Branden Bailey, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. (2026)

Branden Bailey appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion alleging that his Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). While the postconviction court's reasons for denying the motion were erroneous, we affirm based on the tipsy coachman doctrine.

In denying the motion, the postconviction court reasoned that (1) the alleged error relates to the sentencing process, not the sentence itself, and (2) Erlinger is not retroactive because it is not a “development of fundamental significance.”

We have already considered and rejected both of these reasons for denying Bailey's motion in Brown v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1191a (Fla. 5th DCA May 30, 2025). First, while we still agree that rule 3.800(a) is an odd fit for an Apprendi claim, it is also still true that our supreme court's decision in Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla. 2014), makes such a claim cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. “We are, of course, bound by Plott, as is the postconviction court.” Brown, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at D1191a.

Second, “the postconviction court's unelaborated statement that Erlinger is not retroactive misses the mark because, for one, [Bailey] did not rely on Erlinger alone. He relied on Apprendi and its progeny.” Id. In fact, in this case, the motion relies almost exclusively on Apprendi—which was decided long before the convictions at issue.¹ As a result, retroactivity is not relevant to our analysis. Id.

Although the postconviction court's reasons for denying Bailey's motion were in error, we affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine.² This court has already rejected these claims. See Denson v. State, 401 So. 3d 633, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025); Simmons v. State, 332 So. 3d 1129, 1131–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).³

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do not suggest that relying on Erlinger alone would foreclose Bailey's claim because we do not decide whether Erlinger announced a new rule or if it merely applied Apprendi. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). Of course, we are aware of our supreme court's decision in Wainwright v. State, 411 So. 3d 392, 399 (Fla. 2025), but Wainwright did not hold that Erlinger announced a new rule. Instead, Wainwright concluded that “even if Erlinger constitutes a change of law, it does not apply retroactively.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, unlike the appellant in Wainwright, Bailey does not argue that Erlinger created a new rule apart from the rule announced in Apprendi. In short, given the differing nature and procedural posture of the appellant's successive claim in Wainwright, that decision would not necessarily foreclose Bailey's argument in this case. Id. at 401 (“And even if Erlinger announced a new rule that might serve as a vehicle for Wainwright to overcome this procedural bar, Erlinger does not apply retroactively.” (emphasis added)).

2.   See Home Depot U.S.A. Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“The trial judge made the right decision, albeit for the wrong reason ․”).

3.   While our holding in Simmons is currently under review in the supreme court, it remains binding to date. Maye v. State, No. SC2023-1184, 2024 WL 1796831, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2024).

Eisnaugle, J.

Wallis and Lambert, JJ., concur.