E.Y., a child, Appellant, v. STATE (2026)

Appellant E.Y., a child, appeals from the trial court's judgment finding her to be delinquent. She argues the trial court should have granted her a judgment of dismissal for the offense of resisting an officer without violence. We agree and reverse.

Background

The State charged E.Y. in juvenile court with one count of resisting an officer without violence. At her non-jury trial, the State called one witness, the arresting officer. The officer testified that he was dispatched to E.Y.’s address with the information that a 13-year-old girl wearing pink had battered her mother.

The officer's body-worn camera captured the following interaction. When the officer arrived on scene in his full uniform, E.Y., her mother, and another man stood at various points along the sidewalk. The man gestured to where the mother and E.Y. were standing. The officer called out “come here!” in their general direction twice from about 20 or 25 feet away. The mother and E.Y. were both slowly walking away from the officer when he voiced his command, and they continued to do so for a few seconds.

The officer said, “do not run.” E.Y. did not run. The officer then ran towards E.Y. while yelling, “come here!” She immediately stopped walking and started crying. The officer reached E.Y. and handcuffed her without any difficulty. Less than thirty seconds passed from when the officer first said, “come here,” to the point at which he had E.Y. handcuffed.

After the State rested, E.Y. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing that E.Y. had complied with the officer's command “do not run” and did not resist or obstruct him, because she had stopped walking immediately when the officer said, “come here,” and ran towards her. E.Y. argued that her initial walking was to get away from her mother, not the officer, and that none of her actions had impeded or obstructed the officer.

The trial court denied E.Y.’s motion for judgment of dismissal and found her to be delinquent, stating:

Here, I mean, even on the video, it shows that the officer was walking towards the mother and [E.Y.] telling, actually shouting to both of them, come here. [E.Y.] looked at him, walked away. He said, stop, come here like three times. Each time [E.Y.] would stop and then continue walking away. Finally, at the end, the officer had to run to catch up to her as she was walking away from him. I will grant you; this is not the crime of the century. This is like one of the most minimal resisting an officer cases I think I've ever seen.

The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced E.Y. to juvenile probation. This appeal follows.

Analysis

“[T]his court uses the same standard on review [for a judgment of dismissal] as for a judgment of acquittal.” J.P. v. State, 855 So. 2d 1262, 1264 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of review applies․ If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted). We “utilize a much less deferential standard” in reviewing factual findings derived from video evidence which we have also viewed. Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

To prove an individual violated section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2024), “the State must prove: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant's action, by his words, conduct, or a combination thereof, constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty.” Brown v. State, 199 So. 3d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181, 1185–86 (Fla. 2009)).

Here, the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that E.Y. had taken any action which constituted obstruction or resistance of the officer's lawful duty. The trial court was right to characterize this as “one of the most minimal resisting an officer cases I think I've ever seen.” In short, a child harmlessly walked a few feet down a sidewalk for a few seconds and then stood still and cried as a police officer handcuffed her without any obstruction or resistance. E.Y. complied with the officer's command, “do not run,” as she did not run. Further, the officer had not told E.Y. that she was under arrest or that he intended to detain her. See M.M. v. State, 51 So. 3d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In light of the video evidence, which we have independently reviewed, the State simply did not present enough evidence of criminal conduct to satisfy the charged offense's second element. At most, the officer's work was prolonged by a few seconds and accomplished without any difficulty. See R.S. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (reversing where the appellate court was “unprepared to say that under the circumstances of this case [a child's actions] sufficiently impeded the deputies so as to constitute a violation of” section 843.02).

Conclusion

A reasonable factfinder presented with this body-worn camera video would not find sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that E.Y.’s momentary, innocuous conduct constituted “resistance of [the officer's] lawful duty.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand for entry of a judgment of dismissal.

Reversed and remanded.

Forst, J.

Gerber, C.J., and Shaw, J., concur.