ROBINSON v. FARAH FARAH INC (2020)

After denying Petitioner's mandamus petition on the merits in this case, this Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for filing a petition in this Court containing scandalous accusations which insult and malign the lower court judge and allege the judge committed treason against the United States Constitution. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (“After 10 days' notice, on its own motion, the court may impose sanctions for any violation of these rules, or for the filing of any proceeding, motion, brief, or other document that is frivolous or in bad faith. Such sanctions may include reprimand, contempt, striking of briefs or pleadings, dismissal of proceedings, costs, attorneys' fees, or other sanctions.”). Petitioner has not responded to this Court's order.

In light of Petitioner's unfounded, malignant accusations against the lower court judge, and Petitioner's disregard for this Court's order to show cause, the Court hereby finds it appropriate to sanction Petitioner through a public reprimand.^* Despite receiving an adverse legal ruling, Petitioner is expected “to maintain the bare minimum standard of decorum and respect for the judicial system that all litigants must have when filing court pleadings and seeking court rulings.” Day v. State, 903 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 2005). Petitioner's conduct has fallen well below this minimum standard.

When a pro se litigant fails to maintain the appropriate standard of decorum and respect, “[t]his Court has the authority and the duty to prevent the misuse and abuse of the judicial system” and “will not allow its judicial processes to be misused by [a litigant] to malign and insult those persons and institutions” coming in contact with the litigant within the judicial system. Id. Therefore, in light of Petitioner's conduct, Petitioner is warned that any future filings containing such malignant allegations will subject Petitioner to further and more serious sanctions, up to and including barring Petitioner from filing pleadings in this Court unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   In light of the differences in severity between Petitioner's actions in this case and the litigants' actions in Mora and Day, we decline to bar Petitioner from further pro se filings at this time. Compare Mora v. McNeil, 984 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 2008) (instructing the Clerk of Court to refuse future filings by the pro se litigant unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar due in part to petitioner's “scandalous and obscene language in the petition,” where pro se litigant filed 23 pro se pleadings, including a pleading entitled “Petition to Inhibit Jurisdiction From this Very Supreme Court of Injustice” in which pro se litigant tells the justices to repeatedly “kiss his a**” and accuses one justice of being a terrorist); Day v. State, 903 So. 2d at 888 (barring further pro se filings unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar “in order to preserve the dignity of the judicial system, and to prevent the waste of precious judicial resources” where pro se litigant filed 38 pro se pleadings and then “flaunted” his disregard for the Court in response to the show cause order “by making insulting and offensive statements”).

Per Curiam.

B.L. Thomas, Roberts, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.