GONZALEZ v. DABBAH (2024)

Dismissed without prejudice. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) (“It is well settled that to obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist: (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.”) (quotation omitted); Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132-33 (Fla. 2011) (noting: “The last two elements are jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the court may even consider the first element.”); see also Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, Inc., 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012) (“In other words, before certiorari can be used to review non-final orders, the appellate court must focus on the threshold jurisdictional question: whether there is a material injury that cannot be corrected on appeal, otherwise termed as irreparable harm.”). Compare Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So. 2d 694, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (noting: “Ordinarily, trial court orders refusing to compel discovery are not reviewed by certiorari because it is believed any harm caused by the denial can be adequately remedied on appeal from the final order”, but that “[t]he failure to permit a deposition, or allow a party to answer questions during a deposition, has been held to be subject to certiorari relief.”) (citing Medero v. Florida Power and Light Co., 658 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) and Sabol v. Bennett, 672 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)).

PER CURIAM.