RAGAN v. STATE (2026)

Petitioner, Anthawn D. Ragan, seeks relief in habeas corpus alleging that the trial court improperly imposed sanctions barring him from future pro se filings challenging his conviction and sentence. Over a decade and a half ago, the trial court denied Ragan's postconviction motion for DNA testing and simultaneously issued a Spencer ¹ order requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be prohibited from filing further papers on his own behalf. But as the State correctly observes, the lower court docket does not reflect an ensuing prohibition order. Nor has Ragan supplied us with such an order. See Chestnut v. Dep't of Corr., 350 So. 3d 445, 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (dismissing appeal as premature because the notice of appeal did not attach a “rendered order reviewable on appeal” (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (defining “order” as “[a] decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries”); id. (h) (defining “rendition” as the filing of a “signed, written order” with the trial court clerk); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) (providing for “rendition of the order to be reviewed” as the point when the 30-day period in which to file notice of appeal begins to run); id. (l) (allowing for dismissal of an appeal as premature if it is “filed before rendition of a final order”)); cf. State v. S.M., 131 So. 3d 780, 784 (Fla. 2013) (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied when the petitioner fails to provide the district court with an adequate record to review the petition.”); Plumer v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 231 So. 3d 512, 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[P]ro se parties are obligated to abide by the appellate rules.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the petition is, at best, premature.

Petition dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

MILLER, J.