ROBINSON v. STATE (2022)

Jhaphelix Robinson appeals the postconviction court order dismissing his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion.¹ We affirm.

Robinson filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, insisting that his mandatory minimum life sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) is illegal because the PRR statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2010), permits the mandatory minimum portion of a sentence to be enhanced when a trial judge finds that the defendant committed a qualifying offense within three years of being released from a correctional facility. Relying on a trial judge's order from the Orange County Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Robinson insisted that under the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), any fact that increased the mandatory minimum sentence must be found by a jury. Accordingly, Robinson argued, his life sentence is illegal.

The trial court did not err in dismissing Robinson's motion. This court squarely rejected Robinson's argument in Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). In Lopez, we recognized that Apprendi carved out a specific exception for recidivist statutes like the PRR statute. This court found that because a defendant's date of release from a prior prison sentence is directly derivative of a prior conviction, it need not be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be subject to a PRR sentence. Id. (citing Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

In affirming the order on appeal, we note that the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court decision relied on by Robinson is not binding on trial courts within this court's jurisdiction and does not serve as a basis for relief. Cf. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1992) ("[I]f the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it. Contrarily, as between District Courts of Appeal, a sister district's opinion is merely persuasive." (quoting State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976))). Here, the postconviction court correctly determined that Lopez was controlling in dismissing Robinson's motion.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the postconviction court's order dismissed Robinson's motion, it addressed the merits of his claim.

PER CURIAM.

CASANUEVA, SLEET, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.