AMARI WELLONS v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2026)

The appellant, Amari T. Wellons, challenges his conviction for first-degree murder with a firearm, contending that the trial court improperly excluded evidence offered to explain why he fled the scene immediately after the shooting. Although the trial court correctly determined that the evidence was inadmissible as reverse Williams ¹ rule evidence, it failed to separately consider whether the same evidence was independently admissible to explain Wellons's conduct after the shooting and to support his theory that he was not the shooter. Because the excluded evidence was relevant for that limited purpose, and because the state has not demonstrated that the error was harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

At trial, the state's theory was that during a heated argument between two groups of individuals at the beach, Wellons, sixteen years old at the time of the offense, shot “at a group of people that he had had words with,” and a bullet struck and killed an innocent bystander. The defense posited that Wellons was not the shooter, claiming he and his siblings had scattered from the beach because they were being threatened by a group of individuals and did not feel safe.

Video footage from a dive shop near the beach showed that shortly after gunfire rang out, three young men, identified by Wellons's grandmother as Wellons and his brothers, were running in the area where 9-millimeter shell casings were later found. According to the state, the video footage showed that Wellons was carrying a firearm. However, the video did not depict any of the men firing a weapon. No firearm was recovered, and no evidence connected the gun which Wellons was purportedly carrying in the video footage to the shell casings found at the scene. Further, the only person who seemed to see someone firing a gun could not identify that person and did not give a detailed description.

The defense witnesses testified a gang of boys followed Wellons and his siblings after they had departed the beach. At one point, one of the boys in the other group was observed reaching into his book bag as if to withdraw something. The testimony of a state witness supported the defense theory that Wellons and his siblings had fled the scene in fear. A woman standing outside of her apartment building observed “three young boys” running from the direction of the beach. They stopped behind a bank building. They looked “nervous,” “scared,” and “upset” and “were shaking.” They made a phone call and someone came to pick them up but one of them “ran around the back.” Wellons's sister testified that she and her grandmother had picked up Wellons and the others in front of a bank or apartment building. However, another state witness's testimony indicated that the same three young men were “running and ․ jumping and just acting not normal,” but they did not appear to be fearful.

Prior to trial, in response to the state's motion in limine, the trial court excluded evidence that about a month before the shooting, the group of boys from whom Wellons claimed he was running had shot 25 bullets into the residence where Wellons lived. The defense sought to admit the evidence to explain why Wellons ran from the beach. The trial court excluded the evidence based on a determination that counsel had sought to admit the evidence as reverse Williams rule evidence, finding that the two episodes were not similar enough to qualify as reverse Williams rule evidence.²

Although the trial court correctly excluded the evidence insofar as it was offered as reverse Williams rule evidence, the court erred by excluding the same evidence for the separate purpose of explaining Wellons's flight.

“Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.” § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2025). “Evidence may be relevant to ‘put the defense theory of the case in a proper context.’ ” Elder v. State, 296 So. 3d 440, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Jacobs v. State, 962 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)). “Every defendant is entitled to present any evidence that tends to support the defendant's theory of defense.” Edwards v. State, 39 So. 3d 447, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission. However, the admissibility of this evidence must be gauged by the same principle of relevancy as any other evidence offered by the defendant.” Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990) (internal citation omitted). “[W]hat is relevant to show a reasonable doubt may differ from what is relevant to show the commission of the crime itself.” Getts v. State, 313 So. 3d 964, 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Wagner v. State, 921 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). A defendant “gets the benefit of any doubt on the relevance” of proffered testimony. Panaro v. State, 398 So. 3d 1115, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024).

Our courts have based reversal on the exclusion of evidence that supports the defense theory. See Mateo v. State, 932 So. 2d 376, 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (reversing where “Mateo's theory of defense was that the jail officials were biased against him because he had been vocal about jail conditions in the past and that they made up [allegations] to cover up their misconduct,” and the excluded evidence “does provide some evidence” of a “pre-existing animosity between Mateo and the jail officials”); Fratcher v. State, 621 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (reversing exclusion of a defense witness as a discovery sanction where, among other things, the excluded testimony was relevant to the defense theory, the crux of which “was defendant's explanation for his departure from the drugstore and subsequent evasions from pursuing officers”).

Although defense counsel could have done a better job articulating the relevance of the evidence, he acknowledged that the evidence did not qualify as reverse Williams rule evidence, and he asserted that it was relevant to show why Wellons had fled the area. To the extent counsel indicated he sought to introduce the evidence, in part, to show that the other boys had committed the shooting, the trial court correctly excluded the evidence for that purpose. However, defense counsel also sought to introduce the evidence to explain Wellons's flight, which was central to the defense theory of innocence. The trial court erred in excluding the evidence for that purpose.

The state argues the issue was not preserved because the trial court characterized its ruling on the motion in limine as tentative. On this record, however, the ruling functioned as a definitive exclusion of the challenged evidence. Accordingly, the issue was preserved for appellate review. Further, the error was not rendered harmless based on Wellons's grandmother's brief and undetailed reference to a prior shooting during her testimony. Additionally, during closing, the state emphasized that Wellons and his brothers did not “stay behind” at the scene as other witnesses had, and instead had fled. The state discounted their claim that they were “scared for themselves.” The state also argued, in asserting Wellons's guilt, that after the gunfire rang out, Wellons “runs.” The state has not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt “that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).

The excluded evidence would not have compelled the jury to accept Wellons's explanation for fleeing the scene. The excluded evidence merely would have permitted the jury to consider Wellon's explanation. Because the jury was denied that opportunity, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).

2.   Reverse Williams rule evidence “is evidence of a crime committed by another person that a defendant offers to show his or her innocence of the instant crime.” McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 323 n.2 (Fla. 2007). The defendant must show a “close similarity of facts, a unique or ‘fingerprint’ type of information” for admission of reverse Williams rule evidence. Id. (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla. 2002)).

Ciklin, J.

Conner and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.