JOSEPH v. STATE (2025)

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

Jeff Joseph appeals ¹ from an order summarily denying his timely motion for correction of jail credit, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801(a).² The trial court failed to attach any portion of the trial court files or records to its order.

In response to Joseph's initial brief, the State properly concedes that there is nothing in this record to conclusively refute Defendant's claim of entitlement to additional jail credit,³ and in the absence of same, we are compelled to reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Upon remand, if the trial court finds the motion is timely and facially sufficient, and that Defendant is entitled to relief, it shall grant the motion. If it finds the motion is timely but facially insufficient, it shall identify the defects and provide Defendant an opportunity to amend. If the court finds the motion should be summarily denied, it shall attach to the order those portions of the files and records that conclusively show Defendant is entitled to no relief, as required by Rule 3.801(e) (incorporating provisions of Rule 3.850 (e), (f), (j), (k), and (n)). See Williams v. State, 233 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Barrios v. State, 225 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Joseph sought review by filing both a notice of appeal (3D24-2226) and a petition for writ of habeas corpus (3D24-2332). We dismiss the petition because it is duplicative and is not a proper method for seeking review of an order denying a motion to correct jail credit filed pursuant to rule 3.801. See generally Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004). Although Baker was decided before the 2013 adoption of rule 3.801, this rule falls within the scope of Baker’s holding that habeas corpus is generally not authorized for review of orders denying such a claim.

2.   Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(a) provides: “A court may correct a final sentence that fails to allow a defendant credit for all of the time he or she spent in the county jail before sentencing as provided in section 921.161, Florida Statutes.”

3.   The State's appendix contained the sentencing document, in which the trial court directs that Defendant shall receive “Credit Time Served From 5/26/2024 Per Court.” While the State suggests this may indicate Defendant agreed to waive any jail credit other than time spent in jail following his most recent arrest on an alleged violation of probation, it is by itself insufficient to conclusively show that Defendant is entitled to no relief on his motion. See Velasquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 979, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Although the trial court attached the plea agreement, which specifically called for appellant to receive 100 days of credit (which the appellant was awarded), a written notation in the plea agreement as to the amount of credit a defendant will receive is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant ‘knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled.’ ”) (quoting Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(e) (expressly incorporating rule 3.850(f)(5)’s requirement that “[i]f the denial is based on the records in the case, a copy of that portion of the files and records that conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief shall be attached to the final order.”)

EMAS, J.