PINO v. HUDSON EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

Affirmed. See Glenn v. Roberts, 95 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if the moving party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”); Fontainebleau Florida Hotel LLC v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 408 So. 3d 862, 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning․. Where the policy language is plain and unambiguous, no special rule of construction or interpretation applies, and the court should give the plain language in the contract the meaning it clearly expresses.”); Aiello v. ASI Preferred Corp., 315 So. 3d 713, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“[T]he Watercraft Exclusion and severability clause at issue in this case use the term ‘an insured’ rather than ‘the insured.’ Courts have repeatedly recognized that ‘an insured’ and ‘the insured’ are distinct and have separate meanings; ‘an’ means ‘any’ and ‘the’ means a specific insured.” (emphasis in original)); Acceleration Nat. Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Fin. Servs. Motor Club, Inc., 541 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that in a contract “ ‘any’ is often synonymous with ‘either,’ ‘every,’ or ‘all’ ” and “ ‘any’ is defined as ‘[o]ne or another without restriction or exception’ ” (internal citations omitted)).

PER CURIAM.