GRIGSBY v. GRIGSBY (2024)

Appellant appeals an Ex Parte Order for Return of Child to Florida in which the trial court ordered him to immediately return the parties’ child to Florida after he relocated with the child to Georgia. As Appellant contends, section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, which addresses parental relocation with a child, does not apply to this case given that he relocated with the child prior to the institution of any dissolution proceeding. See Rolison v. Rolison, 144 So. 3d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[T]he plain language of the relocation statute applies only where a parent's principal place of residence changes ‘at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing’ ․ or ‘at the time of filing the pending action.’ § 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. The Mother's location was already in Georgia when the Father filed the pending action; as such, in accordance with section 61.13001, she did not have to seek permission from the Father or the court to move there.”). As such, the trial court erred in ordering the return of the child and in entering a temporary custody order without holding a hearing and making any finding about the child's best interests. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 331 So. 3d 832, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (explaining that a trial court must conduct a hearing and make the requisite findings before making a temporary custody determination); Williams v. Williams, 845 So. 2d 246, 249 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“We recognize that a hearing on temporary custody may be more abbreviated than a hearing on permanent custody. Nevertheless, the trial court must receive evidence sufficient to assure the best interests of the child on a temporary basis.”).

Accordingly, we Reverse the ex parte order and Remand for further proceedings.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Roberts, and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.