SENKO v. STATE (2020)

AFFIRMED. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that in a pretrial setting, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit a prosecutor from carrying out a threat, made during plea negotiations, to bring additional, more serious charges against an accused who refused to plead guilty to the originally-charged offense when it is undisputed that the additional charge is justified by the evidence, the prosecutor was in possession of this evidence when the original charge was filed, and the additional charge was filed solely because of the accused’s failure to plead to the original charge); Wallace v. State, 689 So. 2d 1159, 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“There is no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when additional charges are filed, even at the beginning of trial, after a defendant’s refusal to plead guilty to the initially charged crimes.”), quashed on other grounds, 724 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1998); State v. Phillips, 642 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“For just as a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982))).

PER CURIAM.

EVANDER, C.J., and WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.