DAVIS v. STATE (2024)

Affirmed. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12–13, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The rationale for permitting brief, warrantless seizures is, after all, that it is impractical to demand strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment's ordinary probable-cause requirement in the face of ongoing or imminent criminal activity demanding ‘swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat.’ ” (citation omitted)); Enich v. State, 838 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“A pat-down for weapons is justified when a police officer, in light of his experience, has a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is armed and dangerous.”); Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)) (explaining that the reasonableness of an officer's belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous must be determined by the totality of the circumstances); Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (“[A] police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). In order not to violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop. Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).”); see also Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002) (“[A] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling.”).

PER CURIAM.