M.M.M., the Mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2026)

The Mother appeals from a final order terminating her parental rights to her child, L.B., following a nonjury trial. The circuit court found three statutory grounds for termination: sections 39.806(1)(j), 39.806(1)(e)1., and 39.806(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes (2024). We affirm as to each ground. We write only to address the parties’ disagreement over the proper application of section 39.806(1)(j).

The Mother and the Department of Children and Families (the “Department”) both contend that, because the Mother completed an available treatment program within the three years preceding the Department's petition, section 39.806(1)(j) could not support termination, notwithstanding her relapse afterward within that same time period. The Guardian ad Litem argues that the circuit court correctly interpreted and applied section 39.806(1)(j), despite that completed program, given the record as a whole. We agree with the Guardian ad Litem.

The record shows the Mother had a decade-long history with substance abuse and was in treatment while pregnant with the child. Toward the end of her pregnancy, she relapsed and used fentanyl, believing it was heroin. Shortly after birth in June 2023, the child was sheltered after testing positive for fentanyl and marijuana.

In August 2023, the trial court entered an agreed order for reunification, with the Mother consenting to the child's dependency. At that time, the Mother was living at the Counsel and Recovery Center (“CRC”) and participating in a “Mommy and Me” substance abuse treatment program. She graduated from the 90-day CRC program and moved into a halfway house.

In January 2024, the child was again removed from the Mother's care because she was not watching him. Following this removal, the Mother relapsed and entered Mandela, an in-patient drug program, for 30 days. Upon completing that program, she returned to a halfway house but relapsed again and was admitted to Mandela a second time in June 2024, this time discharged unsuccessfully.

For the next two months, she attempted outpatient treatment at the Health Care District, though her attendance was inconsistent because she was using on and off. By November 2024, she entered detox for a month but did not complete the program, leaving after an argument with the therapist and another individual. From there, she moved to another halfway house for about two weeks, leaving because she found the commute to see the child was too far. This was followed by residential treatment at Evolutions in Miami, chosen because no programs in Palm Beach would accept her insurance. In February 2025, she transitioned to another halfway house, Independent Living, where she relapsed and used crack and heroin, stating that “[a]t the time [she] would have used anything that was available.” Finally, in April 2025, she entered residential treatment at a facility in Broward County.

The Department petitioned for termination of the Mother's parental rights that same month, April 2025. The Mother remained at the Broward residential treatment facility through the time of trial in January 2026, with no projected discharge date. Barriers to her discharge included the absence of both stable housing and stable employment.

The circuit court found, among other things, that the Mother's chronic substance abuse history rendered her presently incapable of caring for the child, and that, within the three years preceding the Department's petition, she had both completed, and failed to complete, available treatment.

Section 39.806(1)(j) authorizes termination where:

The parent or parents have a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of alcohol or a controlled substance which renders them incapable of caring for the child and have refused or failed to complete available treatment for such use during the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights.

The Mother argues that, because she had completed treatment twice within the three years preceding the petition, section 39.806(1)(j) cannot support termination. She contends that “have refused or failed,” denotes a past act that remains operative in the present posture of the case, such that an isolated failure, later cured by completed treatment, falls outside section 39.806(1)(j).

The Department agrees with the Mother's interpretation. The Guardian ad Litem, by contrast, argues that section 39.806(1)(j) applies whenever the record shows both completion of, and failure to complete, available treatment within the three-year period, considered together with the parent's present incapacity.

We address, in turn, the general principles governing statutory interpretation, section 39.806(1)(j)’s plain language, and the application of that language to this record.

Florida courts “follow the supremacy-of-text principle, namely, the principle that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” City of Miramar v. Fla. State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1135, ––– So.3d ––––, 2026 WL 1579506 (Fla. 4th DCA June 3, 2026) (quoting State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 470 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)). Accordingly, “[t]he plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.” Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)). Every word is to be given its plain, obvious, and common-sense meaning “unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020)).

That plain-meaning inquiry, however, is never conducted in a vacuum: “the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993)). “ ‘Context always matters’ because ‘sound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections’ ”; context is “a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.” State v. McKenzie, 331 So. 3d 666, 671 (Fla. 2021) (quoting King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 500–01, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Courts must therefore exhaust all the textual and structural clues bearing on a text's meaning, since “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Roldan v. City of Hallandale Beach, 361 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). Read together, McKenzie and Roldan confirm that the analysis begins, and remains anchored, in the statutory text, but that each word must be construed in light of the whole law rather than in isolation. Ultimately, “the goal of interpretation is to arrive at a ‘fair reading’ of the text by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.’ ” Ham, 308 So. 3d at 947 (alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)).

Chapter 39's purposes include providing for the care, safety, and protection of children, preventing abuse, neglect, and abandonment, and preserving family ties whenever the child's welfare can be adequately safeguarded without removal. § 39.001(1)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2024). The Department's prevention and intervention efforts must keep the health and safety of children as the paramount concern, remain focused on clearly defined objectives, and be based on outcome evaluation results. § 39.001(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024).

The tension here is that the Mother completed two treatment episodes within the three-year period, while the Guardian ad Litem points to her unsuccessful discharge from the second Mandela stay, her failure to complete other treatment programs, her relapses, and inpatient status at the time of trial with no known discharge date, all occurring within that same period.

In the only appellate opinion to address section 39.806(1)(j)’s specific language,¹ Judge Griffin observed in concurrence that the subsection, “as written,” would render a court “powerless to terminate parental rights” merely because a chronically incapacitated parent had, at some point in the preceding three years, completed an available treatment; “[i]t will not matter that the parent relapsed and has remained a barely functioning addict and a failed parent ever since.” P.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 86 So. 3d 1290, 1290-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (Griffin, J., concurring). As Judge Griffin put it, “why would it matter whether the treatment were refused, completed or left incomplete if the parent remains incapable of caring for their child? What matters is that treatment was made available, and the parent remains incapable of caring for their child.” Id. at 1291.

We agree. Section 39.806(1)(j) imposes three requirements: (1) a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic substance use; (2) the history “renders” the parent incapable of caring for the child, and (3) a refusal or failure to complete available treatment during the three years preceding the petition. The second requirement's use of the present tense, “renders,” reflects chapter 39's concern with the parent's current capacity to safely parent. The third requirement, viewed together with the second, does not create a safe harbor for a parent who, during the three-year period preceding the petition's filing, has completed one treatment program, but has refused or failed to complete other available treatment, while remaining incapable of caring for the child due to substance abuse. To hold otherwise would reduce sobriety and the third requirement to a task to be checked off, rather than an outcome to be evaluated, contrary to chapter 39's emphasis on outcome-based intervention. § 39.001(1)(b)3.-4., Fla. Stat. (2024).

Here, the Mother's chronic substance abuse history is not meaningfully disputed, and the circuit court found that she remains incapable of safely parenting outside a controlled, residential setting. On this record, the Mother's completion of treatment at CRC and her first stay at Mandela does not foreclose termination under section 39.806(1)(j) where the record also shows other failed or refused treatment during the same period and a present inability to safely parent.

Accordingly, we affirm the final order terminating the Mother's parental rights on each ground found by the circuit court.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While a handful of cases briefly mention section 39.806(1)(j), no majority appellate opinions engage in meaningful statutory analysis of the subsection. See, e.g., T.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 300 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (affirming termination on other statutory grounds after finding subsection (1)(j) unsupported); P.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 86 So. 3d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (remanding for correction of an order terminating parental rights because the record did not support termination under sections 39.806(1)(e) and (1)(j)); Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. L.W., 393 So. 3d 758, 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (affirming termination under sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(j) on a record reflecting six inpatient rehabilitation programs and numerous relapses, without addressing whether the parent had completed any program).

Schwab, Charles a., Associate Judge.

Conner and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.