L.C., Father of J.C.C.O., a child, Appellant, v. E.O., Mother of J.C.C.O., a child, Appellee. (2023)

AFFIRMED. See C.D. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 164 So. 3d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that “[i]n termination of parental rights (TPR) cases, the standard of review is highly deferential” and that “[w]here the trial court's findings that the evidence is clear and convincing are supported by competent substantial evidence, and the appellate court cannot say that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing, the finding will not be set aside on appellate review” (citation omitted)), disapproved on other grounds by S.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 772–73 (Fla. 2016); V.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 322 So. 3d 1153, 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“It was the trial court's role to decide the credibility of the mother's testimony and the reliability of the [witness's] opinion.” (citing Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 560 (Fla. 2010))); Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 508 (Fla. 2005) (“It is not this Court's function to retry a case or reweigh conflicting evidence submitted to the trier of fact.” (citing Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 451 (Fla. 2002))), abrogated in part on other grounds by Alahad v. State, 362 So. 3d 190, 198 (Fla. 2023); In Int. of X.W., 255 So. 3d 882, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (recognizing that “a case plan with a goal of reunification is not required where, under section 39.806(1)(m)[, Florida Statutes], a child has been conceived as the result of an unlawful sexual battery” (citing D.A.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 903 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))); § 39.806(1)(m), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“It is presumed that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child if the child was conceived as a result of the unlawful sexual battery.”).

PER CURIAM.

WALLIS, LAMBERT, and SOUD, JJ., concur.