A-Team Response Restoration Corp., Appellant, v. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Appellee. (2025)

Appellant, the Plaintiff below, A-Team Response Restoration Corp. (“A-Team”), appeals the trial court's Order Denying its Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration of Appellee's, the Defendant below, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), Motion for Final Summary Judgment. We do not reach the merits. Rather, we review whether we are required to dismiss A-Team's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We are not. A-Team included in its notice of appeal only the order denying rehearing and failed to include the final order to which the motion for rehearing was directed. The timely filed motion for rehearing of a final order tolled the time for the filing of the appeal but is itself not independently appealable. However, it is reasonable to conclude that A-Team also intends to challenge the final order directly related to the order denying rehearing. Granting review of such final order would not prejudice Citizens.

In December 2023, A-Team initiated this breach of contract action against Citizens. Less than a year later, Citizens filed its Motion for Final Summary Judgment, which the trial court granted on February 1, 2025. In its three-page order (the “Final Order”), the trial court outlined the general facts of the case and found that the contract at issue “does not comply with § 627.7152(2)(a)(5), Florida Statutes (2022), and is, therefore, invalid and unenforceable.” The trial court also found that A-Team “lacks standing to bring this action and Citizens is entitled to final summary judgment as a matter of law.” The Final Order completely disposes of the single breach of contract claim.

Nine days later, A-Team responded to the Final Order with its Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration. The trial court then denied that motion six months later in its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Rehearing and Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (the “Rehearing Order”). The Rehearing Order makes the same factual findings as the ones in the Final Order. But the Rehearing Order more thoroughly explains why Citizens is entitled to final summary judgment and why the contract here is unenforceable under section 627.7152, Florida Statutes.

A-Team then filed its Notice of Appeal less than thirty days after rendition of the Rehearing Order. The Notice of Appeal designates the Rehearing Order as the only order A-Team wishes to appeal. Thereafter, we entered an order to show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as one taken from a non-final, non-appealable order.

“Generally, the test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order, judgment or decree is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties directly affected. The title of the order, judgment or decree is not controlling.” Salgado v. Suyapa-Jiminez, 254 So. 3d 1053, 1055 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted); see also Corripio v. Commodore Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 415 So. 3d 337, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). And usually, “[o]rders disposing of motions for rehearing or motions that suspend rendition are not reviewable separately from a review of the final order.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(4).

The Final Order here constitutes a final order ripe for appellate review. This is a single breach of contract action where the trial court found an unenforceable contract and granted summary judgment for Citizens. By dispensing with the single claim here, the trial court resolved all the merits in this case and judicial labor ended. Salgado, 254 So. 3d at 1055 n.4.

It is correct that A-Team is technically appealing a non-final, non-appealable order by designating the Rehearing Order as the challenged order in the Notice of Appeal, rather than the Final Order. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(4). But we do not dispense with the right to appeal so easily. See § 924.05, Fla. Stat. (2025) (”Direct appeals provided for in this chapter are a matter of right.”). Indeed, our Court has maintained that in instances where a notice of appeal designates an order on rehearing of a final order as the order being appealed, we may treat the notice as if it is being directed to the original final order. See Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 417 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (en banc) (”[I]t has been repeatedly held on these very facts that a notice which improperly specifies a non-appealable order denying post-trial motions is to be treated as correctly directed to the reviewable final judgment.”); Salgado, 254 So. 3d at 1056 (”[I]rrespective of Salgado's erroneous characterization of the order appealed, we properly treated Salgado's notice of appeal—purporting to appeal the [order denying rehearing]—as appealing ․ the final order to which Salgado's rehearing motion was directed. This Court therefore has jurisdiction to review this matter.”).

In Puga, this Court denied the appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where the appellant appealed the trial court's order denying the appellant's motion for a new trial and renewed motion for a directed verdict only. See 417 So. 2d at 678-79. As the Court explained, “in accordance with the welcome policy that appellate like other judicial proceedings should be determined on their merits, instead of upon irrelevant technicalities, our supreme court has determined—by both its decisions and its enactment of the governing rules of appellate procedure—that non-jurisdictional and nonprejudicial defects in the notice or other steps in the appellate process are not grounds for dismissal.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Davis v. Tookes, 388 So. 3d 155, 157 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). And our Court has continued to hold that identifying a rehearing order as the only order to be reviewed is not a jurisdictional defect warranting dismissal. Salgado, 254 So. 3d at 1056 n.6 (citing Tunstall v. Folsom, 616 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“We also find that appellant's mistake in identifying the order on rehearing, rather than the [final] order of September 2, as the order to be reviewed, is not a jurisdictional defect.”)).

So “[i]f the notice of appeal gives sufficient information from which it can be determined, with a reasonable degree of certainty, which order is being appealed, technical defects in the notice that neither affect jurisdiction nor mislead or prejudice the appellee do not require dismissal.” Tunstall, 616 So. 2d at 1124; Daake v. Decks N Such Marine, Inc., 296 So. 3d 563, 564 n.* (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

Here, A-Team wishes to challenge the Final Order, which the Rehearing Order is directly related to through its expansion of the court's rationale for granting Citizens’ motion for summary judgment in the Final Order. Further, there is nothing in the record showing that granting review would prejudice Citizens. Accordingly, we hold we have jurisdiction and allow A-Team the opportunity to contest both the Final Order and, by extension, the Rehearing Order. See Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice § 24:21 (2025 ed.) (”[A]n order on a motion for rehearing is not appealable, but a party who is aggrieved by the order may challenge it nonetheless in an appeal from the judgment that was the subject of the motion.”).

The only question remaining is whether the notice of appeal is timely. “It is well-established that a notice of appeal must be timely filed with the appropriate court for jurisdiction to be conferred upon an appellate tribunal.” Capone v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 116 So. 3d 363, 369 (Fla. 2013); see also Parkhomchuck v. AIY, Inc., 338 So. 3d 397, 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). And “[j]urisdiction of the court under subdivisions a(3)-(a)(5) ․ shall be invoked by filing a notice with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b).

But under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h)(1)(B), motions for rehearing toll rendition of the final order to the date the trial court disposes of that motion. Nine days after the Final Order, A-Team timely moved for rehearing. When the trial court entered the Rehearing Order, A-Team filed its notice of appeal less than thirty days after the Rehearing Order was released. The notice of appeal is timely because the rendition of the Final Order tolled and occurred on the date the trial court issued its Rehearing Order, which prompted A-Team to timely file its notice of appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B).¹

Accordingly, we find that A-Team has properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction. We hereby order the Clerk of this Court to issue a standard briefing schedule.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In sum, even though the Rehearing Order is not independently reviewable, parties should, and are required to, include these post-judgment orders with the final order in the notice of appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(d) (“[A] conformed copy of the order or orders designated in the notice of appeal shall be attached to the notice together with any order entered on a timely motion postponing rendition of the order or orders appealed.”) (emphasis added). Doing so shows this Court that rendition of the final order has tolled and that we should evaluate a notice of appeal's timeliness based on the date the relevant post-judgment order is issued.

LINDSEY, J.