CHEATHAM v. STATE (2024)

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Before us is pro se Appellant Charles I. Cheatham's Motion for Rehearing. We grant rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion issued on August 30, 2023, and substitute the following in its stead.

Cheatham appeals from the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In 1992, Cheatham was charged with multiple crimes. He was ultimately convicted of (1) first-degree murder with a firearm, (2) burglary of an occupied conveyance with a firearm and with an assault, and (3) robbery with a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender for armed burglary and armed robbery. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See Cheatham v. State, 659 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

In October 2004, Cheatham filed a pro se motion to correct illegal sentence arguing that his armed burglary and armed robbery convictions were life felonies and therefore not subject to enhanced punishment under the habitual violent felony offender statute. See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1992) (“Both the plain language and the history of the relevant statutes lead us to hold that one convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under section 775.084.”).¹ The lower court denied Cheatham's motion, and this Court affirmed. See Cheatum v. State, 907 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

In March 2023, Cheatham filed the underlying motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a). Cheatham again challenged his habitual violent felony offender designation, but this time only for armed burglary. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Cheatham appealed, and this Court affirmed.

Cheatham then sought rehearing, arguing that the trial court failed to attach portions of the record that conclusively refute his claim. In response, the State agreed that the order did not attach the Judgment, the written sentence, and the jury's verdict forms. Accordingly, this Court relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to attach the portions of the record that conclusively show that Cheatham is not entitled to relief.

Based on the record attachments now before us, we agree with the State's commendable concession that Cheatham's argument with respect to habitualization for the armed burglary is correct.

Cheatham was charged by indictment with burglary while armed with a firearm and/or while committing the offense made an assault or battery upon the victim “in violation of s. 810.02 and s. 775.087,” Florida Statutes (1991). Pursuant to 810.02(2) burglary is a first-degree felony “if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender: (a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person.” or “(b) Is armed, or arms himself within such structure or conveyance with ․ a dangerous weapon.” However, if the jury makes specific findings that a defendant is guilty of burglary both with an assault or battery and with a firearm, the offense is reclassified to a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a).² See Weford v. State, 784 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Here, consistent with the charging document and section 775.087, the jury was instructed that “the crime of burglary is greater if the burglary was committed under certain aggravating circumstances. Therefore, if you find the defendant guilty of burglary, you must then consider whether the State has further proved ․ burglary during which an assault was committed” and/or “burglary while armed.” According to the verdict, the jury found Cheatham guilty of a burglary both “with a firearm” and “during which an assault was committed.” Therefore, the Judgment reflects that Cheatham was sentenced to burglary of an occupied conveyance with a firearm and with an assault pursuant to sections 810.02 and 775.087.

Although Cheatham's argument with respect to habitualization for armed burglary is correct, he is not entitled to relief absent a showing of manifest injustice. This is because both the lower court and this Court already rejected an identical claim in 2005. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003) (“[The law of the case] doctrine requires that ‘questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.’ ” (quoting Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001))).

The law of the case doctrine applies here unless its application would result in a manifest injustice. See id. at 291-92; see also Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965) (“We think it should be made clear, however, that an appellate court should reconsider a point of law previously decided on a former appeal only as a matter of grace, and not as a matter of right; and that an exception to the general rule binding the parties to ‘the law of the case’ at the retrial and at all subsequent proceedings should not be made except in unusual circumstances and for the most cogent reasons—and always, of course, only where ‘manifest injustice’ will result from a strict and rigid adherence to the rule.”).

We are bound by the law of the case doctrine because Cheatham's sentences of life in prison, with parole eligibility after 25 years for first-degree murder, and life in prison, with no possibility of release for armed robbery, both equal or exceed the sentence for the armed burglary. In light of these sentences, no manifest injustice has occurred. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 2003) (“[Defendant] was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent thirty-year terms of imprisonment on each of three felonies. Only the habitual offender sentence for the life felony of attempted first-degree murder, however, is illegal. In light of the concurrent sentences of the same length [defendant] is serving as a habitual offender, applying collateral estoppel to his successive motion will not result in a manifest injustice.”); see also Johnson v. State, 311 So. 3d 203, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Here, Appellant is serving an identical, lawful, concurrent sentence for count III. Accordingly, under McBride, application of collateral estoppel to Appellant's successive, identical claim does not result in a manifest injustice.”).

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cheatham's crimes were committed in August 1992. Section 775.084 was later amended, superseding the holding in Lamont for crimes committed after October 1, 1995. See Flanders v. State, 217 So. 3d 160, 162 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“The Legislature amended section 775.084 to include life felonies effective for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1995.”); see also Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“We note also that, effective October 1, 1995, the legislature has overruled Lamont by providing that life felonies are subject to habitual offender sentencing.”).

2.   Under section 775.087(1)(a), a first-degree felony is reclassified to a life felony when a firearm is not an essential element of the offense. When a jury finds that the defendant committed burglary with an assault, that establishes the first-degree felony, for which a weapon/firearm is not an essential element. The additional finding of a firearm permits the reclassification from a first-degree felony to a life felony.

LINDSEY, J.