ADAMS v. ADAMS (2026)

Michelle Adams (“Appellant”), the plaintiff below, appeals an April 14, 2026 order (“Order”) declaring her a vexatious litigant under section 68.093 of the Florida Statutes (2026) – Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law (“the Act”) – and imposing sanctions under the trial court's inherent authority and the Act. Prior to Appellant voluntarily dismissing her lawsuit, Max Adams (“Appellee”), the defendant below, filed a motion to have Appellant declared a vexatious litigant and for associated remedies. Appellee's motion also sought, under the trial court's inherent authority, sanctions beyond those expressly authorized by the Act. Appellant filed a response to Appellee's motion and, after conducting an April 10, 2026 hearing at which Appellant was provided an opportunity to be heard on Appellee's motion,¹ the trial court entered the challenged Order.²

I. Standards of Review

Our standard of review is mixed. We review the trial court's determination that Appellant qualifies as a vexatious litigant under the Act for competent, substantial evidence. See Adamson v. McDonough, 963 So. 2d 262, 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “But to the extent that the trial court construed the Act, such statutory interpretation involves a pure question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review.” Walters v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1233, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 1740177, at *2 (Fla. 3d DCA June 17, 2026), reh'g denied (July 13, 2026). We review sanctions imposed under the trial court's inherent authority for an abuse of discretion. See Edwards v. State, 192 So. 3d 522, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). We review, de novo, allegations of a denial of due process. See Ackerman v. HMC Assets, LLC, as Tr. of CAM XVIII Tr., 338 So. 3d 295, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

II. Sanctions Imposed Under the Act

The trial court's determination that Appellant qualifies as a vexatious litigant under the Act is supported by ample competent, substantial evidence. See § 68.093(2)(c)4., Fla. Stat. (2026) (defining a “[v]exatious litigant” as including “a person, proceeding pro se, who ․ [r]epeatedly files unmeritorious pleadings, requests for relief, or other documents; conducts unnecessary discovery; or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to case unnecessary delay in any action”).³ The statutory sanctions imposed by the trial court are authorized by, and closely track, the language of sections 68.093(4)-(6) of the Act.⁴ We, therefore, affirm these aspects of the challenged order without further elaboration.

III. Sanctions Imposed Under the Trial Court's Inherent Authority

We also affirm those aspects of the challenged order that impose, under the trial court's inherent authority, two non-statutory sanctions: precluding Appellant from continuing to represent herself in pending actions in the 11th Judicial Circuit and deactivating Appellant's e-filing privileges.

First, there is authority for a trial court to bar an abusive litigant from any pro se filings in the court's judicial circuit. See, e.g., Clark v. Baney, 355 So. 3d 976, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (affirming sanctions order – issued under trial court's inherent authority to sanction an abusive litigant – that prohibited the litigant from filing any document unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar, or appearing pro se, in any case in the court's judicial circuit).

A trial court not only has inherent authority, but also a duty, to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants. See Golden v. Buss, 60 So. 3d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). When a litigant abuses his or her right to pro se access, he or she diminishes the limited resources of our judicial system, and necessarily hinders the court's ability to consider and adjudicate legitimate and meritorious claims. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999); Clark, 355 So. 3d at 978. Florida's courts are not a playground for people with perceived grievances, and the constitutional right of access to the courts does not require that courts indulge a pro se litigant's “bizarre, ill-conceived hobby.” Clark, 355 So. 3d at 979. Appellant's pattern of abusing the judicial process clearly warranted, indeed required, the trial court to prohibit further pro se activity by Appellant in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

Second, because unrepresented parties are permitted to make electronic filings through the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, see Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.525(b)(2), it logically follows that the trial court – to ensure compliance with the Order's provisions barring Appellant from pro se filings – instructed the lower court clerk to deactivate Appellant's e-filing privileges. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.525(f)(1)(G) (providing that a document submitted for filing in the portal will not be docketed by the clerk if the filing “is barred by order of court”). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sanction. See, e.g., N.Y. State Corr. v. McCray, No. 2:24-CV-00170-DCLC-CRW, 2025 WL 79829, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2025) (entering a prefiling order requiring a vexatious litigant to submit a motion and obtain leave of court before filing further pro se actions, and directing the clerk's office both to identify the litigant as a restricted filer in the federal Case Management/Electronic Case Files system and to reject any proposed filings by the litigant that do not comply with the prefiling order).⁵

Finally, we reject Appellant's argument that the trial court's imposing sanctions under its inherent authority constituted a denial of due process because the trial court did not issue a show cause order separate from Appellee's sanction motion and notice of hearing on same. Before a trial court imposes sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority, a show cause order is generally required to ensure that the pro se litigant has notice of the proposed sanction and an opportunity to be heard in opposition thereto. See Spencer, 751 So. 2d at 48. In this case, the issuance of a show cause order would have been unnecessarily duplicative because (i) both the title and body of Appellee's motion clearly sought imposition of specific sanctions under the trial court's inherent authority, (ii) Appellant had the opportunity to respond to Appellee's motion, and did so, and (iii) the trial court held a noticed hearing on Appellee's motion at which Appellant, had she chosen to attend the hearing, could have argued her opposition to the sanctions. Appellant was afforded the same due process she would have received had the trial court issued an order to show cause. See Filmore v. State, 935 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“We affirm the trial court's order which ․ granted the state's motion to enjoin appellant from further pro se filings. We find that the trial court afforded appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions. The state filed its Motion for Injunction on May 5, 2006. Appellant had an opportunity to respond to the motion, which put him on notice of the potential sanction, and failed to do so. The trial court entered its order granting the state's motion on June 5, 2006, a full month after the motion had been filed.”) (citation omitted). We, therefore, reject Appellant's “form over substance” argument, and conclude that, in entering these sanctions, the trial court provided Appellant the requisite due process.⁶

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the trial court's determination that Appellant is a vexatious litigant under the Act is supported by competent, substantial evidence, and the sanctions imposed by the court under the Act are expressly authorized by the Act. Further, given Appellant's clear abuse of the judicial process, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing, under its inherent authority to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants, additional non-statutory sanctions. The trial court afforded Appellant with due process.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant refused to attend the hearing despite receiving proper notice of the hearing.

2.   We have appellate jurisdiction to review the Order notwithstanding the trial court having entered the challenged order after Appellant voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit. See Steinberg ex rel. Fiesta Homeowners Ass'n v. Cudak, 429 So. 3d 21, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026).

3.   In its detailed Order, the trial court recited Appellant's extensive litigation history – both in litigation in the 11th Judicial Circuit and in the federal courts – that reflects Appellant's repeated pattern of delay and frivolous litigation tactics. Appellant's misconduct in those cases included Appellant filing meritless pleadings, baseless motions to disqualify the trial judges, and numerous motions seeking unwarranted relief. Appellant also disregarded and refused to obey trial court orders.

4.   The Order prohibits Appellant from filing, pro se, any new action in the 11th Judicial Circuit without first obtaining leave of the trial court: a prefiling order. See § 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2026). Appellant obtaining leave of court is conditioned on Appellant showing that the new action is meritorious and not being filed for delay or harassment purposes, and the court may require Appellant to furnish security. Id. The Order prohibits the lower court clerk from filing any new pro se action submitted by Appellant unless Appellant obtains a court order allowing the filing. See § 68.093(5), Fla. Stat. (2026). And the Order directs the lower court clerk to provide a copy of the Order to the Florida Supreme Court clerk, who will add the Order to the registry of vexatious litigants. See § 68.093(6), Fla. Stat. (2026).

5.   Because the Order permits Appellant to file a prefiling motion seeking leave of court to commence a new pro se action, see Fla. Stat. § 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2026), we note that Appellant may submit the motion in paper form to the lower court clerk for filing. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.525(c)(1)(E) (“A paper document may be submitted to the clerk for filing, which the clerk will convert to electronic format, if the ․ court so orders[.]”).

6.   This case is clearly distinguishable from those instances in which Florida's appellate courts have that found court-issued show cause orders were required because the pro se litigants did not receive due process. See, e.g., Cudak, 429 So. 3d at 24 (concluding the trial court should have issued a show cause order and reversing that aspect of an order imposing the sanction of no longer accepting the litigant's pro se filings, observing that “the defendants’ sanction motion did not provide sufficient notice because the motion did not directly ask the court to prohibit the plaintiff's further pro se filing” but merely requested that the trial court refer the matter to the chief judge); Humes v. Solanki, 305 So. 3d 334, 335, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (determining a pro se litigant was not afforded adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before being prohibited from further pro se filings, where the moving party's “motion to strike the [pro se litigant's] improperly-filed notice for trial and subsequently-issued orders included (on page 3, paragraph 11.c) a request for the trial court to bar [the pro-se litigant] from making any future filings” and the “captions on the first page of the motion to strike and the caption on the notice of hearing did not include any reference to the [moving party's] request for an order barring future filings by [the pro se litigant]”); Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 479-80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding the trial court should have issued a show cause order and reversing an order precluding a litigant from further pro se filings, because the moving party's sanctions motion merely sought to preclude the litigant from making future filings without first paying a filing fee).

SCALES, C.J.