PARSON v. STATE (2023)

In 2016, Michael Parson entered into a plea agreement with the State. Under that agreement, Parson was to plead no contest, the trial court would withhold an adjudication of guilt, and Parson would accept 120 months of sex-offender probation. The State also agreed to an early termination of the probation after five years. The trial court announced that it would “follow the negotiated disposition in this case” and imposed the agreed-upon probation.

Six years later, Parson requested, pro se, that the trial court terminate his probation pursuant to the plea agreement. The State responded by acknowledging that it had previously agreed not to oppose early termination if Parson's request were to come after his completion of half his probationary term without any violations, and it noted that these conditions were satisfied. The trial court nevertheless denied the request in an unelaborated order. Through counsel, Parson next made a formal motion to enforce the plea agreement and terminate the probation early. Counsel pointed to confirmation from the probation officer that Parson had completed all the special conditions of probation (including sex-offender treatment) and satisfied all his financial obligations. Once again, the trial court denied the request with an unelaborated order.

Parson now comes to this court seeking certiorari review of that order. He contends that the trial court had the authority to grant early termination and that the court was bound by the terms of the plea agreement to grant the termination because Parson had done what was expected of him. The Florida Constitution gives this court the authority to award relief in certiorari where there has been a departure from the essential requirements of law in a judicial proceeding and the departure has caused harm that cannot be remedied on some later-available direct appeal. See Kauffman v. King, 89 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1956) (“It is only in exceptional cases, such as those where the lower court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the interlocutory order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be inadequate, that this court will exercise its discretionary power to issue the writ.”); cf. Broward County v. G.B.V. Int'l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001) (“The writ functions as a safety net and gives the upper court the prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other remedy exists.”); M.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 138 (Fla. 2016) (“This discretionary common law writ is not intended to redress mere legal error, but rather to fill the gaps between direct appeal and other prerogative writs.”).

From what we can tell, the trial court here denied both requests for early termination without a hearing, so we have no transcript to consider. And as we already noted, there is no reasoning for the denials provided in the trial court's orders. To aid in our consideration of whether to exercise our jurisdiction to grant certiorari relief, on our own motion, we exercise our authority under the Florida Constitution to issue an interim writ of mandamus to the trial court. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (“A district court of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and other writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied)). Under that writ, the trial court shall issue an amended order denying Parson's motion for early termination of probation, which must include the court's reasoning for its denial of the motion. We trust that the trial court will act promptly in response to this writ, so we will not set a deadline for compliance.

Writ of Mandamus Issued.

Tanenbaum, J.

Bilbrey and Winokur, JJ., concur.