MORGAN v. STATE (2025)

Affirmed. See Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 2006) (“Strickland requires defendants to show ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ․ [A] ‘reasonable probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984))); see also Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 996 (Fla. 2009) (“The Court need not reach both Strickland prongs in every case. ‘[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.’ ” (quoting Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 803 (Fla. 2007))); State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 211 (Fla. 2008) (“Larzelere has not shown counsel to be ineffective for not calling a concrete expert because she had not demonstrated what an individual qualified as a concrete expert would have testified to in this case or how such testimony would cast doubt on her guilt.”); Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 863 (Fla. 2007) (“Relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be based on more than speculation and conjecture.”).

PER CURIAM.