QUINTAS VAZQUEZ v. SMITH (2021)

Petitioner, Alejandro Quintas Vazquez, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the assigned trial judge from further presiding over his dissolution of marriage proceedings pending below. His verified disqualification motion, deemed legally insufficient by the trial judge, alleges nothing more than adverse judicial rulings. We write only to reiterate the well-settled principle that the laws governing judicial disqualification were never intended “to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made,” but, instead, serve “to prevent his [or her] future action in the pending case.” Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31, 41 S. Ct. 230, 232, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) (citation omitted); see Ex parte Am. Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 43-44, 33 S. Ct. 1007, 1010, 57 L.Ed. 1379 (1913); Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So. 2d 857, 860 (Fla. 1956); State ex rel. Locke v. Sandler, 156 Fla. 136, 23 So. 2d 276, 278 (1945). Consequently, mere recitations of adverse rulings, without more, do not constitute the requisite bias or prejudice necessary to support disqualification. See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 204 (Fla. 2010); Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 58, 115 So. 519, 525 (1928); Clark v. Clark, 159 So. 3d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); Areizaga v. Spicer, 841 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Orr v. State, 741 So. 2d 636, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Solana v. Solana, 706 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). “Whether such rulings were correct or not is a matter to be determined on appeal from the final judgment.” Claughton v. Claughton, 452 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Accordingly, here, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a basis for relief.

Petition denied.

After petitioner sought a writ of prohibition disqualifying the assigned trial court judge from further presiding over his family law case, we denied relief. Quintas Vazquez v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 3, 2021). More than fifteen days after the opinion issued, relying upon a timely-filed motion to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, petitioner has moved our court to stay the effect of the mandate, or, alternatively, recall the same, pending further review. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.310; Fla. R. App. P. 9.340(a). This court was required to issue its mandate upon the expiration of the fifteen-day period established in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(a).¹ Further, we are not convinced a stay or recall is “essential” or the balance of relevant factors weigh in favor of petitioner. Fla. R. App. P. 9.120 advisory committee notes; see Banco Indus. de Venezuela, C.A. v. de Saad, 126 So. 3d 259 (Fla 3d DCA 2010); State v. Miyasato, 805 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); 3 Fla. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 414 (2021). Accordingly, we deny the requested relief.

Denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   No timely motion for rehearing was filed with this court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a)(1).

MILLER, J.