DOUKAS v. DOUKAS (2022)

Appellant is the mother of these parties' minor child. She appeals three trial court orders. The first is an order denying the mother's motion for declaratory relief as to interpretation of a relocation clause in the parties’ marital settlement agreement. We affirm this order without further comment.

The second and third orders on appeal denied the mother's petition to modify child support, and then denied her motion for rehearing, respectively. The second order was an appealable non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii), because it required the parties to mediate the issue of timesharing before the trial court would adjudicate the issue of child support. See Cassell v. Erquiaga, 28 So. 3d 143, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that an order is non-final if it “contemplate[s] additional judicial labor”). However, rather than filing a timely interlocutory appeal within 30 days after rendition of this order as required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(b), the mother moved for rehearing. A motion for rehearing is not authorized as to a non-final order, so it does not toll the time for appeal. See Lovelace v. Lovelace, 124 So. 3d 447, 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“The law in Florida is well settled that a motion for rehearing or reconsideration does not toll the time for filing an appeal from a non-final order reviewable pursuant to the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.”). The trial court denied rehearing, and the mother appealed within 30 days after denial of rehearing, but by then—without tolling—far more than 30 days had passed after rendition of the original appealable non-final order. We therefore lack jurisdiction over the untimely portion of the mother's appeal, and must dismiss it.

Affirmed in part; Dismissed in part.

Per Curiam.

MAKAR, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.