Sarah Wishnek Metalonis, Petitioner, v. David Christopher Metalonis, Respondent. (2026)

Sarah Wishnek Metalonis petitions this court for certiorari review of two discovery orders entered upon the motion of David Christopher Metalonis in the family court below. The orders compel Sarah to produce “[a]ny and all text messages” between herself and her mother from January 1, 2024, through at least June 18, 2026. For the reasons below, we grant the petition and quash the orders on review.

I.

This petition stems from a dissolution of marriage proceeding and Sarah's related request to relocate with the parties’ two children. On July 3, 2025, David served Sarah a request for production seeking “[a]ny and all text messages” between Sarah and her mother “from October 2021 to the present.” This request was based on David's theory that Sarah and her mother were engaged in a “long, drawn out [conspiracy] and collusion” to reunite in Ohio, which David intended to argue was proof that the move would not be in the children's best interests. Sarah objected on the grounds that the orders invaded her privacy (and her non-party mother's) and were overbroad, noting the lack of any limitation on the messages produced during the time frame required and that David already had the opportunity to question the mother at her deposition regarding any involvement in the relocation decision.

On April 23, 2026, David served Sarah's mother with a subpoena duces tecum for “[a]ny and all text messages” between her and Sarah “from January 1, 2024, through the date of production.” Sarah again objected on grounds of privacy and overbreadth, and she moved for a protective order. On June 4, 2026, the court heard arguments on the motion for protective order. On June 10, 2026, the court entered twin orders denying the protective order and ordering Sarah and her mother to produce all the messages David had requested.

II.

A.

To demonstrate entitlement to certiorari relief, a petitioner must show that an order (1) departs from the essential requirements of law and causes irreparable harm that (2) results in material injury for the remainder of the case and (3) cannot be remedied on direct appeal. See Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011). We first analyze “irreparable harm” as a jurisdictional requirement. See Saints 120, LLC v. Moore, 292 So. 3d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

B.

“Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein.” Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const. This right applies with equal force to private electronic communications, and court orders that “compel[ ] discovery constitute state action that may impinge on constitutional rights, including the constitutional right of privacy.” Roque v. Swezy, 390 So. 3d 193, 196 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (quotation omitted). Of course, non-privileged information, including electronically stored information, is generally discoverable in family proceedings if it is relevant and either admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.280(c)(1), (3). But “[t]he other side of the equation—the countervailing privacy interest involved with the discovery of data on a cellphone—is also very important.” Antico v. Sindt Trucking, Inc., 148 So. 3d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

Because of the tension between the right to discover relevant information and the freedom from unnecessary intrusion into one's private life, a party seeking to discover private, electronically stored information such as private text messages “must make a showing of necessity which outweighs the countervailing interest” in keeping it private. Josifov v. Kamal-Hashmat, 217 So. 3d 1085, 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quotation omitted). Otherwise, irreparable harm is presumed. See Antico, 148 So. 3d at 165 (citing Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536–37 (Fla. 1987)). The trial court must “balanc[e] the need for discovery with affected privacy interests.” Talley v. Consol. Respondents, 350 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

Appellate courts, including this court, therefore point to adequate balancing when explaining why a broad discovery order does not depart from the essential requirements of law. See, e.g., De Armas v. De Armas, 432 So. 3d 592, 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (allowing access to all of a mobile device's contents in light of petitioner's prior attempts to evade discovery by producing “limited cropped screenshots ․ lacking timestamps or any sender or recipient information”); Talley, 350 So. 3d at 420 (allowing access to thousands of pages of messages because discovery was “narrowly tailored” to relevance and court went to “great lengths” to address petitioner's privacy concerns); Antico, 148 So. 3d at 167–68 (allowing inspection of “all of the cellphone's applications” because discovery was limited by nine-hour timeframe of relevance and noting petitioner's failure to present an alternative when “given the opportunity”).

On the other hand, the appellate courts point to a trial court's failure to balance privacy interests when holding that a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law. See, e.g., Saints 120, 292 at 1213 (quashing discovery order where “trial court failed to balance the competing interests of [respondent's] need to obtain information relevant to the case with ․ [implicated] privacy interests”); Holland v. Barfield, 35 So. 3d 953, 954, 955–56 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (quashing grant of access to “any and all” digital data “from 24 hours preceding February 27, 2009 to present” because it “did not protect” private information); Menke v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 916 So. 2d 8, 10–12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quashing grant of “unfettered access” to computer that would “expose confidential communications and matters entirely extraneous to the present litigation” without “proof that there is no less intrusive method of obtaining the information”).

The orders before us grant access to over two years of text messages between mother and daughter. They are all but certain to sweep in a large amount of private family dialogue, and reveal no balancing of privacy interests with the reason the discovery is sought. Despite Sarah's straightforward suggestion to the trial court that relevant keywords be used, or additional temporal restrictions be added, the orders do not do this or attempt any tailoring. Producing years of irrelevant and private text messages between mother and daughter fails to satisfy the notion of balancing legitimate discovery with privacy interests.

Instead, the orders simply suggest that, once produced, the text messages “shall only be used for litigation purposes,” that they “shall not be disclosed to third parties outside of this litigation unless needed to advance the case,” and that after the case ends, “the text messages shall be disposed of.” The fact that the orders purport to limit the text messages to the instant litigation offers no salve. Once used in litigation, they are on the docket or in a court record or transcript for anyone to see. And in any event, even if they are not published or highlighted, the privacy cat is out of the bag. David, his legal team, and the nebulous “third parties outside of this litigation ․ needed to advance the case” would all have access to years of private communications between mother and daughter, untethered to any relevant issue between the parties or impacting the minor children.

III.

Because the orders on review and the record reveal the absence of any balancing of the need (or relevance) of the requested information relating to the children's relocation with the privacy interests of Sarah and her mother, we grant the petition and quash the orders on review.

Petition granted; orders quashed.

BOKOR, J.