MICHAEL GLENN TRUST LLC v. WALTON COUNTY FL (2026)

Petitioners seek review of a final judgment that affirmed, under section 163.035, Florida Statutes, the existence of recreational customary use on various Walton County beachfront properties, including parcels owned by the Petitioners. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is dismissed.

In 2017, Respondent Walton County adopted an ordinance establishing and protecting the public's “long-standing customary use of the dry sand areas of all of the beaches in the County for recreational purposes.” Walton County, Fla., Code § 23-2 (Mar. 28, 2017). In 2018, the legislature enacted section 163.035, Florida Statutes, adopting the procedure a governmental entity must follow when it seeks to establish the existence of recreational customary use on private property. The County complied with the statutory notice requirements and, in December 2018, initiated the underlying proceeding by filing a complaint under section 163.035 and chapter 86, Florida Statutes, in the circuit court. A bench trial was set, but every claim brought by represented intervening parties at that point had been either dismissed or settled. The County then filed nine motions for summary judgment, each motion relating to a different beach area within the County. The circuit court granted the motions.

In February 2024, the circuit court entered its final judgment under section 163.035 declaring the County had established the existence of customary use and affirming the public's limited right of customary use on the dry sand beach above the mean high-water line with respect to the remaining parcels, which included those owned by Petitioners. Petitioners timely sought review of the final judgment. The case was initially filed as a direct appeal, which this Court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. While the appeal was pending, the legislature repealed section 163.035. See Ch. 2025-178, § 1, Laws of Fla. This Court directed the parties to address the effect of the statutory repeal at oral argument.

At oral argument, the parties conceded the final judgment is a nullity. We agree. With the enactment of chapter 2025-178, section 1, the final judgment has no more legal effect, leaving no harm to be remedied. Cf. State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 109 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1959) (“While no decision on this point has been made by this court, it appears to be universally held in the courts of other states and the federal courts that when the jurisdiction of a court depends upon a statute which is repealed or otherwise nullified, the jurisdiction falls even over pending causes, unless the repealing statute contains a savings clause.”).

Yet, the parties continued to argue the merits. When asked about the effect of the statutory repeal, the County posited the statutory repeal brought the parties back to “square one.” The County could not say whether the 2017 ordinance was revived but affirmed its previous posture that the 2017 ordinance was invalidated by section 163.035 and no longer in effect. The County believed it had discretion to adopt a new ordinance regulating customary use under home rule power. When asked what harm was left to be remedied, Petitioners claimed uncertainty if the final judgment was not quashed. Petitioners hypothesized that the Sheriff might not enforce trespass calls and argued the recorded final judgment operated as a cloud on their title.

Certiorari is an extremely rare remedy that will be granted in very few cases. See Swift Response, LLC v. Routt, 401 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). To invoke this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, Petitioners must demonstrate substantial and immediate harm flowing from the now nullified final judgment. Petitioners have not done so. They have only asserted abstract, hypothetical harm that cannot satisfy the jurisdictional harm requirement. Id. at 643.

For these reasons, the petition is Dismissed.

Per Curiam.

Roberts, Ray, and Kelsey,* JJ., concur.