COUNSIL v. ANDERSON (2018)

Appellant seeks review of the order extending a temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence for 90 days. We reverse because there was no factual basis to enter or extend the injunction because, as the trial court orally found, there had been no violence between the parties.¹ Accordingly, even though the injunction has now expired, we remand for entry of an order vacating the injunction. See Pryor v. Pryor, 141 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (explaining that domestic violence injunctions are an exception to the usual rules of mootness because of the collateral consequences that flow from such injunctions) (quoting Rodman v. Rodman, 48 So.3d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ).

Reversed and Remanded with instructions

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant did not challenge the legal basis for extending the temporary injunction, so we need not decide that issue. However, for the trial court’s benefit in subsequent cases, we note that “[s]ection 741.30 ‘does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions in lieu of a permanent injunction.’ ” Dietz v. Dietz, 127 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Bacchus v. Bacchus, 108 So.3d 712, 716 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ); see also § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (authorizing the extension of a temporary injunction only when the final hearing is continued for good cause shown).

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Wetherell, and Wolf, JJ., concur.