judgment was entered in the underlying case. We grant the petition and issue the writ, concluding the trial court is without procedural jurisdiction over the claims raised in the amended complaint.

I.

MA Ventures filed an eviction complaint below alleging Shaltouki's non-payment of rent. The parties initially agreed upon a stipulation settling the case, which was “ratified and confirmed” by the trial court. When Shaltouki failed to perform as required by the stipulation, the trial court entered final judgment and awarded MA Ventures possession of the property at 125 Waterfront Way, #200, Altamonte Springs, Florida, and $1,815 in damages. Neither Shaltouki nor MA Ventures filed any post-judgment motion or appeal of the final judgment.

Approximately three months after entry of the final judgment, MA Ventures filed its motion to amend its complaint seeking to add counts for back rent at the Altamonte Springs property and for collection of back rent owed for a separate property that was purportedly required by “the prior lease between the parties for the premises [at] 105 Lake Emma Cove Dr. [in] Lake Mary FL.” The motion also sought to add Sameer Merali as a plaintiff. Shaltouki filed his objection to MA Ventures’ motion to amend. After hearing, the trial court granted the motion—nearly nine months after final judgment was entered in the case.

When Shaltouki's motion for reconsideration was denied, he filed the petition for writ of prohibition now before us.

II.

The common law writ of prohibition is the judicial process by which an appellate or superior court acts to prevent a lower court from the exercise of judicial power in a manner not authorized by law. See State ex rel. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 175, 176 (1939). Prohibition is extraordinary and “extremely narrow in scope.” Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O'Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 579 (Fla. 2022).

The writ is entirely “preventive and not corrective.” English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977); see also Mintz Truppman, P.A., 346 So. 3d at 580 (citing McCrary). Its focus is to prevent an extrajudicial act, not to compel the undoing of an act already taken. See State ex rel. R. C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1959); see also Mintz Truppman, P.A., 346 So. 3d at 580 (citing Boyd).

While the writ is generally unavailable unless there exists “no other appropriate and adequate legal remedy,” prohibition will lie to prohibit a court from exercising jurisdiction where none exists. See Sutton v. State, 975 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The force of the writ is to preclude a trial court from acting without jurisdiction, not to correct an erroneous exercise of existing jurisdiction. See Mintz Truppman, P.A., 346 So. 3d at 580.

Here, the trial court's entry of final judgment in favor of MA Ventures was the terminal event that brought the underlying litigation to a conclusion. See Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986). No party filed any post-judgment motion or appeal contesting the final judgment. “Once the litigation is terminated and the time for appeal has run, that action is concluded for all time.”¹ Id. The trial court is simply without procedural jurisdiction (or “continuing jurisdiction”)² to entertain MA Ventures’ amended claims raised months after entry of the final judgment. See id. As a result, it is appropriate to issue the writ of prohibition. See Padron v. Padron, 356 So. 3d 306, 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“The writ is available to prevent the improper exercise not only of subject-matter jurisdiction, but so-called ‘continuing jurisdiction’ (also termed ‘case jurisdiction’ or ‘procedural jurisdiction’) as well.”).

Accordingly, we Grant the Petition and issue the writ with instructions to the trial court to dismiss the amended complaint and close the case.

FOOTNOTES

1.   There is but one lone exception to the “absolute finality” of the trial court's final judgment, and that is a motion brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, which grants a trial court “jurisdiction to relieve a party from the act of finality in a narrow range of circumstances.” See Miller, 484 So. 2d at 1223. That said, Rule 1.540 does not operate to “reopen[ ] ․ lawsuits to allow parties to state new claims or offer new evidence omitted by oversight or inadvertence.” Phenion Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Love, 940 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (quoting Viking Gen. Corp. v. Diversified Mortg. Invs., 387 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 394 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1981)).

2.   Within the broader legal concept of jurisdiction, there exist three distinct notions. First, subject matter jurisdiction is a court's constitutional or statutory authority to adjudicate the cause before it. See Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction concerns the power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs.”); see also Lemos v. State, 431 So. 3d 599, 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2026). Second, personal jurisdiction, which “is a matter of personal right,” refers to a court's authority over an individual or entity sufficient to compel that party into the court's adjudicative process. See JJJTB, Inc. v. Schmidt, 415 So. 3d 129, 134 (Fla. 2025) (Couriel, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Personal Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Finally, “[a]lthough sometimes identified by different terms, procedural jurisdiction simply refers to the power of the court over a particular case that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.” U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Anthony-Irish, 204 So. 3d 57, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Longman v. Atl. Coast Bank, 369 So. 3d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

Soud, J.

Jay, C.J., and Lambert, J., concur.