Annie Gilbert, et al., Appellants, v. In Re: Annie Riley, Appellee. (2026)

Annie Gilbert, et al., (Appellant) appeals the trial court's order denying her petition to reopen the estate, petition for subsequent administration, and motion for rehearing. The motion to reopen the estate was based on a purported alternate will. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decisions, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Annie P. Riley (Decedent) died on June 12, 2016, survived by her adult children. One of those adult children, Willie Riley, is the personal representative for her estate.

On February 14, 2024, Willie filed a petition for administration, with a copy of the Decedent's last will, dated September 16, 2000 (the 2000 Will). The next day, Willie filed a petition for establishment and probate of a lost or destroyed will, and appointment of personal representative. Willie is the sole beneficiary under the 2000 Will.

A week later, a different will, dated May 28, 2014 (the 2014 Will), was filed with the trial court. According to Appellant, “[t]he Clerk of Court uploaded the 2014 [W]ill to the docket one week after the opening of the estate at the Appellant's request.” The 2014 Will names all of the Decedent's heirs as equal beneficiaries. In both wills, Willie is named as personal representative. Significantly, between February 14 and May 17, 2024, Willie continued to probate the 2000 Will with no formal objection by any heir or other interested party. By way of example, the following activity took place without objection:

• On April 16, 2024, Willie filed a proof of will for the lost or destroyed will.

• On April 17, the trial court entered an order to progress and for the personal representative (Willie) to secure letters of administration and order of appointment by May 7.

• On April 29, Willie filed six ex parte motions for clerk's default against Annie M. Gilbert (daughter), Beulah Parris (daughter), Earl Riley (son), Levan Fludd (grandson), Mamie James (daughter) and Nancy Smith (granddaughter).

• On April 30, Willie submitted an affidavit of military service, confirming that the served individuals were not on active duty in the military. The same day, the clerk entered defaults against the six individuals.

• On May 2, 2024, Willie filed letters of administration, and, the same day, the trial court entered an order admitting the 2000 Will to probate and appointing Willie personal representative. Significant to this appeal, the trial court noted that no objection had been made to probate of the 2000 Will.

• On May 3, 2024, Willie filed a petition to determine homestead status of the real property, and days later, (May 6) the trial court entered an order finding that Willie “was named as the sole beneficiary” under the 2000 Will, title to the real property “descended” to Willie, and the homestead exemption applied to protect Willie from “the claims of the decedent's creditors.”

• On May 7, 2024, Willie filed a petition for discharge of the personal representative. The trial court entered the order of discharge the following day, finding the estate had been “fully administered and properly distributed, that claims of creditors [had] been paid or otherwise disposed of,” and applicable taxes paid.

On May 17—nine days after the discharge order was entered—Appellant filed, in a single pleading, an objection to the petition for discharge and a petition for subsequent administration. She contended that the 2014 Will executed by the Decedent was recorded in the depository, and, accordingly, sought to “reopen the Estate, along with any and all other relief deemed necessary and [p]roper, including vacating any Petitions based off the probating of a lost will.”¹ The trial court did not rule on the pleading nor did Appellant seek a hearing on it.

Seven months later, on December 10, 2024, Appellant filed the underlying petition to reopen the estate for further administration. On January 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order to progress the matter, which provided:

Review of the court file on the Clerk's docket indicates that a petition or motion was filed requesting that this case be reopened resulting in an administrative re-opening of the estate; however, a proposed order on said petition or motion has not been submitted, nor has a hearing been set. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that:

The petitioner or movant has an obligation to actively progress the resolution of this cause or to explain to the Court why they are unable to do so at this time. The petition or motion to reopen the case must be ruled upon before any other outstanding matter may be addressed. The petitioner or movant must secure an order to reopen the case or set the matter for hearing within 20 days (January 29, 2025) of the date of this order. Failure to comply will result in an administrative closure of this estate without further notice.

(Emphasis added).

On February 8 (ten days after the January 29 deadline established by the above order), Appellant filed a notice of hearing for February 25. On the day of the hearing (for which there is no transcript), the trial court denied the petition to reopen the estate, denied the petition for subsequent administration, overruled Appellant's objection to discharge of the personal representative, and sustained and granted Willie's objection to re-opening the estate.

Appellant moved for rehearing, citing the 2014 Will placed on the trial court docket after the opening of the estate. She argued that, even if she was in default for not answering, “the Personal Representative had a duty to administer the correct will when competent evidence was provided that the lost will was revoked.” Significantly, the 2014 Will lists the Decedent's children as beneficiaries whereas Willie is the only beneficiary of the 2000 Will. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews an order on a motion to reopen an estate for an abuse of discretion. Loftis v. Loftis, 208 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). A claim of deprivation of procedural due process is generally an issue of law reviewed de novo, but we review underlying factual findings by examining the record to determine whether they are supported by competent substantial evidence. Pena v. Rodriguez, 273 So. 3d 237, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts two claims. First, she contends she was denied due process because the trial court “simply ignored” her May 17 objection to discharge of the personal representative and petition for subsequent administration of the estate. This contention has no merit, given that the pleading was filed nine days after the trial court's discharge order. See In re Jackson's Est., 236 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (“[T]he petition for revocation of probate, filed the day after the entry of the order of final discharge of the personal representative, was untimely and therefore was not a proper subject to be considered on its merits.”); Yellen v. Long, 387 So. 2d 384, 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (“Appellants’ petition for revocation of probate was filed subsequent to rendition of an order discharging the personal representative. We affirm our holding in In Re Estate of Jackson, 236 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), that such a petition should be dismissed as untimely.”); see also § 733.901, Fla. Stat. (2026) (governing final discharge of the personal representative and providing that discharge releases the personal representative and bars any action against him, individually and the surety). Of note, Appellant concedes she was aware of the ongoing probate proceedings (this point is discussed in more detail below).

Second, Appellant contends that the trial court reversibly erred when it probated the 2000 Will even though there was a more recent 2014 Will filed with the trial court.² As to this point, the 2000 Will names only Willie (the personal representative) as beneficiary, and was filed as a “lost or destroyed” will, whereas the 2014 Will names all of the Decedent's heirs as equal beneficiaries. Nevertheless, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order, given that Appellant repeatedly failed to participate in the proceedings or to meet court deadlines.

“The trial court has broad discretion to allow a party to reopen its case throughout all stages of the proceedings.” Loftis, 208 So. 3d at 826. For instance, “where there [are] procedural irregularities or facts constituting fraud or bad faith,” Florida allows “the reopening of an estate after the discharge of the personal representative.” Udell v. Udell, 397 So. 3d 1050, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (holding trial court erred in denying appellant's petition to reopen the estate where he alleged fraud committed by personal representative, e.g., withholding material information about surviving spouse's rights where the personal representative had a duty to disclose this information in that capacity) (quoting Carraway v. Carraway, 883 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).

While an objection based on fraud can serve as a basis to reopen the estate for further administration, see Van Dusen v. Se. First Nat. Bank of Miami, 478 So. 2d 82, 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“If the personal representative has not disclosed its disposition of an asset of the estate, it is not entitled to the sanctuary provided by section 733.901(5), at least not where, as here, it is alleged that the asset was intentionally given away to a party who was not entitled thereto.”); cf. Walton v. Est. of Walton, 601 So. 2d 1266, 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (recognizing “the presumption that a will which was in the possession of the testator prior to death and which cannot be located subsequent to death was destroyed by the testator with the intention of revoking it.”), Appellant never expressly alleged fraud. Appellant's May 17 petition for subsequent administration asserted that the parties had mediated “twice to no resolution;” they “agreed to let the Court determine the outcome of which of the two wills executed by the Decedent would control;” and “the parties objecting to the petition for Discharge always understood that there would be a hearing in this matter in which their concerns could be voiced.” Appellant's December 10 motion to reopen likewise did not directly allege fraud, and merely declared: “The will was never lost. It was always in the depository and filed weeks after the Decedent's death in 2017. [ ] A prior will was used to close the Estate, which is contrary to the Decedent's most recent will.”

Appellant also did not provide any basis for her failure to timely participate in the proceedings, to object to the petition for discharge, or to act timely to meet the deadlines established by the trial court's orders. Appellant (and all heirs) were properly served and therefore on notice of the proceedings. Even her objection (filed by counsel) acknowledges that she was aware of the probate proceedings. Appellant does not allege otherwise and concedes that the 2000 Will was probated without “formal objection” from any heirs until she filed her May 17th objection. And to the extent Appellant's due process claims are based upon disputed questions of fact, the absence of a transcript of the hearing is fatal to this claim. See Olivas v. Morales, 420 So. 3d 1091, 1091-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (noting that “the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the final hearing upon which the trial court based its factual findings and, ultimately, its final judgment. This failure is fatal to Oliva's claim on appeal.”) (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“When there are issues of fact the appellant necessarily asks the reviewing court to draw conclusions about the evidence. Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.”)).

Lastly, and significantly, Appellant failed to either “secure an order to reopen the case or set the matter [her petition to reopen] for hearing” by January 29 as directed by the trial court's January 9 order. The order further warned that the failure to do so would “result in an administrative closure of this estate without further notice.” Yet Appellant did not file a notice for hearing until February 8—ten days after the January 29th deadline.

CONCLUSION

Because Appellant generally failed to participate in the probate proceedings (despite being served and aware of those proceedings), we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's objection to the petition for discharge of the personal representative; denying Appellant's petition for subsequent administration; denying Appellant's petition to reopen the estate; and denying Appellant's motion for rehearing.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant also filed a notice of lis pendens on the property, which Willie moved to dissolve on December 9, 2024. The trial court dissolved, with prejudice, the lis pendens in its order.

2.   Section 733.903, Florida Statutes, provides that the “final settlement of an estate and the discharge of the personal representative shall not prevent further administration.” It further provides that “[t]he order of discharge may not be revoked based upon the discovery of a will or later will.” § 733.903. Here, however, the 2014 Will was not discovered later or after discharge; the 2014 Will was filed with the trial court on February 21, 2024, three months before the order discharging the personal representative.

EMAS, J.