Arturo Oval, Appellant, v. Aura Felipa Leal, Appellee. (2026)

Affirmed. See Apesteguy v. Keglevich, 319 So. 3d 150, 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“Generally, we review a trial court's equitable distribution determination for an abuse of discretion․ ‘Where “there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings, the appellate court cannot” substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.’ ” (quoting Van Maerssen v. Gerdts, 295 So. 3d 819, 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020))); Tercier v. Univ. of Miami, Inc., 383 So. 3d 847, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[W]hat is critical for a reviewing court is that a final judgment reflect the trial judge's independent decision on the issues of a case, not that the judge used words drafted by one of the parties to express that decision.” (quoting Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 987 So. 2d 753, 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“The trial court's active participation in the proceedings supports our conclusion that there is no appearance that the trial court did not exercise its independent judgment when entering the final judgment in the instant case.”); Vindel v. Stewart, 388 So. 3d 228, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (cautioning that “[a] party in a divorce proceeding is not ‘entitled’ to [prejudgment] interest in every case, because the trial court must have broad discretion to determine the most equitable distribution of marital property under the particular circumstances” (quoting Mathers v. Brown, 21 So. 3d 834, 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009))), review granted, No. SC2024-0428, 2024 WL 4686838 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2024); Iannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“The standard of review for an award or denial of attorney's fees in a Florida dissolution of marriage proceeding is abuse of discretion.”).

PER CURIAM.