MORALES DIAZ v. STATE (2020)

Affirmed. See Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001) (noting: “We recognize and honor the trial court's superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses”); I.R. v. State, 385 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding: “Where the evidence is in conflict, it is within the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, and upon evaluating the testimony, rely upon the testimony found by it to be worthy of belief and reject such testimony found by it to be untrue”); Vanstraten v. State, 901 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (observing; “To the extent that the testimonial evidence conflicts, it is a trial court's duty to assess the credibility of witnesses and to determine which testimony warrants belief”). See also Lamkin v. State, 215 So. 3d 640, 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (observing: “The court's express statements during the plea colloquy that it makes no promises as to the sentence, that it could sentence the defendant up to the statutory maximum, or that the defendant may serve every day of the sentence can refute a defendant's claims that, under the advice of counsel, the defendant entered a plea believing he would receive a particular sentence or that he would get certain gain time”) (citing State v. Leroux, 689 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1996)); Scheele v. State, 953 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (observing: “A plea conference is not a meaningless charade to be manipulated willy-nilly after the fact; it is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in the case. What is said and done at a plea conference carries consequences”).

PER CURIAM.