Robert Gerber, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. (2026)

Appellant, Robert Gerber, appeals his conviction of one count of Failure to Comply with Sex Offender Reporting Requirements in violation of section 943.0435(14)(a), Florida Statutes. Appellant concedes that he did not report for the time period in question. In order to prove that Appellant was required to register, the State had to prove, among other things, that he was a convicted sex offender. Appellant argues on appeal that his motion for judgment of acquittal (“JOA”) should have been granted, asserting that the State failed to properly prove that he had been convicted of a predicate or qualifying sex offense in New Jersey as alleged by the State. We disagree and affirm.

At the close of the State's case, Appellant moved for a JOA, asserting that the State had failed to prove the qualifying sex offense conviction by competent, substantial evidence arguing that the New Jersey paperwork documenting his qualifying sex-offender conviction proffered by the State offered was not properly and sufficiently authenticated. In support of his arguments below and on appeal, he cites to Gosling v. State, 205 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), which can be read as requiring proof of the non-Florida qualifying sex-offender conviction to be accomplished with the use of a certified copy of the judgment and sentence complete with fingerprints from the foreign jurisdiction.

However, Appellant overlooks the fact that his probation officer, Anthony Pritchett, with the Florida Department of Corrections, testified without objection during the State's case that Appellant had been convicted in New Jersey of “possession, view, or control of less than 1,000 items of child sex exploitation or abuse.” Mr. Pritchett went on to testify that New Jersey's description of that criminal offense equates to the crime of “possession of child pornography” in Florida. There is no dispute that it is a crime for which a sex offender, such as Appellant, is required to register pursuant to section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2023).¹ Additionally, Mr. Pritchett testified that because Appellant was on probation for the above-described sex offense when he moved from New Jersey to Florida, he was required by Florida sex-offender laws to periodically register or re-register.²

After Mr. Pritchett's testimony was received, the State proffered copies of the New Jersey sex-offender conviction documents. Appellant objected to the copies as proof of the New Jersey conviction because they were “plain” rather than “certified” copies and lacked fingerprints. The trial court overruled Appellant's objections, found that under the circumstances of this case Gosling was not controlling, and denied Appellant's motion for JOA.

Because the State proved the qualifying New Jersey sex-offender conviction and Appellant's failure to timely register through unobjected-to testimony, the trial court's ruling is supported by competent, substantial evidence; thus, Appellant's motion for JOA was properly denied.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence entered below.³

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The sex offender is required to register initially upon moving into Florida, then again every year during the month of his birthday and again during the sixth (6) month following the sex offender's birth month. § 943.0435(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2023). The skipped March 2024 registration was during the sixth (6) month after Appellant's birth month.

2.   Evidence that Appellant had registered twice before in Florida because of the New Jersey conviction, but failed to register in March 2024 was not disputed.

3.   Although our reasoning for finding sufficient proof differs from that expressed by the trial court, affirmance is proper based upon the “tipsy coachman” doctrine. See Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002).

Per Curiam.

Makar, Edwards, and Eisnaugle, JJ., concur.