BARR v. STATE (2020)

Michael Anthony Barr, Jr., appeals his judgment and sentences for armed robbery and grand theft auto. He argues that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm for the reasons that follow.

After the jury returned its guilty verdict, Barr moved for a new trial on the following grounds:

1. This Court erred in sustaining the State's objection to Asked and Answered when defense was crossing the victim ․

2. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made at the close of the State's case.

3. This Court erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made at the close of all the evidence.

4. The Jury failed to review any evidence in this case.

5. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

6. The verdict is contrary to the law.

At the ensuing hearing, defense counsel stated she had “no other argument on behalf of the defendant,” and the trial court denied the motion as follows:

Okay. The Court will rely on the rulings that I made during the trial and again reviewing it at this stage the Court finds no reason to disturb any of those rulings and based on the Court's review of the motion and, again, at this stage the Court will deny the motion for new trial.

Barr did not object or seek clarification on the standard applied by the trial court. Instead, he argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court improperly applied the sufficiency of the evidence standard in ruling on his motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

We review de novo the issue of whether the trial court applied the correct standard in ruling on a motion for new trial. Jordan v. State, 244 So. 3d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). A trial court must evaluate whether a jury's verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, and essentially act as an additional juror, in ruling on a motion for new trial, whereas it must apply the sufficiency of the evidence standard in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. It is reversible error to use the wrong standard. Id. However, the potential that the trial court used the incorrect standard in denying a motion for new trial does not constitute fundamental error, and when the appellant fails to preserve the issue and it is unclear whether the court used the wrong standard, we must affirm. Kline v. State, 274 So. 3d 525, 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (affirming where the trial court denied the motion stating, “[t]he motion for new trial is denied for reasons stated on the record during trial” because the appellant did not object or seek clarification); see also Knighton v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D250 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 31, 2020) (affirming upon finding that the appellant failed to preserve his argument that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard in denying his motion for new trial where it stated, “All right. With nothing more to consider, I mean, I dealt with these issues at trial, and I don't know that I can—there's anything that would change my mind. I think there was sufficient evidence on all three counts to support the verdict of guilty and actual possession” and he did not object or seek clarification); Williams v. State, 278 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

In moving for a new trial, Barr challenged several of the trial court's rulings during the trial, in addition to asserting that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court gave no indication of what standard(s) it utilized in denying the motion. The trial court denied the motion stating that it saw no reason to disturb the rulings it had made during the trial and it was denying the motion for new trial based on its review thereof. The referenced rulings clearly pertained to the State's sustained objection and Barr's denied motions for judgment of acquittal, and the remaining grounds of the motion for new trial were denied without further comment. Barr did not object or seek clarification and, therefore, failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

Moreover, even if the issue had been preserved, we would find no error because nothing in the trial court's ruling suggests that it applied the incorrect standard. See Moreland v. State, 253 So. 3d 1245, 1246–47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the trial court applied the incorrect standard where it denied his motion for new trial stating, “The Court will rely on the rulings previously made in this case, and I will deny the motion for new trial at this time” because the first part of the statement corresponded to the challenges in the motion to the court's previous rulings and the second part simply denied the motion without comment and nothing in the summary denial suggested that the court applied the incorrect standard); see also Franklin v. State, 286 So. 3d 962, 963–67 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (finding no error where the trial court denied the motion for new trial stating, “And I will based upon my review of the motion for new trial and my memory of the trial itself and the argument previously made at trial with the same issue as well as the arguments made today I will stand by my previous ruling and my reasons for those rulings, and I will deny defendant's motion for new trial. Based upon those previous rulings and my reasons for the same I stand by those, and I am going to enter an order at this time denying the Motion for New Trial”); Bell v. State, 248 So. 3d 208, 209–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Bell raised both sufficiency-of-the-evidence and weight-of-the-evidence arguments in his new-trial motions. While the judges’ oral rulings only addressed the standard for the sufficiency arguments, it does not follow that the judges applied the sufficiency standard to the weight-of-the-evidence arguments. [Citation omitted] The judges had separate legal issues before them, and the record does not suggest that they applied the same standard to both.”).

Therefore, we affirm Barr's judgment and sentences.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, B.L. Thomas, and Nordby, JJ., concur.