GLEN DERRICK JOHNSON v. SHARON MUSCELLA (2026)

Defendant seeks review of the trial court's order barring him from filing further pro se pleadings. Because such an order is reviewable by petition for writ of certiorari, we treat defendant's appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause must be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought ․”); see also Epps v. State, 941 So. 2d 1206, 1206-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (reviewing through certiorari an order precluding a party from filing further pro se pleadings). We deny certiorari.

Because an order prohibiting pro se filings restricts a litigant's access to the courts, it must comply with due process and provide “notice and an opportunity to respond” to show cause why the sanction should not be imposed. State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). We find that the trial court gave defendant sufficient due process before barring him from making any further pro se filings. See id. As to the other issues raised by defendant, we find them to be without merit. As such, we deny the writ of certiorari.

Petition denied.

Per Curiam.

Levine, Forst and Shepherd, JJ., concur.