Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Ford Motor Company, Appellant, v. Robert Hetsler, individually and as natural parent of V.H., a minor child, and S.H., a minor child, Appellee.
Denied.
This case involves a $103 million verdict against Ford Motor Company arising from a 3:00 am fire in a parked, but idling, 2016 Ford Mustang that had been heavily modified (Roush supercharged), had multiple changes in ownership across state lines, and was ultimately bought in Florida by Robert Hetsler. Tragically, Hetsler was severely burned while sleeping (and perhaps smoking) in the vehicle, which caught fire for unknown reasons; components of the car had been lost, making it difficult to determine what occurred. At trial, Hetsler was afforded an inference under the authority of Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), a case that—although never approved by our supreme court—has taken on a life of its own in Florida appellate courts. Cassisi allows an inference in a manufacturing defect case that a product is defective if it “malfunctions during normal operation.” Id. at 1148.
Ford seeks a written opinion, a certified question, and, pertinent here, en banc consideration of its argument that the inference in Cassisi should not extend to the unusual facts of this case. Unlike in Cassisi, the supercharged Mustang had been substantially altered after it left Ford's control (the dryer in Cassisi had never even been serviced or repaired), its operation can be viewed as other than “normal” (versus ordinary operation of a standard model dryer), and its linkage to Ford's original manufacturing of the vehicle was muddled due to modification and loss of evidence. Ford seeks guidance, both for itself and manufacturing businesses generally, on the limits of the inference when fact patterns become convoluted and dissimilar from those in Cassisi.
En banc review is warranted because the legal limits of Cassisi need to be drawn carefully as in Torres v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), where this court, en banc, held that a purchaser of a vacuum was not entitled to the inference. Id. at 1016. Consensus has not been reached regarding whether the Cassisi inference, which is a judicial creation, should be grounded in the consumer expectation test or a risk utility analysis, a debate that spans thirty years. See, e.g., Theresa A. DiPaola & Edward M. Ricci, Evolution of the Automobile Crashworthiness Doctrine in Florida, 69 Fla. B.J. 40, 45 (Oct. 1995) (discussing Cassisi in the context of automobile crashes). Given that the scope of the Cassisi inference appears to have much pliability, is based in large measure on unresolved public policy arguments, and has eluded review by our supreme court (and befuddled the Florida Standard Jury Instructions Committee (Civil) for decades), en banc review is merited no matter the outcome of the case.
Postscript
This dissental responds solely to Ford's motion for rehearing en banc that was directed to the panel's original disposition in this case, which was an unelaborated per curiam affirmance without a written opinion issued on November 18, 2025. Today, the panel withdraws its prior per curiam affirmance, replacing it with newly minted written opinions, obviously in response to Ford's motion for a written opinion. Because the panel's brand-new decision will be subject to review should Ford file a motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc (or a judge of this Court move for rehearing en banc),* this dissental does not address the panel's new decision and written opinions at this juncture.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE. Florida's appellate rules provide that a “party shall not file more than 1 motion for rehearing, clarification, certification, or written opinion with respect to a particular order or decision of the court. All motions filed under this rule with respect to a particular order or decision must be combined in a single document.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(b) (emphases added); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(d)(1) (“Generally. A rehearing en banc may be ordered by a district court of appeal on its own motion or on motion of a party.”).
Per Curiam.
Jay, C.J., and Lambert, Edwards, Eisnaugle, Harris, Soud, Boatwright, Kilbane, and MacIver, JJ., concur. Makar, J., dissents with opinion. Wallis, J., recused.
Thank you for your feedback!
As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin.
Docket No: Case No. 5D2024-2368
Decided: July 31, 2026
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)