VENGER v. RENO (2026)

Appellant appeals an order denying her motions for enforcement and reunification that she filed in her dissolution action. Appellant sought to modify a no-contact order that had been entered in her separate dependency case and to enforce the parties’ timesharing plan included within the final dissolution judgment. We agree with Appellant that the trial court erroneously determined that her requested relief should have been pursued by petition rather than by motion. Not only had Appellant already filed a supplemental petition to modify timesharing that was still pending in the dissolution action, but the dependency court's no-contact order was not a final judgment. Cf. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.110(h) (“When the nature of an action permits pleadings subsequent to final judgment and the jurisdiction of the court over the parties has not terminated, the initial pleading subsequent to final judgment must be designated a supplemental petition․ Proceedings to modify a final judgment must be initiated only under this subdivision and not by motion.”) (emphasis added). As such, Appellant properly sought relief by motion.

With that said, we affirm the order on appeal under the tipsy coachman doctrine for three reasons. See Holifield v. Big Bend Cares, Inc., 326 So. 3d 739, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (explaining that under the tipsy coachman doctrine, if a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, its decision will be upheld if there is any basis that would support the judgment in the record). First, although Appellant's motion to enforce the final judgment's timesharing plan was properly filed in the dissolution action, the trial court could not have enforced that plan while the dependency court's no-contact order was still in place. See § 39.013(4), Fla. Stat. (providing that orders entered under chapter 39 that affect the placement of, or parental time with, a minor child “shall take precedence over other orders entered in civil actions or proceedings”).

Next, Appellant moved for reunification and to modify the no-contact order in the dissolution action, not in the dependency action. This was notwithstanding the fact that the dependency court retained “jurisdiction” over the case when it terminated protective services and administratively consolidated the two cases. That consolidation did not close the dependency case. See CDI Contractors, LLC v. Allbrite Elec. Contractors, Inc., 836 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“The purpose of consolidating cases is to minimize expense and delay․ Consolidation affects the procedure of the case, but has no effect on the substantive rights of the parties in an individual case, and does not destroy their separate identities.”). Indeed, the dependency court's retention of jurisdiction was “until such time as jurisdiction is relinquished to Family Law Court.” We find nothing in Appellant's appendix showing that jurisdiction over the dependency case was relinquished to the family court. See B.D. v. C.D., 417 So. 3d 322, 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (holding that the guardianship court lacked “case jurisdiction” to proceed where the dependency court continued to exercise jurisdiction over the children); 14302 Marina San Pablo Place SPE, LLC v. VCP-San Pablo, Ltd., 92 So. 3d 320, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Ray, J., concurring) (explaining that “case jurisdiction” pertains to whether a court has power over a particular case that is within its subject matter jurisdiction as determined by reference to the case's procedural posture).

Finally, even if Appellant had filed her motion for reunification in the dependency action or had the trial court in the dissolution action had authority to rule on the matter, Appellant did not abide by the no-contact order's requirements for seeking reunification. Not only did she fail to submit any evidence pertaining to a completed mental health/psychological evaluation below, but she also failed to produce any evidence from the children's therapist, counselor, or psychologist as to visitation. Both types of evidence were expressly required in the no-contact order before the issue of visitation could be reevaluated.

Accordingly, we affirm the order under review.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Ray, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.