HARPER v. CITY OF KEY COLONY BEACH (2024)

Denied. See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995) (“As a case travels up the judicial ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader.”); Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Saxlehner, 96 So. 3d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Because this case involves second-tier certiorari, our scope and standard of review is quite limited. ․ A district court of appeal may not utilize second-tier review to correct simple legal error. To permit such a broad scope of review would, in essence, permit a second appeal, nullifying the narrowing scope of review described in Haines.”) (citation omitted). See also Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (“[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.”) (quoting Haines, 658 So. 2d at 530); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CEDA Health of Hialeah, LLC, 300 So. 3d 748, 750-51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Our analysis is limited ‘by the narrow scope of second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court acting in its appellate capacity.’ ”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CC Chiropractic, LLC, 245 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)).

PER CURIAM.